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ABSTRACT
ANDREW BESMER. Configuration of application permissions with contextual
access control. (Under the direction of DR. HEATHER RICHTER LIPFORD)
Users are burdened with the task of configuring access control policies on many dif-
ferent application platforms used by mobile devices and social network sites. Many
of these platforms employ access control mechanisms to configure application per-
missions before the application is first used and provide an all or nothing decision
for the user. When application platforms provide fine grained control over decision
making, many users exhibit behavior that indicates they desire more control over
their application permissions. However, users who desire control over application
permissions still struggle to properly configure them because they lack the context
in which to make better decisions. In this dissertation, I attempt to address these
problems by exploring decision making during the context of using mobile and social
network applications. I hypothesize that users are able to better configure access
control permissions as they interact with applications by supplying more contextual
information than is available when the application is being installed. I also explore
how logged access data generated by the application platform can provide users with
more understanding of when their data is accessed. Finally, I examine the effects that
this contextually improved application platform has on user decision making.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
People use a variety of applications on different platforms everyday for entertain-
ment and socializing. On social network sites, users can add 3rd party applications
to enhance their profiles, interact with friends, play games, share photos, and even
read their news feed. Similarly, we see the same kind of 3rd party applications on
mobile device application platforms like Android and iOS (Apple’s iPhone OS).
Everyday, people increasingly install and use these applications. Facebook’s appli-
cation platform reports that users install applications more than 20 million times a
day [21]. On Android’s application platform, it is estimated that each Android user
will download 9 applications a month and use applications on their devices at least
79 minutes a day [1]. These numbers continue to grow as smartphone usage becomes
more popular and ubiquitous.
In order to provide services and functionality to users, 3rd party applications con-
sume user data and/or device resources. On social network sites, 3rd party applica-
tions consume user profile data such as: a user’s name, list of friends, interests, etc.
In exchange for trading user data, the application may provide social enhancements
like a list of friends with similar interests to the users. Mobile application platforms
operate similarly and require both user data and access to phone features. For exam-
ple, a photo tagging application might require access to the device camera, network
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connectivity, GPS location information, and user contact data.
There are good reasons to allow applications to consume profile data and resources,
such as sending and receiving SMS messages. For example, there are several appli-
cations in the marketplace that replace the default SMS messaging application. This
is the value of the Android ecosystem, if the default application is not sufficient for
your needs, you can build or find a new one. The same is true of almost all parts of
Android up to and including the home screens of the mobile phone.
Users are empowered to decide which applications they install, be it on their social
network profiles or mobile devices, and therefore which applications have access to
their data and resources. Yet, despite this level of provided control, we see numerous
problems occurring. For example, users suffer from unintended disclosure of personal
information to pay-per-text services that can cost users money. In December 2011, a
set of malicious Android applications had to be removed from user phones because
they sent and received unexpected SMS messages on behalf of the user [11].
Thus, as a result of 3rd party application usage, user data and resources are at a
potential risk of unintended exposure. For example, BBC News developed an appli-
cation that had the ability to harvest large amounts of user profile data in just three
hours [4]. In March 2011, 21 malicious applications were pulled from the Android
Market. These applications, which required user consent to install, harvested per-
sonal mobile phone data as well as identifying device information. It was estimated
to have affected 50,000 devices before being removed from the market.
Fortunately, users are in control of the applications they install and use. Before
using the applications for the first time, users are asked to configure appropriate
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permissions and select what data and resources can be accessed. The method of
configuration varies across different platforms, but all platforms share the common
purpose of using user data to enhance functionality. The majority of access permis-
sions are readily understood by users. For example, mobile phone users understand
that an application may need access to contacts, the network, the phone vibrator, or
a list of family members to provide the advertised features.
However, when users are asked to consider the permissions the application is re-
questing, they are forced to do so out of context. That is to say that users are aware
of the type of application, the name of the application, the vendor name, a brief
description with a picture, and the list of permissions. These are the only pieces of
information available to the user aside from their own previous knowledge or assump-
tions about what the application actually does. Users can become habituated to the
screen [18, 60], too committed to the primary task of installing the application to be
interrupted [44, 28], or left to reason with the incomplete information provided [5]
to make good decisions.
A survey of nearly 1,000 Android applications shows that almost all applications
request half of the permissions Google has categorized as dangerous on the device
[25]. Additionally, developers include many permissions they do not even access with
their applications. More than 10% of the applications surveyed showed that they
requested permissions they did not use and some even requested permissions that
effectively could not be granted [25]! Users accept these permissions because they
have become habituated to the installation screen, which could result in privacy vio-
lations. Similarly, they put other people’s information at risk because their devices or
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applications may contain personal information about their friends and acquaintances.
For example, pictures and telephone numbers of other people are commonly stored on
friends’ phones and can be at risk of unintended disclosure to installed applications.
This Android “permission creep” is a good example of how even developers can be
confused about what permissions are and are not required for their applications to
implement all of the desired features. Researchers in the area of mobile security are
trying to reduce this “permission creep” by providing developers with additional tools
to assess their permission needs [62].
It appears that users do care about their privacy and the privacy of others. The
Facebook developers documentation on authentication states [23]:
“There is a strong inverse correlation between the number of permissions
your app requests and the number of users that will allow those permis-
sions. The greater the number of permissions you ask for, the lower the
number of users that will grant them; so we recommend that you only
request the permissions you absolutely need for your app.”
In Section 4.1.4, I present findings that suggest users are unwilling to take the time
to configure policies. However, like Facebook, I also see motivated users who do
take time to configure security settings. Unfortunately, even when these users are
presented with security choices outside of the sharing context, they may not make
well-informed decisions.
When users are left to authorize permissions out of context it is a source of frus-
tration to them. In some cases, the application is denied installation or upgrading
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and is even subject to removal when users are made aware by others. Even well
established companies are not immune to this frustration and its repercussions. For
example, a very popular online music service, Pandora, provides an application to
the Android marketplace enabling users to listen to music on their phones. However,
this application requests access to the users’ contacts and the ability to create and
modify calendar events for the user. The reviews for the Pandora application are
littered with examples of users removing the application, calling it malicious, refus-
ing to update to the version with the permission, and switching to competing online
radio applications. I even found one review where the user recommended others use
AppShield, an application on the market, to repackage the application removing the
undesired permissions.
Pandora has good reason to request the permissions and includes an explanation
on their website. In order to share a station with friends they ask you to select a
contact to send it to. Similarly if you heard an ad for an event and want to attend,
they allow you to initiate a new calendar entry. Yet this also happens to be out of
context for users performing installation, and apparently misunderstood by many.
I believe that when users are asked to make these decisions in context with more
relevant information available, they will be able to make informed decisions that more
accurately reflect their desired disclosure preferences. Therefore, I explore methods
for providing control over sharing data in context, and the design implications as well
as potential impacts.
6
1.1 Dissertation Statement
User configuration of application permissions is currently failing because
users lack the context in which to make decisions. By presenting access
control decisions in a contextual way and providing users with concrete
information about data access, users are able to make more informed de-
cisions about access to their data without unreasonable user burden.
1.2 Contributions
In this dissertation I make several contributions to existing research.
• I improve the understanding of how users currently use application platforms
• I illustrate why poor mental models developed for social network sites
• I formalize an existing access control model and improve on it formalizing those
changes
• I test those changes and show how when given a context users attempt to make
decisions appropriate for that context
• I show why poor mental models lead to undesirable policy configurations
• I increase context by pushing access control decisions into runtime
• I show how runtime contextual access control benefits memorability
• I further improve runtime contextual access control and evaluate decision mak-
ing that occurs with it
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• I examine strengths and weakness of runtime contextual access control and
highlight paradoxes that occur
• I test a large set of techniques for notifying users about information flows within
the sharing context
My overall hypothesis is that providing contextual configuration methods to users
can be an effective way to ease the burden of configuration that users encounter.
Additionally, providing users with acceptable notifications can improve their under-
standing of data usage to enable this decision making. By improving the user’s ability
to configure and understand data access, users are able to take better control of their
data on mobile and social network application platforms. This helps to reduce inad-
vertent user disclosure of personal information. It also ensures that application use
better matches the user’s desired policy.
Existing research shows promise in using context to improve user understanding of
information access. This dissertation expands this research through a comprehensive
analysis of methods for displaying contextual information. This research provides
an understanding of effective ways to both prompt users and inform them when
information is accessed.
1.3 Organization
This dissertation is divided into several chapters each containing a contributing
body of work. Each chapter examines different aspects of users’ interactions with
applications and application platforms. In Chapter 2, I present background and
related research to usable privacy and security and contextual information. In the
8
remaining chapters, I present research in the areas of user understanding, contextual
configuration and information flow.
In Chapter 3, I examine how users use and perceive application platforms with
a qualitative study assessing how people use Facebook’s application platform. By
understanding how and why users interact with applications on the platform, I learn
how users are making decisions about which applications are granted access to their
profile data. Additionally, I gain insight into issues users have while making access
control decisions with Facebook applications.
In Chapter 4, I begin to explore the contextual configuration of application per-
missions by examining it at install time. I contribute findings on how users react to
such a system and the different types of policies they configure. In Chapter 5, I push
access control decisions into runtime to facilitate giving users additional context. This
chapter is split into two major sections. In Section 5.1, I begin by examining runtime
contextual configuration on mobile devices using the Android operating system. I also
compare the memorability of requested permissions between install time and runtime
contextual access control. In Section 5.2, I examine runtime contextual access con-
trol on the social network site Facebook. I examine decision making, strengths, and
weakness in greater detail.
In Chapter 6, I examine user understanding of information access and test the
boundaries of acceptability for different modes of notifications. Providing configu-
ration in context at runtime requires additional notifications to user. I therefore,
compare several different methods for informing users of information access and ex-
amine the strengths and weaknesses of notification styles that can inform the design
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of configuration systems. Finally, I explore the limits of user acceptability by deter-
mining the frequency of notifications that result in users no longer tolerating that
style of notification. Finally in Chapter 7 I bring all the studies together to discuss
the implications of the work I performed as part of this dissertation. I highlight
important findings, considerations, and future directions for the research in this area.
In the next chapter, I examine the background work associated with the study of
privacy, access control, and information flow in these domains.
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
The management of 3rd party applications presents both security and privacy prob-
lems. In this section, I discuss the background research related to these fields.
2.1 Security and Access Control
Information security is defined by three principles: integrity, confidentiality and
availability. Each has an important role in maintaining the security of data. The
first of the three, integrity, is charged with preventing data from being modified or
destroyed. The second, confidentiality, seeks to allow access to information only if
it is authorized. Finally, availability aims to provide access to the data in a timely
manner [39].
In a networked world, users rely on information security to protect their privacy
via confidentiality and protect their identity via integrity. Information security mech-
anisms are put in place to achieve these goals. These mechanisms—no matter how
sophisticated—should not violate the principle of availability. For example, consider a
social networking company that seeks to protect users’ private information by putting
a mechanism in place that ensures servers are always powered down. The company
can ensure that no profiles or sensitive information will be released and likewise, they
can claim that no one will be able to modify another user’s profile. Clearly, this so-
lution does not work and is not usable for a system designed for sharing information.
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A type of mechanism used to provide information security is access control. Access
control mechanisms provide authorization for subjects to take actions on certain ob-
jects. Subjects of an access control systems may include software, computers, users,
etc. Objects may include personal data or resources such as the camera or vibra-
tor on a mobile phone. Actions or permissions can include, but are not limited to,
reading, modifying or executing resources. To provide authorization, the access con-
trol mechanism identifies and authenticates subjects to use available resources. The
actual privilege model should follow the principle of least privilege—subjects should
only have access privileges to objects necessary to accomplish the assigned task [52].
Access control and information security are necessary to prevent the malicious
actions of subjects towards protected objects. Originally, the intention was to pre-
vent a user from inappropriately modifying another user’s objects. As early as 1971,
researchers recognized the capability system applications have to cause the same
malicious actions as humans and therefore also sought to protect objects from appli-
cations [35]. Today, applications are widely used and many access control systems
treat applications as subjects.
Access control mechanisms rely on being able to both identify and authenticate
subjects in order to provide the authorization previously described. Identification is
making a claim of who you are while authentication is proving that you are indeed
who you claim you are. For example, I can claim to be Douglas (“Dougie”) Powers
but when asked to produce a drivers license to authenticate this claim, I could not.
Authentication is typically based on something you know, something you have, or
something you are.
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A commonly used example of something you know are passwords. Passwords are
widely used to authenticate to computer operating systems, websites and even to
check voicemail. Something you have are often tokens such as a smart card, license
or credit card. Finally, something you are includes physical characteristics like a
fingerprint or voice pattern. Once the subject is identified and authenticated, that
subject can then be authorized to perform actions on certain objects. This forms the
basis of access control which provides both confidentiality and integrity of access to
available resources.
Access control models are generally grouped into one of two categories. They can
be discretionary or non-discretionary and sometimes a combination of both. Dis-
cretionary access control models allow the owner of an object to manage the access
permissions. Non-discretionary or mandatory access control has permissions assigned
by someone else other than the subject of the access control rule [53]. Subjects can
not change the permissions on objects in non-discretionary access control models.
Three of the most popular access control models are discretionary access control,
mandatory access control and role based access control. Role based access control
can be either mandatory or discretionary but differs by assigning subjects to defined
roles [53]. Roles are typically used to describe a subject’s function within an orga-
nization; for example, a computer staff person that designs and maintains databases
would be assigned the role of database administrator. The roles are then granted
access to resources required to perform their function. Thus, a person who has the
role of database administrator would be granted full control to the database server
and files. Any number of subjects who need to design or maintain the database can
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simply be assigned the database administrator role without the need to reproduce an
access policy for every subject.
In this dissertation, I explore access control on social networking sites and mobile
platforms from a human computer interaction perspective. In both cases, users of
these systems are generally considered to own the data or privileges (objects) and
configure them appropriately for applications (subjects). Thus, access control in
these domains is primarily discretionary access control. Some social network sites
use discretionary role based access control models by allowing subjects to form roles
and assign access permissions. In this dissertation, I do not cover identification and
authentication as they are beyond the scope of this work.
There is related research on access control for 3rd-party applications. For example,
Apex by Nauman, explored extending the Android permission model by allowing users
to enforce runtime constraints [41]. Apex allows users to have fine grained control
over permissions at install time that are enforced during runtime. For example, users
could choose not to allow an application to send SMS messages or they could choose to
restrict the application to send exactly 4 messages before denying access to the SMS
system. While the authors claim that their mechanism called Poly is user-centric,
they provide no usability evaluation of these claims.
Shehab, et al. describe an access control control system that allows generalization
of profile attributes to be shared with applications [55]. In their findings, they also do
not explore the usability of such a system. However, generalization does help to blur
the line between disclosure and non-disclosure by providing less detailed information.
As a result of providing a generic non-identifiable attribute, the decision to be more
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explicit can be put off until a more appropriate time.
In other work, Ongtang et al. present a fine grained system called SAINT [46],
which is primarily concerned with providing the ability to create fine grained ap-
plication to application policies. Another policy enforcement framework, CRePE,
supplemented the Android access control with additional context to provide the abil-
ity to be selective in certain contexts [13]. In this case, context could be determined
by factors such as light, location, time of day, etc. Both of these frameworks address
access control shortcomings but do not attempt to examine the human problem. My
work will attempt to inform the creation of these schemes with an understanding of
how humans interact and understand access control in these domains. In the next
section, I discuss both human computer interaction and usable security research that
focuses on the human related aspects of security.
2.2 Human Computer Interaction and Usable Security
Users are frequently required to configure access control settings for various com-
mon activities such as using mobile devices, surfing the web and interacting with
social network site profiles. Configuring access control can be time consuming and
difficult for people to understand. In many cases when an access control task is diffi-
cult or is excessively time consuming, users adopt a number of different strategies to
avoid properly configuring access control. Some of these strategies are: circumventing
security, delegating security decisions to others, and accepting defaults policies [17].
Security failures often occur when users are asked to perform difficult security tasks.
Research in the area of human computer interaction provides insight into reasons why
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users struggle when asked to perform security related tasks. For example, in a study
by Whitten and Tygar, users were asked to send a message using a secure email
system named Pretty Good Privacy (PGP 5.0). The study finds users ultimately
failed to properly configure additional security for emails within 90 minutes provided
to complete the tasks [63]. The biggest reason for task failure was user inability to
form correct mental models of how the security features worked. Whitten and Tygar
define several qualities needed for usable security software. Security software systems
should ensure users:
1. Are reliably made aware of the security tasks they need to perform.
2. Are able to figure out how to successfully perform those tasks.
3. Are not able to make dangerous errors.
4. Are sufficiently comfortable with the interface to continue using it.
In later chapters, I use these qualities to validate the improved usability from con-
textual access control. Whitten and Tygar also discuss some problematic properties
of security. For example, the unmotivated user property describes how users do not
primarily use systems to configure security, but configuring security is usually sec-
ondary to another task. This property has been observed in a number of studies
[17, 5]. Another property they describe is abstraction, where configuration interfaces
can abstract the lower level details of an access control mechanism. For example,
document sharing mechanisms allow a user to share a document with another user
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while abstracting the lower level details of generated access control lists that contain
rules that specify what subjects are allowed to access which resources.
Existing research demonstrates improvement in easing the configuration burden for
access control systems. For example, Expandable Grids built on the notion of how
access controls can be thought of in terms of Lampson’s Access Control Matrix [35,
50]. The Access Control Matrix lists subjects or roles on one axis and objects on
the other. The intersection of these two points contains the access that is granted
or denied for the subject on the corresponding object. Reeder’s Expandable Grids
use colors (red, yellow and green) at the grid intersection as a visual representation
of the access policy. Reeder found this method of configuration to be superior to
the existing configuration method offered by Windows XP [50]. Watson et al. also
applied their visualization to Facebook profile privacy settings [38] and found it to be
usable.
In other research, Lipford et al. investigate configuring access control to social
network site profiles by providing the user with on-screen controls that relate to
audiences. At the time, Facebook audiences were widely understood to be networks—
cities or school communities. When comparing an audience-centric configuration to
the existing Facebook mechanism, researchers noted an improvement in both accuracy
and confidence that the desired access control policy was correctly configured [37].
Felt and Evans find many users accept permissive sharing policies on the Facebook
application platform and suggest a novel method to protect user privacy when using
social network applications [24]. They posit a privacy-by-proxy design in which social
network applications use tags or markup to customize user experience. For example,
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in a privacy-by-proxy design, an application wishing to use the user’s name may
include markup like: <uval id=“[$id]” field=“name”/>which would be transformed
into something like “Andrew Besmer.” Markup is used by application developers
to reduce the user’s burden of policy configuration. Privacy-by-proxy removes the
need to prompt users at install time to configure application permissions because
the application is not able to access actual profile data. The obvious downside to
this approach is that it limits the functionality of the application. Applications that
require processing of actual user data would not be able to function using the privacy-
by-proxy design.
Work by Mazurek et al. explores a reactive access control mechanism. In a re-
active access control system, negotiation over file access which typically takes place
offline can be integrated into the mechanism itself [40]. In their study, they test a
simulated access control system for a week where participants are prompted to allow
or deny access to files requested by familiar associates. Initially, they feared that
users would not tolerate frequent prompts requesting permission configuration. Sur-
prisingly, they found the system to be quite practical and that users did not find the
prompts annoying.
Expandable grids, reactive access control, and audience view are all interfaces that
show how when users are provided more concrete and visual methods of configuration
they are more successful. Reactive access control shares similarities to contextual
access control proposed in this dissertation. Prompting and configuration are two
such similarities that may improve access control decisions with context. The findings
from the reactive access control research provide strong motivation to my work by
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proposing that additional promptings in exchange for more desirable policies may be
an acceptable and usable practice.
Current methods of policy configuration for applications can be grouped into two
categories: those that are configured at install time and those configured at runtime.
Install time policy configuration is shown to be problematic because users struggle
to understand the reason why an application might need access to the requested
attributes at the moment they choose to install the application [5]. As an example,
consider a book recommendation application on an Android-based mobile device. At
the moment the user installs the application, they are shown a set of permissions that
the application is requesting to be granted access to. The user is required to make the
access control decision based on knowing just a few details about the application, such
as the name and perceived benefits. Because so little is known about the application
and its permissions, there is no way for a user to appropriately weigh the risks and
benefits of the application’s requested configuration. Kelley et al. studied install
time decisions around permissions and found that many participants did not consider
permissions when downloading applications. Additionally, they concluded that it was
better make the information more clear and to present information when users were
making decisions [32].
Runtime access control configuration also has drawbacks. As previously mentioned,
policy configuration is rarely the user’s primary task [63] or the user may lack an
understanding of the privacy configuration request [27]. Additionally, research on
end user license agreements demonstrates there are issues of desensitization to policy
configuration screens during software installation [28]. In work by Egelman et al, they
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found that alerting users to policy misconfigurations was ineffective. They created a
prototype interface based on Venn Diagrams to help users in making policy decisions.
They found that participants were much more likely to over-share than under share
with their prototype interface [19].
This dissertation seeks to improve access control for social network applications
and mobile device platforms. To achieve this, I believe it is necessary to address
the human factor of the system. The research presented here provides evidence that
improvements can be made by addressing user concerns and designing systems that
ease user burden. However, current systems, with the exception of Mazurek et al.’s
reactive prototype, are examples of systems where access control configuration is
removed from the sharing context. Furthermore, many interfaces and access control
mechanisms that claim to be more user-centric have not actually been tested to
validate improved usability.
2.3 Privacy
Privacy is a motivating factor for improving usable configuration of 3rd party ap-
plications. The type of data consumed in these platforms is often sensitive in nature,
for example: photographs on a user’s phone or social network site, a list of friends
or contacts and even location and microphone data. Third party application access
to such sensitive information can form an environment where privacy breaches are
possible and in many cases likely to occur.
What privacy means can be defined and interpreted in different ways depending
on the context or research domain. Altman, a social scientist, defines privacy as
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a dialectic process of dynamic boundary management [2]. Individuals alter their
behavior to disclose or withhold information to manage their identity and allegiances
with others over time and through social interaction. Altman argues that we manage
these boundaries based on our expectations and interaction with others. Palen and
Dourish build on Altman’s work and create a model to illustrate the privacy tensions
that exist in the modern day and how technology changes this privacy theory [48].
They describe three boundaries that exist: the disclosure boundary, identity boundary
and temporal boundary.
The disclosure boundary is the tension between being private and public [48]. Ev-
eryday we come across many situations where we decide to withhold or disclose in-
formation. In online social network sites, users decide to intentionally share interests,
religions and sexual orientations to help illustrate and describe themselves to others
in their social network. Palen and Dourish also point out that disclosure is sometimes
necessary to gain more privacy. They use the example of a celebrity disclosing certain
pieces of information to become less accessible.
The identity boundary is the tension between self and other [48]. An example of
this tension that frequently arises is the conflict between a person’s opinions and that
of their employer. For this reason, many companies forbid using their email accounts
when publicly stating opinions. Similarly, we may act differently around different
groups of people. For example, we might disclose different types of information to
our doctor than we would to our car mechanic. We expect that our doctor would
protect confidential health information while we might not assume the same from a
car mechanic.
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Finally, the temporal boundary is a tension between past and future [48]. While it
may seem that a decision to share a piece of information is appropriate when we share
it, we do not know what effect that sharing decision might have in the future. The
problem is magnified with technology because archival of perfect quality is possible
for a potentially infinite amount of time. In addition, sources of information from the
past, previously thought to be unarchived, are brought into the present and begin
to make up our identity. Facebook’s recent introduction of timeline is an example of
this [65]. Wall posts between friends which have always been available on the user’s
wall suddenly became easily accessible. As a result users felt their privacy had been
breached. Palen and Dourish assert that managing this boundary is very much part
of the management of our privacy. These boundaries are useful for examining privacy
issues that occur in modern systems like online social networks. The boundaries are
also relevant to 3rd party applications, particularly with social applications. Social
applications not only share profile data from the user to application but also from
user to user through the application.
Contextual integrity is another method used to examine privacy with 3rd party
applications. Contextual integrity is useful for examining how certain types of in-
formation sharing can create privacy issues [42]. Contextual integrity includes the
concept that all information sharing has certain expectations and that these are di-
rectly related to the context of sharing. All types of sharing include these expectations
or norms. Nissenbaum asserts that there are two types of informational norms: norms
of appropriateness and norms of information flow [42].
Norms of appropriateness are governed by what is appropriate to be shared in a
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given context. For example, sharing personal information with friends is appropriate
while sharing the same information with co-workers might not be appropriate. The
second—norms of information flow or distribution—deals with how information moves
or changes hands beyond the initial disclosure. An example of this is if a friend
were to share personal information given in confidence with a stranger. The flow
of information from your friend to the stranger causes a privacy breach because it
was originally shared in a confidential context. Of course, over time we may find
that informational norms change and therefore using contextual integrity to identify
privacy problems could also change [42].
Lederer also notes that policies are highly influenced by the context and explains
that users are unable to anticipate privacy needs ahead of time [36]. To exemplify
this, a study by Rabkin examined bank challenge questions. Challenge questions are
typically used to recover a lost password. He illustrated how common information
disclosed within one context can become extremely problematic when the same infor-
mation is used in a different context. In his study, he found that a large number of
challenge questions for banks could be answered by using data gathered from a social
network site shared within the context of a group of friends [49].
Since applications consume this information, it is possible for third parties to an-
swer these questions in an automated fashion. It is clear that the informational norms
of distribution do not match user expectations and therefore violate contextual in-
tegrity. I believe contextual integrity is more useful for identifying problematic privacy
breaches with social applications and information flows. For example, users may not
realize the context of sharing or the types of information being shared. Therefore,
23
they may behave in ways that contradict their desires.
Stutzman reviewed privacy changes over time on the social network site Facebook.
He found that as time went on users became less willing to publicly disclose infor-
mation on the site. At the same time as users were willing to share less publicly
they interestingly began to share more privately [59]. Therefore, effective privacy
management tools may have the ability to actually increase social network site utility
not reduce it.
2.4 Information Flow
Lederer, et al. developed five pitfalls that ultimately cause privacy designs to
fail [36]:
1. Obscuring potential information flow.
2. Obscuring actual information flow.
3. Emphasizing configuration over action.
4. Lack course-grained control.
5. Inhibiting established practice.
The first two pitfalls describe usability problems pertaining to information flow.
As explained above, users must understand to whom their data is going and also
to whom it can go in the future to understand the context. The third pitfall states
that users should not be forced to do an excessive amount of configuration in order to
protect their privacy. Instead, privacy should be designed as an integrated part to the
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primary task. The fourth pitfall is the lack of a course-grained control. For example,
systems might include a feature to disable all GPS access on a device regardless of
applications that have been configured to allow access to the GPS [36].
Lederer’s pitfalls and Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity emphasize how important
user understanding of information flows is to protect privacy in online social interac-
tion. It is therefore necessary to find acceptable ways to present information about
how information is shared to users. One of the contributions of my dissertation is to
explore ways of notifying users and discover the frequency limit when they begin to
become excessively annoying to the user.
Previous research examines how information flow can be used to improve user
awareness and understanding. The hypothesis is that increased awareness of actual
and potential information flows can aid users in making better disclosure decisions
when sharing personal data. In work by Kowitz and Cranor, they experimented with
creating a peripheral display that projected words being transmitted over an insecure
wireless medium onto a wall [33]. While no significant changes were found in network
traffic or users’ perception of privacy, a qualitative analysis found that participants
changed their expectation of privacy after seeing the information. As a result, their
behavior may have changed to be more cautious of revealing sensitive information
over the unencrypted wireless medium. However, it appears that users may not
have learned that the medium was insecure, but instead feared the information being
displayed on the wall.
In a similar study investigating informed consent, Friedman et al. developed a
system, Mozilla Cookie Watcher, for making information flow—in this case cookies—
25
more visible [26]. Similar to Kowitz and Cranor they focused on a peripheral display
design to avoid disrupting the user’s primary task. Mozilla Cookie Watcher results
suggest that even though users did not self report an increased understanding, they
did actually gain an increased understanding of cookies. Another positive finding
is that more than half of the participants reported exploring the mechanism. Un-
fortunately, some of those that did not explore it still had an incorrect or limited
understanding of cookies.
Consolvo et al. created a WiFi Privacy Ticker similar to Kowitz and Cranor.
In contrast to Kowitz and Cranor’s implementation, Consolvo’s peripheral display
contains only information about the user and not all users of the WiFi network [12].
Additionally, instead of being publicly displayed, the ticker is visible only to the
user. The results suggests the WiFi Privacy Ticker increases people’s awareness of
the dangers of unencrypted WiFi use. Quite surprisingly, the system was well liked
and many participants asked to continue to use the software after the conclusion of
the study.
These studies illustrate two important findings. First, users desire a clearer visual
indication about their informational data flows. Secondly, when given better visual
indicators, awareness is increased and behavior changes to reflect improved awareness.
This work deals with information flow on non-mobile networks. Mobile information
flow is different for a variety of reasons. Mobile devices are smaller with less screen
space to use, data can move about the phone without actually leaving it, and these
devices are not constantly in use yet still able to transmit.
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Related research in mobile devices has taken steps to improve information flow
with the Android application platform. Enck, et al. built an information flow track-
ing system for the Android platform. By modifying the Android API, the researchers
taint the data and monitor the information flow within the device [20]. When data is
sent to certain “sinks”, such as the Internet or the device’s storage card, the action is
logged allowing for a complete track of the actual flows of data on the mobile device.
While Enck, et al. are not necessarily concerned with the usability of presenting the
information flow, they did provide a platform for researchers to build flow notification
systems. Enck provides a simple application that displays a notice for each informa-
tion flow event. Such a system is not practical because it generates an excessive
amount of notices that eventually will frustrate users and cause them to stop paying
attention. In work by Balebako et al, notifications and visualizations are used to try
to inform users of data flows occurring on mobile devices, particularly the Android
mobile phone. They find that users currently do not understand the data sharing
occurring on the devices and are largely unaware that it is even happening [3].
2.5 Warnings and Notifications
Systems present notifications to users that are either active or passive. A passive
notification includes notifications like the WiFi Privacy Ticker and WiFi wall. It can
be anything that does not force the user to make a decision or react to the notice,
such as the system simply changing the color of an indicator on the display. An active
notification, in contrast, forces a user to respond to the notification. A good example
of this is a popup notification that requires the user to click a button to continue
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using the system.
In a study about phishing indicators, Wu et al. test phishing indicators and note
that active notifications are far more effective than passive ones [64]. They note
that managing the passive security indicator is not the primary task of the user and
so it is easily missed. However, they support a previous suggestion by Don Norman
that warns that overusing active indicators can be detrimental and ineffective because
users eventually ignore and disable them [43]. Sunshine et al, examined SSL warnings
and found that they could improve the warnings. Unfortunately, even the improved
warnings still resulted in dangerous behavior and so they recommend preventing
a warning from being shown when possible [61]. They also point out that small
numbers of users may abandon the software being used for other software because of
the warnings. Bravo-Lillo et al. studied different types of warnings and found that
novice and advanced users considered risks at different times. They argue that to
improve warnings we as designers should look at all the parts of the warning process
and only produce them when necessary [9].
Egleman et al. expand this work with a study that compares the effectiveness of
active and passive notifications to prevent phishing [18]. Their study examines notifi-
cations within the context of a warning model—Communication-Human Information
Processing Model (C-HIP model). The C-HIP model attempts to describe the factors
contributing to the overall effectiveness of a warning [14]. The C-HIP model includes
variables such as behavior, motivation, attitudes, attention, stimuli, etc. making it
useful to evaluate warning failures. The model outlines all the steps involved with
users being presented with and responding to a warning. It helps to highlight the
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importance of noticing, understanding, and reacting to warnings. In related work,
Cranor develops a set of questions to examine steps in the C-HIP model [15] which
Egleman also uses to test the effectiveness of active and passive warning notifications.
Egleman’s analysis suggests that active warnings far outperform passive warnings to
prevent phishing attacks [18].
While it may seem that active indicators are more effective to warn users about in-
formation sharing, it should be noted that these studies are in the context of phishing
where the risk is high and immediate action is necessary to prevent the attack. It is
useful to understand how users react to increased habituation to active warnings and
when users are better protected by active warnings. However, information flow in ap-
plication platforms differs from general Internet use and passive warnings seem better
suited for these platforms based on research previously mentioned by Consolvo [12]
and Kowitz [33]. In Chapter 6, I test both active and passive notifications about in-
formation flow. My purpose is not to debate which warning method is generally more
effective, but to determine which method works better for contextual notifications on
application platforms.
CHAPTER 3: UNDERSTANDING THE USER
I begin by performing a qualitative semi-structured interview in order to better
understand users. I gain an insight into how users perceive application platforms
and the data sharing that occurs within application platforms. I will then be able to
inform the design of future prototypes to help address those perceptions and make
improvements in user policy configuration for application platforms.
3.1 Social Network Application Platform Usage
Online social network sites have hundreds of millions of users sharing a variety of
personal information. In order to expand functionality, many of the leading social
network sites have created a platform to allow 3rd party developers to create appli-
cations that utilize and enhance users’ profiles. These applications have been widely
successful, with very high adoption rates. Applications add value to the users of social
network sites by allowing them to add additional content to their profiles, participate
in games, share photos, and much more.
In order to provide engaging experiences, these platforms provide the ability for
applications to consume users’ profile data. This data commonly includes attributes
like name, birthday, interests, and more. Applications are also commonly allowed
to access this same information about friends of the user who have not yet directly
accessed the application. The result is that a large set of data is made available to
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3rd parties that might not necessarily need it. To demonstrate the risk to users, the
BBC News developed a malicious application that had the potential to harvest large
amounts of user profile data in just three hours [4].
To further complicate the matter, information on the user’s friends is given without
the adequate knowledge or consent of the user. For example, on Facebook a dialogue
such as Figure 1 is shown to users on the first access to the application. I do not
believe this message adequately conveys the data sharing that occurs. The message is
generic at best and likely ignored because the message dialog looks identical each time.
Previous research has shown that over 98% of users rarely read EULA’s [28]. While
this dialogue is much shorter, I think users are similarly going to become habituated
to the dialogue box and ignore or not understand the information in it, in order to
get to the primary task of accessing an application.
For example, consider Katie, a typical social network site user. Katie just signed
on and sees that her friend Jason sent her a bumper sticker for her profile. Katie is
interested in what the bumper sticker might be, so she clicks a button to see it. Since
Katie has never used the bumper sticker application before she is prompted to review
the agreement shown in Figure 1 and accept it. Katie quickly clicks the allow button
in order to view what Jason has sent. Most of her profile data, as well as much of her
friends’ profile data, is now available for the application to query and use.
Existing application platforms also provide little in the way of tools for limiting the
profile data that is given to applications. For example, in 2009 Facebook, one of the
most popular social network sites, took an all or nothing approach, where in order
to access an application the user often must consent to sharing most of her profile
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Figure 1: Adding an application (2009) - This screen warns users that they are
permitting the application to access most profile attributes. This image has been
modified with a fake application name.
data. This violates the well-known principle of least privilege [52]. A more recent
implementation I explore in Section 4.1 allows for some selective permission granting.
Some users might expect that not using or visiting the application would protect
themselves. Even this can violate expectations, as applications can request users’
information by utilizing a friend who did authorize the application. On several sites,
users are able to set a default policy on what information is accessible to applications
their friends have authorized. These policies are highly permissive by default to
encourage social use, and users may also not understand the purpose of these settings
or set them appropriately.
It is not hard to believe that privacy problems are occurring given users’ lack of
control over their information and their difficulty in understanding the implications of
application use. These motivations paved the way for researchers to begin examining
alternative access control tools that may help to reduce the risk in utilizing these
applications. Proposed solutions have ranged from models where no information
about a user is given [24] to sharing generalizations of the personal attributes [55],
to providing fine grained privacy settings [5]. While these solutions may address
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some of the problems, there has been no study of users’ motivations and perceptions
to inform these efforts. What is still lacking is not an articulation of what problems
are occurring, but an understanding of why. Understanding users’ behavior and
conceptions around social applications can help determine why users are struggling
and aid in the design of effective and usable tools. I later draw from this knowledge
to inform the design of access control prototypes for contextual access control.
Even digitally, people do not wish to share everything, with everyone [45]. As
mentioned previously, I believe that users do not understand the context they are in
on the application platform, and as such, cannot make privacy-appropriate decisions
about information they do wish to share. This makes boundary maintenance difficult
as users do not fully understand the scope of the information, actors involved or how
the boundaries could be violated.
It is currently unclear where the balance lies between privacy and social value
for these social applications. It is clear however, that little is known about why
users use applications and how they perceive them operating. This understanding
is crucial in order to suggest socially acceptable and understandable methods for
using applications while maintaining adequate and desired privacy. This chapter
examines how users are currently finding, adding, and removing applications as well
as what data they perceive is shared as a result of this use. Results indicate that the
social nature of these applications colors user perceptions, leading users to be very
unaware of what data applications can access. I then discuss potential implications
of these results and the impact on the creation of new privacy tools for social network
site platforms. I draw on these findings in later chapters to inform the design of
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mechanisms to aid users in making more informed decisions about data sharing on
application platforms.
3.1.1 Background
This study focused on Facebook, as it was and still is the most widely used and
oldest application platform. In 2009 when the study was conducted, Facebook re-
ported having 400 million active users with 50% of those users signing in any given
day. Today, Facebook claims 1.11 billion users are active on the site each month.
Facebook was the first major social network site to offer an application platform to
its users. When creating the API they also created a SQL-like querying language,
aptly named FQL, that allows applications to access the vast majority of a user’s pro-
file information, including a user’s name, birthday, education, work history, current
location, photos, and more.
The platform has been very successful; at the time of the study Facebook reported
that there were over 1 million developers who had created over 500,000 applica-
tions [22]. In addition to a large producing developer base there was also a very
high adoption rate. Every month 70% of Facebook’s users would use at least one
application [22]. In fact, many of the features Facebook provides such as the market-
place, photo sharing, and events were written as Facebook applications by Facebook
themselves.
Research on social network sites has shown that users tend to share a large amount
of personal information including contact information, associations, photographs, and
more [31, 58] which has motivated their friends to participate as well [30]. One study
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at Carnegie Mellon University found that over 70% of students disclosed their picture,
birthday, hometown, and high school information in their profiles [29]. Other research
has also examined how various profile information on these sites is used for managing
identity, communication, and strengthening relationships [8, 7]. Furthermore, because
of the ever increasing amount of personal information, users are putting themselves at
risk of identity theft, spear phishing, and stalking [56]. For example, in a 2008 study,
Rabkin showed that many challenge questions used to reset or remember passwords
can automatically be answered by using Facebook profile data [49].
Additional work has focused specifically on the application platforms I am dis-
cussing. Currently these applications are being given access to a large set of the
information on a user’s profile. In addition, applications are able to request similar
information on user’s friends. Yet a study by Felt et al of the top 150 Facebook
applications showed that most only needed access to the users’ name, list of friends,
and networks they belonged to [24]. This suggests that as many as 91% of appli-
cations that are currently available have access to data they do not need, violating
the principle of least privilege [24, 52]. This led Felt et al to propose a framework,
privacy by proxy, that severely restricts the information available, yet may also re-
strict value in social applications. Others have suggested generalization of personal
attributes in order to help users maintain privacy yet still be able to benefit from
sharing information [55].
Research regarding the social application platform has primarily been concerned
with the design of access control models. Yet while this work is trying to improve
privacy, few have examined why applications are used and what users actually think
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of them. This understanding is critical both to expand and enhance social applica-
tions as well as mitigate the risks currently associated with using them. This chapter
aims to show how users interact with applications and examine users’ comprehen-
sion of data sharing through the platform in order to inform the design of privacy
management tools for application platforms.
3.1.2 Study Methodology
A semi-structured interview as well as a survey was administered to examine key
points in an application’s life-cycle: its discovery by users, addition and use, as well
as possible subsequent removal. Users’ conceptions of what information is shared,
and with whom, and what they would be comfortable sharing with applications were
also examined.
In the summer of 2008, 15 students were recruited from the city of Charlotte and
from the University using paid advertising on Facebook and flyers to participate in
an hour long semi-structured interview. Inclusion criteria for the study included the
participant being 18 years of age or older, having an active Facebook account, and
having used at least one application other than photos, marketplace, or events within
the last three months. Interested participants were offered a small financial incentive
in exchange for their participation. An additional 11 participants were recruited to
take just the survey regarding data sharing with applications.
To conduct the interview, I sat down with participants in front of their Facebook
profiles and framed questions around each of the applications the participant had
authorized. I asked questions about how the participants found the application, why
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they decided to authorize it, and if they had removed any applications, examining
any factors that were important in making their decisions.
I asked participants if they had ever invited others to use the application, and why.
In addition, I asked what they like most/least about the application, and any concerns
they might have with it. I also asked participants to explain how applications fit into
their usage of the social network site as well as what they consider a good application
and a bad application. Since participants were asked to self report, they did not
always remember details for every application. When this occurred, I simply moved
on to the next application on their profiles.
After discussing all the applications, I administered a survey to participants to
gather information about their demographics such as age, sex, race, and education.
I used Westin’s privacy segmentation index [34] as part of the survey to identify
participants as privacy fundamentalists, pragmatists, or unconcerned. In addition, I
used a series of questions with Likert scales to gauge participants’ understanding of
which profile attributes were shared with applications. I tested their understanding for
applications their friends had authorized as well as applications they had authorized.
I included items that are not on Facebook profiles like social security number and
files to prevent participants from assuming the correct answer was everything and
ensure that participants were truly answering the questions and not simply checking
a column. This survey was administered after the bulk of the interview was completed
to prevent a bias towards a privacy-centered interview. I then finished with additional
interview questions regarding their conception of data sharing in applications. I later
invited an additional 11 participants to complete the survey.
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3.1.3 Results
I interviewed 15 participants with ages ranging from 18-25. Most participants were
male (9) and undergraduates in college (13). This is a limitation of this study and
future studies examining those who are outside of college would be necessary in order
to determine if these findings hold for all groups of people.
Participants had an average of 13 applications each (min = 3,max = 26), for
a total of 195 applications or cases. Participants were unable to recall any details
in 36 cases (cases = 18%, participants = 10). I did not include these applications
in the analysis. While this is by no means the majority of applications I was still
surprised by the number of applications that users could not remember any details
of. I suspect at least some of these included cases where the participants might have
been uncomfortable discussing the details of an application, such as an application
used specifically for dating.
I will present the results of the interview, followed by the survey results. I will
first discuss users’ motivations around finding, adding, and removing applications. I
also discuss users’ concerns with applications as well as perceptions of data that is
shared with applications. Finally, I discuss what information participants expressed
they would be comfortable in sharing.
3.1.3.1 Finding Applications
There were several ways in which applications could spread, including a directory,
friends inviting other friends, activity of others displayed in the user’s news feed, and
a box displaying the application on the user’s profile. For applications the participant
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remembered they could not remember the source 17% of the time. Most participants
found an application by being invited by a friend (cases = 39%, participants = 14).
These invites were broken down into two different categories: those that were based on
interaction, and those that were not. Invitations based on interaction inform the user
that a friend has shared information or performed some action for them. In order to
view the information, or return the interaction, the user must access the application.
For example, a bumper sticker application allows users to send interesting bumper
stickers to friends to be displayed on their profiles. The act of sending the bumper
sticker notifies the other user and serves as an invite for those who have not yet
authorized the application. As one participant stated:
P10:“I wanted to see what I had gotten and then I wanted to send them
something back.”
That user can then send bumper stickers to other users, further propagating the
application.
Other invitations are explicit messages, sent after a user is asked to choose a set
of friends to invite. Participants reported being forced into inviting in order to use
the application or get a result from it (cases = 6%, participants = 7). Participants
generally referred to this as spam, and many of them mentioned that they do not like
invitations as a result (participants = 9). Participants mentioned a specific reason
or objective for sending, despite seeing them as spam:
P15:“I invite the friends to add the application to earn extra points for
something and for each person you invite you get a certain amount of the
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thing. When you join you earn that extra certain amount too.”
Some participants stated that they would never invite or add an application that
required them to invite because of too many unwanted invitations from others. In
one case a participant expressed frustration with invitations:
P7:“I never do that because its annoying. Everyone does it to me and I’m
like ignore ignore ignore ignore so I don’t want to do that to other people.”
However, this participant later went on to tell me about applications where he had
sent things like bumper stickers or gifts to others. While this can also act as an
invitation, the perception is less negative and seen as sharing rather than inviting.
Another common way participants found applications was browsing the profiles of
their friends (cases = 29%, participants = 12). Participants did not indicate that
they were browsing the profiles for the purpose of finding applications. Instead, they
indicated that in the course of viewing the profiles of their friends they found an
application which was of interest to them. Participants mentioned several other ways
they found applications: newsfeed, advertisements, and off-line communication.
Interestingly, browsing for an application in the application directory was the least
cited method of finding applications for participants (cases = 1%, participants = 2).
Thus, the most commonly cited ways which participants found applications were
social in nature.
3.1.3.2 Adding Applications
Participants cited a variety of reasons for adding applications, such as to play
games or add interesting information to their profiles. A desire for additional inter-
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action with others was the most common reason for adding an application (cases =
25%, participants = 14). This interaction varied from viewing a picture made by a
friend to playing an online chess game with friends. In several cases this interaction
was a one time event in which a user sent a picture, opened a virtual gift, or viewed
another user’s interaction with an application. In many cases, participants mentioned
that interaction was based on the need to meet new people or strengthen ties with
existing social circles (cases = 11%, participants = 12).
P14:“I added that because I knew I was gonna be in college and I put my
courses on there so I could network with people that had my same classes.”
Thus, many applications are facilitating an interaction between two people, en-
hancing the social experience on the site. Participants reported liking the social
interaction created by applications (participants = 15). They frequently discussed
how they would compete, play, collaborate, or have contact with others through their
applications.
Although social interaction seems to drive much of application use, interest (cases =
22%, participants = 14) and entertainment (cases = 21%, participants = 10) were
also mentioned, frequently overlapping interaction with one another.
P9:“Cause I thought it would be cool to compare my best friends with it
and my friends that were with it... kind of like a six degrees of separation
thing almost.”
Applications revolving around interests commonly include categories like: sports,
horoscopes, TV shows, music, movies, and more. Entertainment generally referred
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to participants who mentioned adding the application to reduce boredom or fill time.
Interaction, entertainment, and users’ interests accounted for the majority of the
motivation behind application authorizations.
3.1.3.3 Application Removal
Many participants reported regularly going in to remove applications (participants =
6) every couple of months. Their reasons for removing applications during this time
included inactivity, cleaning up their profile, and an application that looked cluttered.
P14:“Whenever there is some applications that I feel are cluttering up my
Facebook profile I just delete them basically. Just for aesthetic reasons.”
Participants occasionally removed an individual application immediately after au-
thorizing it. These applications were removed for not meeting the user’s expectations,
taking up too much space or also having a cluttered look.
P12:“I just installed it, looked at it, realized I didn’t like it and deleted it.”
Several participants mentioned receiving unwanted messages due to an application,
which prompted removal. Participants also reported blocking applications, usually to
stop recurring invitations from other users. However, this was not the main purpose
of the blocking feature. The block feature was supposed to be used to prevent any
information about the user from being consumed by an application. There was a
separate button for blocking all invitations from an application. Participants did not
appear to understand the true purpose of the blocking feature, although its use did
have added benefits in that it prevented any further data sharing with the application.
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3.1.3.4 General Concerns
I asked participants what concerns they had with each application they had au-
thorized or removed, or concerns they might have in general. The concerns reported
included profile space, others’ perception, privacy, time investment, and inappropri-
ate content. Privacy is specifically discussed later, for now I will discuss the other
issues.
Participants reported profile space as the number one concern of having an applica-
tion (cases = 19%, participants = 10). They frequently questioned how much space
would be required in order to have an application as well as if that space would later
be recoverable.
P10:“Well I wanted to make sure it didn’t take up too much room like the
fun wall and it looked alright so I kept it and I liked it.”
Once deciding that they would authorize or keep an application, they would become
concerned about where to put the application on the profile. Some participants even
strategized by speculating on where best to place the application in order to comple-
ment their profile. This is less likely a concern today because, since this interview,
applications on Facebook are not given a box on the user’s profile automatically, and
application boxes are now displayed on a separate tab on the profile.
Participants were also largely concerned with others’ perceptions of them (cases =
13%, participants = 10). This concern was based on the applications they had au-
thorized or their activities within them. It was magnified at times based on stereo-
types about groups of people. For example, a participant who referred to himself as
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Mexican, had serious concerns about an application involving criminal activity. He
mentioned that the activities he would engage in on an application involving ‘mob
activity’ did not reflect his activities in the real world.
P2:“[People might say] alright well if he would do that on there... would
he do that in real life.”
Other participants were concerned about the conversations others were having
about them inside of applications. Examples of this are the ‘hot or not’ applica-
tion, the compare friends application, or an application involving the buying and
selling of friends. In cases like these, participants would authorize the applica-
tion not to use it, but to monitor the perception others could have about them
(cases = 2%, participants = 3).
P9:“I wanted to see what everyone else had to say. I mean who doesn’t
want know what other people think about them.”
These participants added the application they were concerned about, then removed it
from the profile and newsfeed, just to monitor others’ activities about them occurring
inside the application.
The time involved in using an application was another consideration for participants
(cases = 10%, participants = 6). Participants referred to the amount of time required
to use the application almost exclusively as a waste of time. Many participants
did not want to be bothered with an application that would take up too much of
their time, instead preferring applications where they could decide how much time
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was appropriate. Some cited their own habits about procrastination and how these
applications would help them perpetuate this.
Some participants were concerned with the inappropriate content that might be
generated due to applications (cases = 4%, participants = 3). This included both
viewing the inappropriate content and/or having it posted to their profile.
P7:“[A bad application has] dirty stuff. Umm they all do kind of. Bumper
stickers has really nasty stuff...”
One of the participants surprised me though by mentioning her use of an application
in which she would poop on other friends’ profiles, which she found humorous. Her
biggest complaint: many others were unwilling to authorize it.
3.1.3.5 Potential Problems With Use
I asked participants what problems they had heard of or could see occurring as a
result of using applications. I expected a large number of privacy-oriented responses,
yet I was surprised with few of them. The leading response was that participants
were unsure or had never heard of any problems (participants = 7). Being unsure
was followed with concerns about identity theft (participants = 3). One participant
simply casually mentioned it as part of a response with no further explanation as to
why it might be applicable. The other mentioned that she might be redirected off the
Facebook site where someone could attempt to steal her password. Another said that
people are posting too much public information that could be consumed by others
and result in a compromised identity.
Other miscellaneous problems included copyright violations, where the participants
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Table 1: Perceived disclosure rates
Applications I Installed Applications Friends Installed
No Don’t Know Yes No Don’t Know Yes
Name 4% 8% 88% 0% 16% 80%
Picture 8% 8% 84% 12% 16% 68%
Friends 8% 24% 68% 8% 24% 68%
Status 12% 24% 64% 16% 28% 56%
Hometown 20% 16% 60% 24% 40% 32%
Education History 20% 20% 60% 36% 32% 32%
Birthday 20% 24% 56% 20% 40% 40%
About Me 20% 24% 56% 28% 40% 32%
Events 20% 28% 52% 28% 32% 40%
Relationship Status 24% 24% 52% 36% 36% 28%
Photo Tags 36% 16% 48% 40% 32% 28%
Current Location 40% 8% 52% 40% 24% 36%
Work History 40% 20% 40% 40% 32% 28%
Marketplace Listings 40% 32% 28% 44% 36% 20%
Photo Albums 44% 12% 44% 28% 32% 40%
Significant Other 44% 20% 36% 44% 36% 16%
specifically mentioned someone profiting from remaking well-known games such as
Scrabble. In addition, a concern that people would be able to make themselves appear
to be a younger child rather than an adult. Malfunctioning applications, malicious
applications, and concerns of SPAM where also mentioned once each.
3.1.3.6 Privacy
Participants said they desired being able to know what new information is exposed
as a result of using an application. Many applications are quizzes, for example, to
determine what type of beer or cartoon character people are most like. Participants
using such a survey application can give others more information about themselves
than they would be comfortable with sharing. It is very important to note this is
not a concern about profile data being given to the application or its developers, but
rather about additional information flows within their social spheres generated as a
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result of an applications use.
P8:“[Surveys contain] what attributes you are looking for potential boyfriend,
girlfriend, you know I really don’t want everybody to read that.”
Only one of the participants was concerned with an application built with the pur-
pose of maliciously collecting information about himself. This participant thought
the way such an attack would be executed would include someone sending him pic-
tures of a woman and starting a conversation in which he would divulge his personal
information. He was not in any way referring to the automated collection of his profile
data as a result of having authorized the application.
In general, participants’ concerns stemmed from the social interactions that they
participated in online, and managing identity and impressions appropriately through
applications. They were largely unaware of privacy dangers due to data sharing with
applications.
3.1.3.7 Who Gets Data
I administered a survey, described in Section 3.1.4, in which we asked participants
to select which attributes they would be willing to show applications and indicate their
understanding of what was already shared. When participants were asked why they
indicated that they were willing to share each of these items they usually responded
by saying that these items generally did not say too much about who they were.
The information was not considered very personal. I also asked participants several
questions including whom they envisioned they were giving this information to when
they gave it to applications. It was clear from the responses that users were not very
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sure.
Participants said that they would be giving personal information to friends, busi-
nesses, and developers. The most cited group participants said would be receiving
information is their friends (participants = 5).
P5:“Well I mean based on my privacy settings I think my profile is limited
view, so only my friends.”
Others felt the same way believing that only friends and possibly friends of friends
would be given access to their data through the applications.
Some believed that Facebook would be using this information for advertising on
Facebook. They believed that some companies would then be given this information
in order to solicit them for products or services (participants = 3). Most seemed to
view this in a strictly professional light, even citing that this information would not
be used for identity theft. This point of view is itself paradoxical. Indeed, if Facebook
is giving the information to applications why would it need to re-consume the data
to provide ads? I believe this demonstrates users’ lack of a mental model for data
sharing and data flows on these platforms.
Three participants believed that the information would be given to the developers
of the application (participants = 3). Even then however, two of those participants
mentioned that this information would be used to “keep the application running” and
was “mostly computer generated stuff”. Thus, many participants who indicated in
the survey that data was being shared, did not have an accurate conception of who
potentially data could be shared with.
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3.1.4 Survey Results
In addition to the 15 participants I recruited for the interview/survey, I invited an-
other 11 participants from another study to complete just the survey. One participant
did not fill out all the questions completely so their data was discarded. The remain-
ing participants were predominantly female (15) and ages 18-25 (23). Using Westin’s
2003 classification criterion [34] I separated participants into groups of fundamental-
ists (7), pragmatists (17), and unconcerned (1), although I found no differences in
response based on this classification.
The survey asked participants to use a series of 7-point Likert scales to answer
whether they thought each profile attribute was shared with applications they had
authorized. After answering this series, I then asked if they thought applications their
friends had authorized could see the same data using the same 7-point Likert scale.
The Likert scale indicated that a value of 1 meant that the attribute was definitely not
shared, a value of 4 meant they did not know, and a value of 7 meant they definitely
knew it was.
For the purposes of reporting in Table 1 responses of 1-3 were grouped into one
category of no, for responses of 4 the category was left as did not know, and 5-7
were categorized as yes. The table has been sorted by no responses, ascending for
applications that the participant has installed on the profile. For applications the user
has installed the answer should have been yes 100% of time, provided the information
was filled in on their profile. None of the participants responded correctly for all data.
Data sharing for friends’ applications depends upon the user’s application privacy
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Table 2: Differences in perception of disclosure to applications
Applications Applications
I Installed Friends Installed
M SD M SD
Name 6.12 1.453 6.21 1.179
Picture 6.08 1.552 5.46 1.769
Birthday 5.08 2.272 4.52 1.982
Current Location 4.12 2.438 3.80 2.217
Photo Albums 4.12 2.351 4.24 2.067
Photo Tags 4.36 2.361 3.80 2.255
Hometown 5.29 2.177 4.25 2.027
Friends 5.60 1.683 5.36 1.68
Status 5.40 2.082 4.68 1.909
About Me 5.00 2.217 4.08 1.977
Education History 5.08 2.308 3.84 2.154
Work History 3.96 2.491 3.60 2.041
Events 5.08 2.159 4.44 2.162
Marketplace 3.68 2.155 3.28 1.815
Relationship Status 4.72 2.441 3.76 2.006
Significant Other 3.72 2.475 3.08 1.792
settings. During the study I viewed the settings for the 15 interview participants and
13 had default open policies, indicating that their data would be shared with any
friends’ applications. Thus, the correct answer is not 100%, but should still have a
high percentage of yes responses provided the information is filled in on their profile.
Table 1 shows that participants generally agree that their name and picture are
being shared with applications they have authorized. After these two attributes we
see a large increase in the number of participants who specified that they do not
know. There are two exceptions to this, current location and photo albums. In both
cases, participants are often wrong, with many who did not feel or did not know the
data fields are being shared with applications.
Table 2 reports the average score for each attribute. In this table, we see that in
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most cases participants felt less sure that data is shared with friends’ applications
than their own. For example, more participants perceived that their hometown,
status, about me, education history, and information about their significant other
was given to applications they had authorized than applications their friends were
using. It should be noted that the default policy protects information about who the
user’s significant other is from friends’ applications (summer 2008). However all other
attributes in Table 2 are not protected by the default policy, which was employed by
13 of the 15 interview participants.
I also asked participants to specify which attributes they would be willing to share
with applications. The results are shown in Table 3. We can see that participants
were almost universally willing to share their name and profile picture. This reflects
current practices in Facebook applications. Many also were willing to share their
education history. Since most of the participants were of the college age and using
their university email in order to sign up for Facebook was a requirement, this may
have impacted their willingness to share educational history.
There are still some troubling findings. First, participants do not have the correct
mental model of information flow for applications. As such, it is highly likely that
they are not referring to sharing these attributes with developers, but rather with
other users. Still, there are many attributes that participants are unwilling to share.
So even though they do not understand how far the information is being spread, they
still do not want complete disclosure. This clearly does not match their behavior or
the platform’s design. Second, a few fields users are willing to share are particularly
sensitive for security, namely their birthday and hometown. Again, users may believe
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Table 3: Attributes participants were willing to share
Name 100% Events 40%
Picture 80% Time zone 40%
Education History 68% Photo Albums 36%
Favorite Music 64% Photo Tags 36%
Birthday 60% Work History 36%
Friends 60% Relationship Status 36%
Favorite Movies 60% Political Views 36%
Status 56% Current Location 32%
Sex 56% Affiliations 32%
Favorite TV Shows 56% Interested in 24%
Hometown 52% Wall Count 24%
Interests 52% Pages Your A Fan Of 24%
About Me 48% Profile Update 20%
Activities 48% Notes Count 20%
Favorite Quotes 48% Listings 16%
Groups 48% Looking for 16%
Religious Views 44% Files on my computer 4%
Favorite Books 44%
they are only sharing these with friends, or may not realize the risks in disclosing
these data fields.
3.1.5 Discussion
The results of this study identified several important perceptions of social applica-
tion usage that are now summarized:
• The use and perceptions of social applications are primarily driven by social
interaction.
Participants of the study used applications for several purposes, reflecting the gen-
eral goals of social network site use [8, 7, 30]. Some applications were used for identity
management, to share additional information, affiliations, or interests. Others simply
relieved temporary boredom and filled time. Yet interaction with others was still
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key for most successful applications. Users mentioned many different ways they are
interacting with other users, including challenging them, communicating with them,
playing games, and strengthening their ties by sending virtual gifts back and forth.
Participants’ most favored and most used applications were those that generated re-
peated interactions with others. Thus, applications on social network sites are truly
social in nature and interaction through the social network is driving the spread and
use of applications.
The concerns that users do have about privacy are also based around interaction
with others, similar to the general privacy concerns with overall social network site
usage [57]. Thus users were concerned with monitoring and controlling the flow of
information to the social network to further manage their identity.
• Users do not realize they are sharing so much information with applications,
and do not wish to do so.
The interviews and surveys made clear that users do not realize they are sharing so
much personal information. This lack of awareness is driven by the expectations that
are created by the application platform. For example, particular parts of the user’s
profile such as name, picture and friends are commonly used within applications to
customize them towards the user as well as provide the application with a way of
communicating and interacting with the users’ friends. Users can actually see that
information flow within the application itself. As a result, most expected that this
information can be accessed and were comfortable with that. Yet all potential data
accesses were not visible and thus not understood.
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Figure 2: Removing an application - This screen incorrectly informs the user that
removing the application will prevent access to their data. This image has been
modified using a fake application name.
The survey and interviews indicated that users do not wish to share all their data.
They only consent to sharing because it is impossible to interact with others using
applications without doing so. Users did assume additional information is shared and
are indeed informed of the data sharing every time they access a new application
(Figure 1.) This warning does not seem to be influencing their mental models. I
believe this highly relates to previous findings within the phishing domain, where
users are more focused on their primary task than that of privacy or security [16].
As such, the screen warning of data sharing is simply skipped as something the user
must do in order to accomplish their primary goal. Thus, relying on dialogue boxes
and warnings is likely not sufficient to inform users of the data sharing.
Unfortunately for users who do read the warnings and notices and attempt to
understand their content, they may still arrive at an incorrect model. For example, if
they were to remove an application on Facebook they will see Figure 2. This warning
clearly states that by removing the application it will no longer have access to their
profile data. This is simply not true since if a friend has the application authorized
it may still query the users’ data. While this is a very site specific observation, it
underscores the need for a consistent interface that helps to build an accurate mental
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model. This leads to the next perception problem:
• Users do not realize that they are sharing so much information to the applica-
tions of their friends.
Users are completely unaware of the privacy dangers that the media and security
community have identified, that of third party developers having access to so much
information.
• Users do not realize that they are sharing information with third party devel-
opers outside of Facebook.
These misconceptions have important implications. Users shape their behavior by
their perception of the social context [42]. Without a clear understanding of how
information is shared, users can not weigh the risks and rewards of application usage
and behave as desired. Users’ underlying trust and motivation gained from their
friends’ application use, combined with their lack of understanding about the data
flows, leads users into a very dangerous situation. There is a potential for a malicious
application to quickly spread and harvest a large amount of valuable user data.
This study helps explain user behavior and motivates the need to take a different
approach to the design of privacy mechanisms on a social network site application
platform. The results indicate that platform changes or new tools are needed that
reflect these results:
1. Social applications and privacy mechanisms for them need to reflect the social
needs and motivations driving application usage.
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2. Application platforms need to provide users with more control over the flows of
information between users and their friends and developers.
3. Application platforms need to provide users with more accurate mental models
of the sharing that occurs, both with their friends and with developers. Users
need to understand all parties involved in the sharing of profile information.
External pressure has added to the haste in which changes must be made. In
mid-2009 Canada’s Privacy Commissioner objected to several of Facebook’s practices
including the third party use of user data described here [47]. Facebook agreed to
address the disclosure of information to third party applications by giving users more
control. This access control seems needed as simply restricting the platform from
releasing all information is in direct contradiction with the needs and motives of both
Facebook and its users. For example, horoscopes are popular, but could not operate
without a user’s birthday. Still, it is not trivial to properly determine the least amount
of information necessary in order to perform a task and balance privacy needs against
the social benefits of individual applications. Similarly in 2011, Facebook settled with
the FTC for making data users thought would be protected public [65]. Facebook
agreed to better keep their privacy promises as well as conduct independent privacy
audits for the next 20 years.
The results of this study indicate that currently proposed solutions do not ade-
quately address the misconceptions uncovered. For example, the study performed in
Chapter 4 Section 4.1 examined behavior that occurred when the user was provided
with fine grained access control for social applications. The proposed solution did
56
attempt to address the 3 guidelines outlined above with an interface to improve the
user’s mental model by presenting the concrete information to be shared, including
information from a random friend, and allowing the user to limit disclosures to indi-
vidual applications. The result led some users to take steps in order to protect their
information. However, a significant number of users still did not, even in scenarios
that were created to appear malicious.
The results in this section help to explain this behavior. While this proposed
access control interface improved the transparency of information flow, it still did
not convey who the third party is and the risks of sharing information outside of
Facebook. Thus, simply adding fine grained access control is not sufficient. The
application platform needs to make all data flows transparent so that users can build
accurate mental models to make informed privacy and sharing decisions. And as we
have already observed on Facebook and in other security domains such as phishing,
warning dialogue boxes and messages are likely to be ignored. Instead, users build
their mental models through interacting with applications. Thus, making decisions
within the context of a running application may lead to more informed decisions and
more motivated users.
While this particular study focused on Facebook, other platforms likely have similar
uses and suffer similar misconceptions. There are two caveats to this. First the
population studied on Facebook was generally in the 18-25 range and this does not
represent the entire Facebook demographic. Additionally, Facebook friends tend to
represent real world friends whereas other social network sites like Google+ commonly
foster friendships between users who have never met. Future studies might examine
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not only whether these findings hold across sites and different demographics, but
also how users’ perceptions are (mis)informed by the design of the platform and site
interfaces.
3.1.6 Conclusion
Applications on social network sites are now ubiquitous. Users are accessing these
third party services at an unprecedented rate, yet little research has examined what
users think about accessing these applications and the overall platform. In this chap-
ter I have contributed an understanding of users that use social network site appli-
cation platforms. The results indicate that similar to social network site use, social
interaction is driving the spread and use of applications, and coloring users’ percep-
tions about privacy and information disclosure. Users are interacting, competing,
communicating, and entertaining themselves. And their privacy concerns are cen-
tered around sharing data with other people on the social network, with almost no
understanding of the data sharing that occurs with the application developers. The
end result is that there are serious risks of applications maliciously harvesting profile
information, and users are not truly understanding and consenting to these risks.
The solution to this problem may lie in better integrating privacy settings into the
user interface during the primary interaction tasks, rather than only during the initial
installation, conveying a more accurate mental model of data sharing throughout an
application’s lifecycle. In Section 5.1 and 5.2 I explore pushing the configuration of
user policies into runtime and closer to the context of use. Results presented in this
chapter of the users’ motivations, concerns, and naive understanding of data sharing
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can lead to improved platform designs, with alternative privacy and data disclosure
mechanisms which provide transparent information flow.
In the next chapter I begin to explore contextual policy configuration. I begin by
testing users reaction to contextual configuration at install. I provide users with an
interface that is presented during an applications first use. I then push the decision
out of install time and into runtime.
CHAPTER 4: INSTALL TIME CONTEXTUAL CONFIGURATION
In Chapter 3, I provided an analysis of the use and perceptions around the social
network site platform. In this chapter, I address some of these issues using what
I learned about user perception to inform design. I believe that by providing a
more concrete mental model through increased contextual information users will make
policies that more accurately reflect their desires.
I begin in Section 4.1 by providing users with context in the form of more explicit
information about user data being consumed, including introducing users to types of
data shared about their friends as a result of application use. I find that users who are
motivated enough to configure policies do attempt to configure policies that reflect
what might be considered reasonable use. They base these decisions off the provided
explicit sharing information as well as the application name. However, participants
did not utilize a feature which would provide them with additional reasoning on the
information requested.
4.1 Install Time Configuration
In this section I present and formally define the current access control model used
by social network site application platforms. I then attempt to improve upon this by
introducing a new user-application policy to provide protection while still allowing
desirable information access. I explore users’ behaviors in utilizing a potential inter-
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face for this new access control model. Finally, I discuss the potential implications
for protecting personal information on social application platforms, extensions, and
improvements to the current prototype.
4.1.1 SNS Architecture
Given the similarity of OpenSocial to Facebook’s API circa 2009, it is possible to
generalize the architecture of the access control. Since this is a generalization certain
specific aspects of each platform may be lost. However, I attempt to generalize in
a way that includes as much as possible. To begin, the subjects in online social
networks are users, and applications act on behalf of users to provide services. Each
user i maintains a user profile Profilei, which is a representation of the user on the
social network and includes information such as the user’s name, birth date, contact
information, email addresses, education, address, interests, photos, music, videos,
blogs and many other attributes. In addition, the profile includes the user’s set of
friends and installed applications. Current social network architectures have enabled
users to specify fine grain access control policies on the profile attributes to control
user-to-user interactions. In a user-to-user interaction, the user making a request is
referred to as the viewer and the requested user’s profile is the target. The user-to-
user interaction is governed by the user-to-user access control policy.
Applications can provide services to users and interact with users by combining
and aggregating attributes from multiple target profiles. For example, an application
that provides birthday gift recommendations for a user’s friends needs to access the
user’s profile and her friends’ profiles to access their birth dates and interests to be
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able to make an appropriate and timely birthday gift recommendation. Social network
frameworks provide a set of API’s that enable third party applications to interface and
access user profile attributes. We refer to the set of attributes accessible through the
exposed APIs by S. For example, Facebook allows most profile data to be accessed.
Their framework adopts what can be considered an all-or-nothing policy when it
comes to applications. In other words, upon installing an application, the application
is given access to all the attributes in S. When a user i installs application Appj, the
application has access to user i’s profile S and to the target profiles of user i’s friends
by acting as a viewer on behalf of user i. This introduces the ability for an application
to access profile attributes of users that have not installed the application. To resolve
this issue, current social network frameworks enable users to specify a default access
control policy for all non-installed applications. For example, in Facebook the set
of attributes available for an application Appj accessing the profile of target user t
through the viewer user v can be described as follows:
RAppj ,v,t =

Pt,v ∩ S, t.Appj = 1
Pt,v ∩Dt ∩ S, t.Appj = 0
Where:
• t.Appj : Is a binary attribute, which is set to true if user t installed application
Appj and false otherwise.
• S : Set of attributes available to the application through the API’s exposed by
the social network.
• Pt,v : Is the user-to-user profile policy for target user t and viewer user v. Bob
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(the target) specifies a policy outlining what attributes Alice (the viewer) can
see of his personal profile. For example, many sites let Bob choose whether to
share aspects of his information publicly, with “Only Friends” or with “Friends
of Friends”. Facebook provides users with the ability to set policies based on
particular groups of friends as well. Note, that if viewer and target are the
same user, then Pt,t = S which is effectively everything provided by the API
framework.
• Dt : Is the default application policy, the set of profile attributes specified by
the target user t regarding what applications that are not installed by user t
are allowed to access. The target, Bob, may also allow or restrict other profile
attributes, e.g., Profile Picture, Education History, Work History, etc. For
example, Bob may specify that in addition to his Name and Lists of Friends,
his Profile Picture be accessible to applications that he did not install. This
policy is applied to all applications that are not installed by Bob. The default
policy provided by the sites is usually extremely permissive.
• RAppj ,v,t : Is the profile attributes for target user t accessible to application Appj
through viewer user v.
For example, Alice (the viewer) installs application App1. This action makes all of
Alice’s user profile attributes available through the API framework (S) accessible to
App1 both for the user and her friends. Alice’s instantiation of App1 requests Bob’s
(the target) profile attributes (e.g., Profile Picture and Education History). If Bob
already installed App1 then this access is granted as App1 will have access to Bob’s
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Figure 3: Facebook’s application access control model
profile attributes in S; otherwise, if Bob did not install App1 then the intersection
of Alice− Bob’s user to user profile policy (PBob,Alice) and Bob’s default application
policy (DBob) are applied before access is granted to App1. So consider for example
an application that requests Bob’s profile picture and education history, PBob,Alice is
setup to “Only Friends” (Alice and Bob are friends) and DBob is set to all of Bob’s user
profile information except Education History. Therefore, the set of data returned to
the application will just be Bob’s Profile Picture. Figure 3 shows the different policies
applied between the application, viewer and the target profile, in case the application
is installed and not installed by the target.
When the viewer is the same as the target the Pt,v policy is equal to everything,
which implies that the installed application has access to all the user profile attributes
exposed through the API framework. Furthermore, when the target users create the
policy Pt,v, their intention is that they are granting access to other people, and not to
installed applications accessing their profiles through their friends. Thus, this model
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treats an application that is not installed by the viewer as one of the viewer’s friends,
and as the viewer himself if it is installed. This violates users expectations and
provides little protection to users who wish to use any applications. This also makes
it very easy for a seemingly useful application to maliciously access large amounts of
personal information.
Given a target profile t, a set of viewers V , and an application Appj, the effective
set of attributes accessible to the application through all the viewers v ∈ V is given
by:
REffAppj ,t =

( ⋃
v∈V
Pt,v
)
∩ S, t.Appj = 1( ⋃
v∈V
Pt,v
)
∩Dt ∩ S, t.Appj = 0
The term
(⋃
v∈V (P t,v)
)
represents the effective set of attributes contributed by treat-
ing the application as a normal viewer and adopting the target to viewer profile poli-
cies. Note, that this model assumes that the application access is controlled solely by
the user-to-user policy. I now present a more granular framework that would restrict
the ability of such an exploit to occur.
4.1.2 A Granular Framework
I now introduce a social network application access control model that addresses the
shortcomings of the current application access control model. The goal is to maintain
as much of the current architecture as possible, as current platforms are already
widely used. Facebook, for example, reported having over 24,000 applications by
400,000 developers in 2009. Since that time, the number has increased to nine million
applications and websites in 2012. This model improves upon the model presented
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in the previous section by introducing a user-to-application policy. This restricts the
application to access only those attributes specified in the user-to-application policy.
The model presents several restrictions on the access granted to the application in
order to enforce user preferences and create a more secure execution environment.
4.1.2.1 User to Application Policy
The user-to-application policy is defined as:
• AAppj ,i : The user-application policy is the policy specified by any user i out-
lining the specific access restrictions for the application to the user’s profile
attributes. This policy has two effects. First, it restricts what information the
application can access for the person who installs it. For example, Alice speci-
fies what attributes application App1 can access of her profile. This policy also
supersedes the default policy when created for a particular application. Second,
the policy also restricts what information the application can request on behalf
of a user. This is referred to as friendship based protection. This behavior is
summarized in the overall model below.
The proposed application access control model is summarized as follows:
RAppj ,v,t =

Pt,v ∩ AAppj ,v ∩ AAppj ,t ∩ S, t.Appj = 1
Pt,v ∩ AAppj ,v ∩Dt ∩ S, t.Appj = 0
Where t.Appj, S, Pt,v, and Dt are the same as defined in Section 4.1.1 , and AAppj ,i is
the user application policy assigned by user i for application Appj. The application
is installed by the viewer, and is used to access the profile of the target user. If
the target user already installed the application then the attributes accessible to the
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application are computed by intersecting the user-to-user policy of the target and the
viewer, Pt,v, the viewer application policy AAppj ,v, and the target application policy
AAppj ,t. Incorporating the target application policy enables the target to explicitly
specify the set of attributes to share with the application.
By additionally including the viewer application policy it is possible to ensure that
if an application Appj uses a viewer v to access the profile of a target t, then the pol-
icy specified by the viewer AAppj ,v provides an additional set of restrictions protecting
the target profile. Similarly, the viewer’s application policy AAppj ,v is incorporated,
in addition to the user-to-user policy Pt,v and the default target application policy
Dt, when an application that has not been installed by the target attempts to ac-
cess the target profile. Note that when the viewer equals the target, this model
effectively reduces to the viewer application policy instead of everything as in the
previous model. This is still subject to what is allowable by the API. In addition
to providing a mechanism to enforce fine grain access control on applications, the
proposed model also provides a mechanism for social collaboration in making policy
decisions, where the viewer is able to influence the set of target attributes accessible
by the application, which is a fundamental difference when compared to the current
social network implementations, including Facebook.
Note that the model gives both the target and viewer finer control in deciding
their exposed attributes to applications either installed or not installed. The model
incorporates the user to user profile policy between the viewer and target whenever
the application attempts to access the target profile, this is intuitive and builds on
the fact that the application is using the viewer user to be able to access the target
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profile. This ensures that if the target has restricted the viewer in some way the
application will be restricted as well when making calls on behalf of the viewer.
Since the viewer application policy AAppj ,v is intersected with other policies to
compute the set of attributes available to the application, it follows that the viewer
contributes to protecting the target profile, which is a form of friendship based pro-
tection. For example, target users who do not spend time and effort to configure
restrictive default application policies can still be protected by their friends who do
specify strict user-application policies.
For example, Bob (the target) is a careless user who does not pay close attention
to protecting his profile privacy and leaves his default application policy to be very
permissive such that DBob is the same as S. Alice (the viewer) is Bob’s friend, and
she installed a horoscope application App1 which is not installed by Bob. Alice is
security conscious and she setup her application policy AApp1,Alice to allow access to
only the Birth Date attributes.
The application will now only be able to access Bob’s birth date when requested
by Alice, and nothing more. Alice’s awareness does not only protect her but it also
protects Bob’s profile due to the fact that Alice’s policy AApp1,Alice is incorporated
when the application App1 attempts to access Bob’s profile. Again Bob is further
protected if he has specifically prevented his birth date from being known by Alice.
In that case App1 would not be granted access to Bob’s date of birth. Figure 4, shows
the different policies applied between the application, viewer and the target profile,
in case the application is installed and not installed by the target.
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Figure 4: Proposed application access control model
In this model, friends’ (viewers) application policies are incorporated when making
access decisions, however the policy is upper bounded by the policies set by the target.
The policy definitions for both installed and non installed applications are:
• Pt,v ∩ AAppj ,v ∩ AAppj ,t ∩ S ⊆ Pt,v ∩ AAppj ,t ∩ S
• Pt,v ∩ AAppj ,v ∩Dt ∩ S ⊆ Pt,v ∩Dt ∩ S
Thus the addition of the viewer’s policy AAppj ,v will only help limit the profile
exposure and is upper bounded by the policies set by the target. In no case is it
possible for a careless viewers’ policy to reduce the effects of a protective targets’
policy.
Given a target profile t, a set of viewers V , and an application Appj, the effective
set of attributes accessible to the application through all the viewers v ∈ V is given
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by:
REffAppj ,t =

( ⋃
v∈V
Pt,v ∩ AAppj ,v
)
∩AAppj ,t ∩ S, t.Appj = 1( ⋃
v∈V
Pt,v ∩ AAppj ,v
)
∩Dt ∩ S, t.Appj = 0
The term
(⋃
v∈V (P t,v ∩ AAppj ,v)
)
represents the effective set of attributes con-
tributed by all the viewers, which represents the overall society contribution towards
the target’s effective application policy. It is possible but less likely in this model for
a user-to-user policy Pt,v to be violated by an application as a result of this collective
information. This violation may be an unintentional one such as an incident involving
the TopFriends application [10]. The application unintentionally allowed a user to
see others partial profiles on Facebook that they should not have access to because
the application cached REffAppj ,t. This can be completely mitigated for a given target
in the new model by a strong default policy, and if they install the application, a
strong policy on that application. In the previous model users who have installed the
application, even if briefly, have no way of preventing this.
4.1.2.2 Setting the User to Application Policy
This access control model requires three different policies to be created: a user-
to-user policy, a default application policy, and the new user-to-application policy.
Most social network sites already have controls for user-to-user policies, and other
researchers are focusing on improvements to these controls [37]. So I will not address
this policy in the current work. Many sites also already provide a default policy,
which users can customize. For example, on Facebook, the default policy settings
are one part of the general privacy settings, and users can select which pieces of
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information they are willing to share or not share with applications they have not
installed. Current default policies tend to be permissive to encourage sharing, but
can be modified to be very restrictive.
This model adds a new policy, the user-application policy, AAppj ,i. The most basic
method for creating this policy is to ask users to indicate their choices for each
application they interact with. There are several times we could collect this data
from users. First, we could ask users to indicate all of their preferences the first
time they access or install an application. However, this may take too much time
to specify a complex policy. Alternatively, an application could request confirmation
for each individual access to a data item, or at least for the first access of that piece
of information. I explore this idea in Chapter 5. Finally, users could have special
configuration settings for each application they have accessed to view or modify their
policies at any time.
There may be other more advanced methods for setting this user-application policy.
For example, policies could allow the generalization of personal attributes [55], e.g.,
providing state of residence instead of a complete address. In such cases, the user
could opt to allow the application to view generalizations of information on their
behalf. This generalization might serve to be useful as the user can completely harness
applications such as horoscopes and location-based services without exposing the
specific data as to their whereabouts or actual date of birth. However, providing this
capability creates an even more complicated set of controls and decisions for the user.
Another alternative would be to rely on a voter model, in which more informed
users make decisions about the access policies for themselves and for others in the
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Figure 5: Fine grained access control prototype
community. Those in the community could then apply a policy based on the number
of votes. This would reduce the burden of choosing a policy for a large number of
users, yet potentially still provide a useful policy. Of course the down side to such a
scheme is that it is subject to gaming, in which several malicious accounts are used
to defeat the system.
In this section I present the first exploration of this model, I chose to ask users to
set all of their preferences upon installation, expanding upon the current screen for
providing consent that most if not all platforms already employ. This initial study
investigates a basic selection of data fields, without aggregation or voting. With an
understanding of how well this method works and how users respond, I am able to
explore more advanced methods in the next section.
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4.1.2.3 Prototype User Interface
As a step towards understanding and refining the model, the first prototype focused
on the user interface for specifying the user-application policy, and mechanisms to
help users choose what information to share or protect. A screenshot of this interface
is shown in Figure 5. Users view this interface on installation, the first time they
access the application. The interface includes several features to aid users in making
decisions about their policy. First, applications are allowed to request both required
and optional information fields. The policy would then automatically restrict any
information not requested. When adding or accessing an application for the first
time, users would be shown the information that the application requests, and given
the opportunity to modify these fields or opt out of the application.
In the interface, required fields are stared and the checkboxes grayed out for those
fields. All requested fields are by default selected to encourage sharing, but the user
could uncheck any of the optional fields to protect that information. This is also
done in part to preserve the current nature of the applications for users who do not
care to protect their privacy. By simply skipping to the continue button users are
opting for a full disclosure, such as the one described in the previous model, with little
extra time involved. These users however, are still offered greater protection as the
application has constrained its own level of full disclosure to those attributes it needs
to optimally work. And applications that request extensive amounts of information
may get a second look from users seeing so much requested data.
To make each decision more concrete and clear I add more context by using the
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user’s own personal information that will be shared. This information is added to
the interface, and also information from a randomly chosen friend. This provides
a more accurate mental model of precisely what will or will not be shared with an
application. In addition, it serves to catch the user’s attention to try and prevent
them from skipping this screen even though setting a policy is not their primary task.
A community indicator bar is also added, which is an indication of what percentage
of the user’s friends have allowed access for this application to each information field.
Based on a separate evaluation, I have shown that this influences users’ decisions
regarding which pieces of information to share [6]. Finally, users could read an
application-supplied description of how each of the information fields would be used
by clicking for more information.
For this prototype, I emulated and implemented on the Facebook platform, as that
is the most active application platform, and Facebook’s API allows access to a greater
amount of user data than other social networks. This also allowed me to more easily
recruit users for the user study and provide an extremely realistic user experience.
The wording chosen and buttons to add an application are presented in a similar
appearance to Facebook’s 2008 application interface. Thus, users click on a “Con-
tinue” button to indicate consent and install the application, or “cancel” to leave the
application and not set their policy. A method for creating a user-application policy
when the user decides not to install the application has not been explored. One pos-
sible action is to immediately lock down the application policy to prevent any data
from being shared. This certainly needs to be explored further.
The prototype shown in Figure 5 was implemented as a Facebook application.
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Thus, users can “install” this prototype on their profile, giving the prototype access to
their real profile information to add to the interface. In an actual implementation, the
information fields required by an application can be modeled in XML to automatically
generate this screen for each application. While a number of real applications were
chosen for the prototype and user study, the information fields the applications would
want were made up. In addition, the explanations and the values for the community
indicator bar were also artificially created.
4.1.3 Study Methodology
The model proposed relies on user input to regulate the amount of exposure to
both the user and the user’s friends. The user study was developed to see to what
extent users would set policies restricting or allowing that information on Facebook to
be released to an application. To accomplish this a prototyped implementation pre-
viously described, which is depicted in Figure 5, was created. A user study was then
performed, asking users to go through the process of adding a number of applications
to their profile. Participants were told that I had created a new application container
that I was testing, and that they would be adding applications to their profile using
that container, which allows them to limit the information given.
Participants were also informed that they did not have to add any applications
they were not comfortable with, and that I would help them remove the ones they
did not want to keep at the conclusion of the study. In reality, no applications were
added, the prototype was merely a simulation. As a result all the participants were
completely protected from malicious applications that might have existed. I did want
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users to believe they were actually adding the applications in order to make real
privacy decisions, and all users appeared to take the task seriously and believe that
they were adding these applications to their profile. After the tasks, participants were
informed of this and the prototype application was removed from their profile.
All participants were first given a survey which collected demographic information,
as well as used Westin’s [34] method for categorizing people into privacy fundamen-
talists, pragmatists, or unconcerned. After participants completed the survey they
signed into their own Facebook account and I installed the prototype. They were
given no training on the interface.
The prototype presented users with eleven application installation scenarios. All
applications were real Facebook applications to enhance realism, but the data fields
that each application was “requesting” from the participants were created. Applica-
tions chosen may or may not be malicious, as there is no way of truly knowing; this
was a major reason for choosing to simulate the experience. A wide variety of appli-
cation functionality including horoscopes, flowers, games, and others was represented.
All scenarios were the same for each user, except that the users’ own profile informa-
tion was inserted into the interface. Participants began with three training scenarios
that asked for simple and basic information. The remaining scenarios included two
that asked for information that was realistic within the context of the application,
two that were unrealistic but seemingly harmless to allow, and two that requested
sensitive information that did not fit the applications’ context. There was also one
application that asked for twenty-eight different attributes and another that did not
ask for anything except for name and networks to which the participant belonged.
76
The realistic scenarios asked for data that made sense given the context of the
application. For example, a book recommendation application requested the user’s
interests and books liked. An unrealistic one was something like a flowers application
that asked for political interests. An out-of-context application asked for sensitive
information such as a hometown or date of birth, but that request did not fit with
the theme of the application and was not justified. Within each category, I presented
users with one shorter and one longer scenario of requested information fields.
When participants completed all eleven scenarios, they were then interviewed and
asked several questions including what they liked and disliked about this method of
installing applications, who they thought they gave their data to, and feedback on
other elements of the interface. I recorded both the computer screen and audio using
usability software for later analysis.
4.1.4 Results
Participants were recruited through the use of Facebook ads on two campuses and
in Charlotte. However due to the requirement to participate in the study on campus,
all of the participants ended up being students. A total of seventeen participants were
recruited from two local universities who were active members of Facebook. There
were sixteen undergraduate students and one graduate student who participated.
Eleven of the participants were females and six males. With the Westin survey,
ten of these participants were classified as being privacy pragmatists: those that are
concerned about privacy but are willing to trade it for benefits. Out of the others, five
were classified as being fundamentalists: those who are distrustful of organizations
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and worry about how their data is used. The remaining participant was classified as
unconcerned.
In general, participants who added applications had two strategies they could use
for releasing data to applications. They could use the application’s default policy,
releasing all required and optional data requested. Or they could use a custom policy,
restricting some or all of the optional information. Some participants were minimalists
and unchecked every optional field, others made case-by-case decisions.
Table 4 shows the number of applications added, number of times each participant
used the strategies described, and average times, for their eleven scenarios. Users
generally stuck with one strategy or the other, either accepting all information with
little thought, or using custom policies to restrict information or not adding the
application at all. Participants are grouped by their general strategy, as indicated by
the time spent on each scenario, use of custom strategies, and behavior observed on the
recordings. This is not to say these groups are statistically different, rather they are
categorized based on observed behavior, both quantitative and qualitative. I refer to
these two categories as motivated users and unmotivated users. This categorization
was by no means meant to be definitive, but used to illustrate the differences in
behavior and discuss results. Westin’s survey had some correlation to these groupings.
All fundamentalists fell into the motivated group, along with two pragmatists, and
the one unconcerned.
A closer look at three participants labeled P6, P7, and P8 reveals that they used
a minimalist strategy. This minimalist strategy shows that they are motivated in
restricting applications from acquiring their data. P7 and P8 were both pragmatists
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Table 5: Comparison of groups disclosure
Privacy Total Added Default Policy Custom Policy Avg Time
Motivated 77.27% 31.82% 45.45% 0:23
Unmotivated 82.83% 75.76% 7.07% 0:10
and P6 was the sole participant categorized as unconcerned. Others like P13 exhibit
behavior that in Table 4 would suggest they belong to the motivated group. P13
however made the decision not to install applications based on if she had seen them
before, as she did not want more stuff on her profile. This is further confirmation
that participants also decide to not to add applications for social reasons, not just for
privacy reasons, as discussed in Section 3.1.3.2. Analysis of the recordings left P16’s
intentions unclear. As such we grouped P16 with the unmotivated group based on
Westins’ classification as well as the similar timing data.
The data in Table 5 summarizes the results for the two groups, and shows that
there are stark differences between the motivated and unmotivated users. Motivated
participants added fewer applications, did not grant applications access to the at-
tributes they requested, set custom policies far more often and on average took more
than twice the time to add applications as their unmotivated counterparts.
Specifically, unmotivated participants used whatever the applications asked for
76% of the time they installed, while the motivated users only used that strategy
32% of the time they installed an application. In fact, the unmotivated group only
set a default policy 7% of the time. The motivated group instead set a custom
policy 45% of the time, or allowed the application access to some subset of requested
attributes. The unmotivated group rarely used these strategies. This accounts for the
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timing difference between the two groups, the motivated group spent time reading
and unchecking information fields, while the unmotivated group did not.
Table 6 shows the results of these strategies on four of the eleven different scenarios
or tasks. These are representative of two context appropriate and two context inap-
propriate scenarios. Horoscopes and Books iLike asked for information that seemed
somewhat appropriate to the scope of the application. However SpringWater asked
for sensitive information, provided no explanation for data it required, and the appli-
cation’s description was written in Hebrew. The HighSchoolBuddies scenario seemed
less suspicious, but still asked for several pieces of information that did not fit the
application and were not justified.
For both context appropriate scenarios, the motivated and unmotivated groups had
high rates of adding the application and high rates of allowing access to the data.
The exception was hometown information for the horoscope application, which might
not have made as much sense as originally planned. The description stated that the
hometown information was used to see what stars the participant had been born
under. Motivated users usually restricted this information.
SpringWater, a context inappropriate scenario, requested a variety of sensitive in-
formation. The motivated group mostly refused to add this application, while the
unmotivated group had a startlingly high rate of adding the application and allowing
their information to be accessed. However, a significantly different number of moti-
vated participants were willing to add the HighSchoolBuddies application as a result
of not being forced to release personal information, something that the SpringWa-
ter scenario required. Instead, the motivated users restricted the optional fields to
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protect themselves.
In general the users in the motivated group protected their personal data more than
the unmotivated group. Other scenarios had similar results where the unmotivated
participants just accepted the defaults. As Table 6 shows, there were, however, still
times when the motivated group disclosed personal data to applications which might
not have needed it. When reviewing the videos, in some cases motivated users had
not entered the data into Facebook, so they might have mistakenly considered them-
selves protected. For example, if a participant never supplied their favorite books to
Facebook they would not consider that option while installing. There is danger in this
strategy which I discuss later. In addition, the three participants P6, P7, and P8 used
a minimalistic strategy to account for the privacy decision and may have incorrectly
assumed that their information was being protected even though the application may
have required sensitive information it did not need.
On applications that asked for data which it did not seem to need but could be
harmless, the motivated group of users used the custom policy to stop that disclosure.
For example, in another scenario a flowers application requested participants’ political
affiliations. Seven of the eight motivated participants added the application and five
of those set a policy to remove political affiliations from being disclosed. In contrast
unmotivated participants who installed the flowers application allowed the disclosure
with none restricting it.
To summarize the results, participants generally behaved in two different ways.
The first group made efforts to minimize the impact of installing an application as
well as attempted to make informed decisions about the application’s data usage in
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context. For these users, the interface and the model would work reasonably well.
The second group did not, and generally accepted the default policy supplied by the
application.
I did not evaluate the potential effectiveness of the community bars in this study.
There was too little use of custom policies, and thus too small of an impact from
the bar to be observed. Instead, I evaluated the community bar separately isolating
factors that may contribute to its effectiveness. I found that given a sufficiently strong
negative indicator behaviour can be changed [6].
4.1.5 Discussion
The model presented seeks to find a balance between sharing information with
applications and protection of user privacy. As such, the model does not offer per-
fect protection. The results presented here inform the next iteration of this model
presented in the next section and may inspire others to do the same. I feel users
should be able to choose to share information with applications if they desire, but
this may lead to inadvertent disclosures. However, the model does potentially reduce
the risks by restricting the amount of information disclosed both for individuals using
the application and their community of friends. This model is thus highly dependent
on the success of setting an appropriate user-application policy. In this section users
were asked to set this policy on installation. In the next section I ask users to set this
policy at runtime.
A limitation of this study is that participants were aware that they were partici-
pating in a study, and may have made more restrictive or careful decisions than they
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would make when faced with installing an application that they are really interested
in. Thus, further work is needed to verify whether this model would work in deploy-
ment. The prototype attempted to make the scenarios as realistic as possible to have
participants believe they were installing these applications.
A number of users were motivated to take the time to review the interface and
further restrict the information they shared. As a result, these users reduced their
threat, yet still did share some useful information with applications. In addition, they
would have added those same protections to their friends and informed the greater
community of their choices. This set of users would likely also be motivated to set a re-
stricted default policy, further protecting them from all unknown applications. Thus,
the model and the interface would achieve the desired balance for social applications
for those who truly care about their privacy.
However, there are still improvements that could be made. There were still in-
stances of motivated users sharing sensitive data with applications outside a seem-
ingly appropriate context. And while several users were minimalists, and restricted
all optional fields, they did still allow sensitive information to be shared when it was
required by the application. Thus, minimalists may feel more protected, but could
still release their data without full consideration. In the next chapter, Chapter 5, I
attempt to improve this by increasing the amount of information available through
context of use at runtime.
Many users monitor their privacy on their profile by not entering information in
the first place, or entering in false information. Thus, the application policy for that
data is irrelevant, as it would not impact their real information. However, if users
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later update their profiles, they may then accidentally disclose that information to
applications already installed. This problem is reflected in the current interface as
non-disclosed user attributes result in blank spaces within the interface. There were
also several cases observed where a custom policy was set but a personal attribute
such as date of birth or hometown was not allowed to be shared with applications or
had not been filled in on their profile. In many of these cases users would not make
a decision to restrict this attribute.
About half of the participants were not motivated enough to take the time to
set their policy or consider whether to add an application in the first place. This
unmotivated group left themselves open to disclosures of very personal information,
and as a result, also exposed their friends with weak default policies. Arguably the
only ones they are putting at risk are others like them who are not going to be willing
or do not want to set either the default policy Dv or the application policy AAppj ,v.
So the risky users will be hurting other risk taking users.
Given the population of these social network sites, types of data involved, and ease
with which the information can be collected, I find this to be unacceptable. With
1 billion active users currently on Facebook, even if only 10 percent of users engage
in risky behavior, that leaves 100 million users subject to greater risks. That is still
large number of users and the numbers continue to grow every day. A better social
feedback mechanism might be needed to better inform those users when they are
making a decision that is contrary to the community’s decisions.
There are several reasons users may not be taking the time to set these policies.
I believe that users are unlikely to fully understand the risks associated with the
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disclosure of certain pieces of information, such as their hometown or work history.
Thus, they may feel comfortable sharing that information, when perhaps they should
not be. This leads me to believe that we either need to increase user motivation to
influence more users to more appropriately set their application policies, or reconsider
the means in which we set AAppj ,v and Dv. In Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 I explore
policy configuration at runtime which may provide a better means to configure AAppj ,v.
The model presented in this section does not dictate how this is done, and with
appropriate policies would effectively preserve the users’ privacy and security and
promote the social value of applications. This is a tricky balance though because if
the policies are too restrictive, some applications will be effectively crippled. If the
policies are too open, users who do not change the policies will expose themselves
and be the weakest links in their social networks. Thus, more work needs to be done
to explore appropriate mechanisms for setting these policies.
In a much larger sense the results in this section imply that any access control
model that relies on users determining their own policies may be subject to similar
results. That is, protecting those who are most concerned but inadequately protecting
those who are less concerned or less aware of the risks. Perhaps by providing a better
understanding of user information flow users can become educated on the types and
frequency of data shared.
It is also possible but less likely in this model for a user-to-user policy Pt,v to
be violated by an application as a result of this collective information, such as the
incident involving the TopFriends application [10] on Facebook. The application
unintentionally allowed a user to see profile information of others that they should
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not have access to, because the application cached user data REffAppj ,t. This can be
completely mitigated for a given target in the model by a strong default policy, and if
they install the application, a strong policy on that application. In the previous model
users who have installed the application, even if briefly, have no way of mitigating
this potential attack.
4.1.6 Conclusion
This section presented a new model for access control for applications on social net-
work sites. This model adds a new user-application policy which greatly restricts the
information applications can access, while still allowing useful and desired information
sharing. The model also adds few changes to existing application platforms, enabling
this approach to be easily adopted. A new interface helps to make this model usable
by providing concrete context of the information that is being shared. The success
of the model, however, depends upon appropriately setting the new user-application
policy.
This first prototype explored having users set this policy upon installation. In
Section 5.1 and Section 5.2, I explore policy configuration at runtime. At runtime
additional information is available such as the context of data use. In this study,
during install time I observed motivated users who configured policies based on the
name of the application provided to them. Those who were motivated to protect their
information, were able to easily use the interface to set their policy and protect much
of their personal information. These users would be able to reap the benefits of social
applications and remain reasonably protected against the threats posed by them. In
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fact, a user could even be using a malicious application without exposing themself
to any risk. However, this interface did not work for half the users, who were still
unmotivated to protect themselves, and in turn, their friends. For these users, more
exploration is needed to explore alternate means to set their application policies.
Despite the mixed user study results, the overall model is favorable for several
reasons. First, it lessens the likelihood that someone who is concerned about an ap-
plication accessing his or her data will accidentally disclose that information. Second,
it prevents applications that are poorly coded from being exploited by hackers to gain
the entire set of a user’s data. It also reduces the ability of an application to record
all the user attributes and accidentally disclose them to others where it might violate
the user-to-user Pt,v policy, as was done recently by a popular Facebook application.
For those who are very concerned, data is not ever released without their explicit
consent. And those who are less concerned can opt to release everything just as they
are able to in the current architectures.
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CHAPTER 5: RUNTIME CONTEXTUAL CONFIGURATION
In this chapter I examine contextual configuration at runtime. These studies build
on findings in Section 4.1 by attempting to provide even more context and evaluate
user decision making at runtime.
In Section 4.1, I provided evidence that increasing awareness of the sharing context
improves motivation for users to make appropriate data sharing decisions. Partici-
pants interacted with a set of application scenarios and made decisions about what
to share with each scenario, if anything. Participants were provided with the appli-
cation name and a list of the requested permissions. To provide increased context, I
utilized the users’ data to illustrate the sharing that would be taking place within the
application, included additional information on how each permission was relevant to
the application, and included a reference to the application developer.
Participants largely ignored the additional justification provided for each permis-
sion. Instead, results suggested that motivated users were attempting to make access
control decisions based on the application’s name. By configuring the application
at install time users are asked to holistically consider the policy of the application
including features they may never use. By moving that decision into runtime I can
include all the information available to users at install time and include additional
context to help users make more informed decisions.
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At runtime, additional types of information are available. For example, consider
the Pandora internet radio problem, where users do not understand the reasoning for
access to their contacts at install time. At runtime these same users would not have
been asked to consider this decision until prompting the application to share a radio
station with someone. Since they initiated the action they can further reason that
the contacts are needed in order to identify who they want to share with. Likewise, if
they indicate that they wish to attend an event that the application advertises, then
the user would further be able to reason that access to their calendar is needed.
Configuration during runtime also has several other advantages. Users can run ap-
plications on their device that truly adhere to the principle of least privilege. Applica-
tions would not need every permission granted in order provide for partial application
usage. For example, users who wish to listen to Pandora but not share stations would
not have to grant access to the contacts. Furthermore, by binding policy decisions
to the screen users can observe what benefits the application provides that they are
missing out on and better weigh the risk vs benefit tradeoffs.
In this chapter, I explore providing the user with contextual runtime configuration.
I provide an increased context by showing an onscreen icon and visualization to inform
users of the need to configure the permissions. By default policies are set to deny all
access and so users must allow access to use the functionality. In this chapter I seek to
determine if contextual runtime access control leads to better policy creation. I also
seek to understand how distracting runtime configuration is, if it results in increased
memorability, and how users react to it.
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5.1 Mobile Contextual Configuration
I chose the Android mobile phone platform to begin exploring runtime contextual
access control. In regards to access control, Android’s platform is similar to the
social network site application platforms in that it asks users to consider policies
at install time. During the application install process, users see the permissions
being asked for such as contacts or access to the camera. However, mobile devices
with operating systems like Android do not require the friendship-based protection
discussed in Section 4.1.2.1. Generally users are considered to own all the data on
their devices and there is no concept of a friends’ phone sharing information located
on their phone.
5.1.1 Prototype
In order to test runtime configuration of access control policies, two prototype
applications were outfitted with contextual access control. The first application,
Divide and Conquer, was an Android open source example that we added permissions
to as well as created a profile feature to track the user and the user’s friends’ high
scores. This application requested several permissions including access to the vibrator,
contacts, Internet and phone identity. We bound each permission closest to their
context of use. For example, the vibrator was bound to the game play area with a
small icon in the bottom right hand corner and the Internet permission to the save
profile area on the profile screen.
The second application, called LifeJournal, allowed users to take audio or picture
notes and tag them with contacts, locations, notes, and more. Again, the permissions
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Figure 6: An example of contextual binding with the LifeJournal application.
are bound as close to the context of use as possible. Figure 6 shows an example of
contextually binding access to the microphone to the creation of an audio note.
The two prototypes using runtime contextual access control differed in terms of
functionality and requested permissions. Both prototypes allowed participants to set
permissions at runtime. For both prototypes, permission dialogs could be initiated
in two different ways. The first way was for the participant to touch the persistent
icon on the user interface that indicated whether or not that set of permissions had
been allowed. If the icon represented a single permission its state reflected that
decision with locked or unlocked respectively. If the icon represented more than one
permission then it shows unlocked if any of the permissions it represented had been
allowed. Future iterations would likely contain three states reflecting the partially
granted permissions.
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The second way of initiating the permissions dialog was by utilizing functionality
within the application. In both prototype applications, button listener events that
required special permissions to be granted resulted in the production of the on screen
configuration dialog. Once the dialog was rendered, the participant could configure
their desired policy and select save. At that point the user’s policy was updated
and the execution of the application resumed. Once the policy had been configured,
if those permissions were needed again, there was no need to re-prompt the user.
As such this second way of initiating the dialog was automatically bypassed if all
permission requirements were already met.
In some cases, a permission was required in order for execution to resume. For
example, when a participant wanted to record audio, the microphone permission
absolutely must have been allowed. In these cases, I notified participants using the
Android toast notification system of which permission was required in order to move
on in that step. I added this feature when pressed for time after some of the pilot
participants were unable to figure out why they could not save a journal entry. This
turned out to be a useful method to notify participants when required permissions
were necessary to continue. It is a method I reuse in the next prototype, again with
success.
In an actual deployed system I anticipate that there would be other places to
configure the access control policy and review the policy in a holistic way. One
example currently in use, is the Android application management tool. Users can use
this tool to remove applications, move them to an alternative storage location, review
permissions, and so on. However, my desire is to evaluate the contextual aspect of
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configuration and I therefore did not include any of these features in the prototype.
5.1.2 Study Methodology
I designed this study to test several aspects of contextually configuring access
control at runtime in comparison to standard configuration at install time. With
this study, I attempted to explore the following questions:
• Effort - What is the difference in how difficult or complicated it is to configure
access control in this way versus the standard installation screen provided by
the platform.
• Comfort - How comfortable were users in making decisions? Did they find this
contextual method of access control annoying?
• Comprehension - How well did users understand what was being asked of them?
• Distraction - Was configuring access control in this way distracting? All the
tasks were designed to have users encounter access control during use which
may interrupt their primary task.
• Memorability - Does providing access control in a contextual manner allow users
to better remember the permissions they have configured for a program?
I designed a within subjects user study to examine these different research ques-
tions. Participants interacted with three different applications: the Divide and Con-
quer application, LifeJournal application, and CatchNotes. Both Divide and Conquer
and LifeJournal were my prototype applications and participants would configure
policies while interacting with the application during runtime. These two runtime
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configuration applications did not request the exact same set of permissions and were
tested separately for memorability. CatchNotes was an actual application available
for free from the Android Market. Its features were extremely similar to the ones
offered in my prototype LifeJournal. Because this application was from the Android
Market, it was configured by using the standard install time installation method on
the Android Platform.
In order to maintain a consistent study environment, I used a rooted Motorola
Droid Android phone. I configured a custom phone image that contained: the study
software, a configured test google account, a set of fictional contacts, and a few ran-
dom images from the Internet. In the image, I configured the airport mode to be on,
effectively disabling any phone calls, text messages, or other regular phone activity
that might disturb the participants. I then enabled and configured the wireless In-
ternet of the device. This allowed participants to use the Android Market to install
the CatchNotes application. Before each study session the phone was restored to this
original image so that participants’ experience would be as similar as possible.
Participants were briefly shown how to use the Android phone they were given at
the beginning of the study session. I reviewed how to turn on and off the phone,
unlock the phone, and how to access the study related applications. I instructed
participants on how to find the Catch Notes application using the Android Market
and how to use both prototype applications. I then showed them the task sheet and
survey software used to record the session. Finally, I gave participants a chance to
ask any questions that they might have before starting the study tasks.
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Participants’ use of the standard install time configuration and both contextual
runtime configurations were counterbalanced to reduce order effects. Participants
performed a set of tasks on each of the interfaces. Tasks included creating audio
journal entries, picture journal entries, playing the game, and configuring a profile.
As participants completed their tasks across the different applications, they were
required to interact with both the install time and the contextual runtime access
control interfaces. After each task was complete, participants paused for a brief break
to fill out a short survey. Participants were asked about the effort required to configure
the access control they encountered in that task. Participants were also asked how
comfortable they were configuring the access control. Finally, participants were asked
to describe any other issues they wanted to discuss regarding the application and task.
After completing all three tasks, I asked the participants to take three short quizzes
to assess memorability. For each application, the participant attempted to identify
all permissions that they had been asked for while performing the study tasks. The
test contained a list of 16 permissions for each application that asked participants
to identify which of the permissions from the list were or were not requested by the
application. The list of permissions on the quiz was the same for each application.
The quiz included permissions requested by the application during the tasks as well as
other permissions not requested during the task. Each permission item was scored as
either a correct or incorrect response. Correct responses indicated that a permission
was asked for when it was or was not asked for when it was not. Any other answer
was deemed incorrect.
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After completing the three quizzes, the participants completed demographic ques-
tions and three questions pertaining to the Westin Privacy Segmentation Index. I
then sat down with participants and asked them to rate and describe their overall
experience, understanding of access requested by the applications, and respond to the
complexity of the access control configuration. I also asked participants to describe
how annoying the configuration was, and the level of control that they felt. After
completion of the study participants were compensated with a $15 Amazon e-gift
card.
5.1.3 Results
I recruited 14 participants for the study using flyers and a recruiting table setup
in the student union. They reported ages ranging from 18-28 with (M = 21). Most
participants (n = 11) reported having some college or an undergraduate degree and
some reported having at least some (n = 3) graduate coursework or degree. Most
participants (n = 11) reported being smartphone users although some (n = 2) re-
ported not using a smartphone at all. Only a few participants (n = 3) reported using
Android daily. Most of the participants (n = 8) reported having not used Android at
all. Participants self reported their ethnicities as predominantly White (n = 8) and
Africian American (n = 4). One participant reported themselves as Hispanic (n = 1)
and the other Middle Eastern (n = 1). Participants in this study were predominantly
male (n = 10) compared to female (n = 4). Using Westins Privacy Segmentation
Index I found participants to be mostly unconcerned (n = 7) and pragmatist (n = 6).
One participant was classified as a fundamentalist (n = 1).
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Overall most participants (n = 11) said their experience with the contextual access
control was positive. Participants cited the ease of selecting permissions (n = 3) as
well as liking increased control (n = 4). Some participants (n = 3) mentioned being
initially confused, however, all who mentioned being confused described their overall
experience as positive. A few participants (n = 2) disliked the repetition of the access
control and one participant (n = 1) disliked the extra time associated with using the
access control. Of the participants that described the experience as positive, two
participants (n = 2) described the access control interaction as annoying.
Most participants (n = 12) felt it was easy to understand that applications were
requesting permission using contextual access control. Many of these participants
(n = 11) said it was obvious because the notification made it clear when the appli-
cation displayed the access control message. One participant (n = 1) found it easy
to understand, but mentioned that it was not clear when action was necessary to
allow access. Two of the participants (n = 2) found it difficult to understand. Of
these, one participant (n = 1) said he had concerns about what was shared as a result
of granting a permission—specifically access to the SD card. He was not sure if his
contacts or other information was stored on the SD card and thus shared as a result
of granting the permission.
P6:“It was easy to understand what they were requesting access to... access
to the SD card... but you know, what does that do? What all is held on
the SD card, because I don’t know where the information is held [like my]
contacts. [...] I just really don’t know what they are getting access to.”
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The other participant (n = 1) said he was not able to understand how to do the task
without additional help from the investigator.
Most participants (n = 11) did not think contextual access control was compli-
cated. Some of them (n = 5) commented it was not complicated because it required
little additional effort to use the prototype applications. A few participants (n = 3)
said it was clear how to use contextual access control to grant permissions. Several
participants mentioned that although the access control was simple to use, they did
not like the repetition of interaction (n = 2) nor the extra time (n = 2) needed for
managing access control.
Most participants (n = 12) felt like they had more control over their data using
contextual access control. Some of these participants (n = 5) also liked the ability
make a decision about whether or not they were willing to share during runtime.
Similarly, some of these participants (n = 5) liked the increased awareness that
resulted from the contextual access control.
P3:“Everything was asking for... like I had to save it. So I was aware of
everything that was going on and what was being saved, it let me know...
stuff popped up to let me know what was going on.”
One participant (n = 1) felt neutral about being in more or less control and com-
mented how he wanted to see install time permissions but also liked being aware of
when the application was requesting access using contextual runtime dialogs. Inter-
estingly, one participant (n = 1) said he felt as if he was in less control when using
contextual access control because he felt rushed to complete tasks.
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P13:“You have to allow so much information and your really not... I know
I wasn’t paying attention to what I was supposed to be allowing. I was just
rushing to get through it so I could complete the task. You just have to let
go of some security in order to have access to the program.”
Some participants (n = 5) found the runtime contextual access control to be dis-
tracting. The primary concern expressed (n = 4) was being distracted from com-
pleting the study task. The prototype applications using runtime contextual access
control produced a dialog message automatically at any moment when a function was
used that needed permission to access the phone. One participant explained how he
felt distracted by the dialogs:
P9:“You are trying to do something, and you might be in the middle of
doing something... and it just disrupts the flow of completing it.”
Half of the participants (n = 7) disliked the extra effort and repetition involved in
contextual access control. Some participants (n = 5) also found runtime contextual
access control annoying.
P6:“It is good they are asking for permission but to allow every single
access to all the different components is pretty annoying.”
One participant (n = 1) also said that contextual access control was not user friendly.
Other participants said they were not annoyed because they only had to grant ac-
cess one time (n = 2), and they liked the additional awareness that resulted from
contextual access control (n = 2). For example one participant explained:
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Figure 7: Memorability scores for two runtime contextual configuration applications
vs an install time application Catch Notes.
P3:“It helps you understand what was going on and what your doing with
the phone. I think it helps prevent confusion.”
Many participants in the study reported liking the increased awareness (n = 7)
and enjoyed the increased level of control (n = 8). Yet, half of all participants
(n = 8) complained of the effort, repetitive nature, and annoyance that they felt
towards contextual access control. Ultimately, most participants (n = 9) thought
they would want access control like this on more applications in the future. However,
some participants (n = 5) said they would not want to see runtime contextual access
control in the future citing concerns with the repetition of dialogs (n = 2), the
annoying nature of it (n = 2), and that they had to deal with popups (n = 2).
I conducted a test to measure participants’ memorability of what permissions were
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requested by both types of access control techniques (runtime contextual and install
time). The tests contained 16 possible permissions available to any of the applications.
The same 16 items were asked for each of the three applications, however, each of
the three applications asked for permission to different items. For each application,
participants indicated whether that application did or did not ask for the permissions
on the quiz. The total score was calculated as the total number of correct responses
for each participant. A participant’s answer was correct if he indicated an item was
asked for and it was or an item was not asked for and it was not. Any other answer
was marked as incorrect.
Participants scores per application are shown in Figure 7. Divide and Conquer and
LifeJournal both used runtime contextual access control configuration, however, each
application differed in its set of requested permissions. Catch Notes and LifeJournal
were nearly identical in functionality but differed in access control techniques. Fig-
ure 8 shows histograms of scores for each application. The distribution of scores for
both Divide and Conquer as well as LifeJournal are negatively skewed. The distribu-
tion of scores for Catch Notes, the install time application, is approximately normally
distributed. In addition, Catch Notes scores appear to be similar to the binomial
distribution. For this reason I tested each of the scores using the binomial test. I
found that both Divide and Conquer and LifeJournal to be statistically significant
with p < .001. However, Catch Notes was not statistically significant with p = .791.
This means that participants observed scores were not significantly different than
what could have been obtained by simply tossing a coin to determine the answer for
each permission.
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Since the scores for all three applications were not normally distributed, I chose
to use a Friedman test to determine if there were differences between the scores
obtained for each of the three applications. After finding a significant difference with
the Friedman test, I used Wilcoxon signed ranks tests to do all pairwise comparisons
of applications. I calculated 6 tests (3 pairwise, 3 binomial), therefore, I adjusted my
significance level to (p < .0083) using a Bonferroni adjustment.
Using the Friedman test I found that the memorability scores were statistically
significant with χ2(2) = 23.098, p < .001. Specifically, I found that participants scored
higher Z = −3.195, p < .001 on Divide and Conquer (M = 12) than they did on Catch
Notes (M = 8). Additionally, participants scored higher Z = −3.330, p < .001 on
LifeJournal (M = 12.5) than they did on Catch Notes (M = 8). Effect sizes for Divide
and Conquer and LifeJournal were both large, (r = 0.85, r = 0.89) respectively. There
was no significant difference Z = −2.172, p = .030 between Divide and Conquer and
Life Journal, both runtime contextual configuration applications. Effect sizes are
reported as r as advocated by Rosenthal for analysis in social research [51].
5.1.4 Discussion
This study examined the differences between install time access control and runtime
contextual access control. The results indicate that there may be tradeoffs between
control, awareness, memorability, and usability that need to be addressed. I now
highlight some of these findings.
• Despite liking awareness and additional control there are major issues experi-
enced by half of the participants.
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Participants in this study liked that they had control over access to information on
the phone. Participants also gave positive comments on the awareness of access they
gained using contextual access control. However, runtime contextual access control
requires more interaction with the user while they are engaged with the primary
task. As a result, half of the participants in this study disliked the extra effort
and annoyances of runtime contextual access control. Participants did not seem to
mind configuring one or two permissions, but felt it cumbersome to configure access
many times. This problem of repetitive prompts surfaced throughout the interview
discussion on various aspects of the user experience. It seemed to not be limited to
one aspect of their experience. I also note this same issue in the next study presented
in Section 5.2. Since this is a recurring problem, I more thoroughly explore the issue
in Chapter 6.
Runtime contextual access control in these prototype Android applications could
invoke permission configuration dialogs when using functionality that required per-
missions for the first time. After granting the permission, the application continued
to operate with the expected functionality. It appears that the access control dialog
may have been perceived as an unexpected response from the system. For exam-
ple, when clicking “Tag a contact,” the expectation is to see a representation of the
contact on the phone. Instead, the application displayed a dialog asking for the con-
tacts permission. Participants often referred to this dialog as a popup. Since the
popup came as an unexpected response by the system, it seemed to distract many
of the participants. In some cases, this distraction was described as annoying and
future research on runtime contextual access control should explore how to capture
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the increased awareness while decreasing or eliminating annoyances.
• It is not clear how well participants comprehended the permissions that appli-
cations were asking them to grant.
Nearly all the participants believed it was very easy to understand what permissions
were requested by the applications using runtime contextual access control. Phone
permissions are not very technical and are generally understood by most users, so
it is not surprising participants’ reported understanding of the access control. For
example, several applications asked participants for permission to their contacts, the
internet, or the phones vibrator. These types of permissions are not technical in
nature and understood by most phone users. However, it is not clear users under-
stand exactly where their data resides on a phone and what access is granted with
some permissions. One of the participants pointed this issue out by asking what the
granting of a certain permission really means. In particular, they questioned what it
meant to grant the application permission to access their SD card. This participant
introspectively thought about their contacts and photographs being stored on the SD
card and therefore did not consider contacts as a separate permission. When using
fine grained access control, presented in Section 4.1, understanding the scope of per-
mission sharing was less of a problem. In that study, sample data was used to help
establish context and convey details of the requested information for participants.
Two participants in this study were confused with what would be actually shared by
granting a permission. Despite this confusion, it illustrates that participants exhibited
increased awareness by actively considering application permissions and the decision
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to grant access to the application. Future research should consider combining these
findings to see if presenting actual user data can further help understand the sharing
scope and access control.
• Runtime contextual access control increased memorability of configured permis-
sions and possibly awareness.
The results of this study support that runtime contextual access control increases
memorability and awareness. Although participants were not directly asked about
awareness in the interview, half indicated they were more aware that they were shar-
ing data with the applications using runtime contextual access control. Quantitative
results suggest improved memorability between the two prototype applications and
the standard install time application. Participants’ correct scores for remembering
requested permissions increased by 25% between applications using the different ac-
cess control techniques. Using prototype applications could have confounded these
results with a novelty effect, however, many of the participants (n = 8) in this study
reported never using an Android device. Thus, the novelty of Android’s install time
access control system should have been similar to the novelty of the runtime con-
textual access control for these participants. Additionally, I informed participants
that the purpose of the study was to examine the differences between the two access
control systems. This would have likely increased emphasis on attention to access
control for both techniques.
Memorability and awareness are not equal. However, evidence suggesting increased
memorability likely reflects some increased awareness of sharing. Increased awareness
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can improve the capacity to make more informed decisions about what and when users
share to applications and possible third parties. Unfortunately the positive results
indicating an increase in accuracy of remembering requested permissions may still not
be ideal. Recollection results for install time access control were poor and could also
be represented by random guesses, therefore a significant increase in recollection may
be good, but not represent enough awareness to truly inform users about information
sharing.
Recollection of permissions at runtime using contextual access control was better,
but the improved scores can still be considered poor. Participants were only able
to recall permissions with 75% accuracy. Forgetting 25% of the granted access can
possibly lead to significant unintended access because a single permission can indicate
access to a large amount of information. The potential damage from such unintended
access can still be widespread and serious. Improving and understanding the link
between awareness and memorability is an effort that should be explored in future
research. Further improvements will only help increase awareness and result in users
making better sharing decisions.
5.1.5 Conclusion
This section compared runtime contextual access control to install time access con-
trol. Contextual access control consistently resulted in higher memorability of which
permissions were requested by a phone application. Runtime contextual access con-
trol improved recall by 25% over the install time access control. Despite the positive
change in the overall memorability, the results were still disappointing. Participants’
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average score for install time memorability appeared to be no better than simply
tossing a coin. Runtime contextual access control recall scores were on average 75%
correct.
While 75% may appear to be a high number, the leftover 25% of sharing that was
either unrecallable or incorrect is a concern and should not be dismissed. Future
work should seek to further increase this memorability to provide users with better
awareness of their data sharing. Additional research may also provide insights into
how important memorability is to overall awareness with access control. In particular,
discovering quantitative methods to judge awareness would be a pertinent contribu-
tion. Having such a quantitative tool may help to more completely compare different
versions of access control configuration systems and eliminate variations that might
result in unintentional sharing.
The prototype in Section 4.1.2.3 presented a concrete representation of what was
being shared as a result of granting permissions. In contrast, the prototype in this
section only provided the permission name and the ability to make the decision. As a
result, two of the participants were unsure of the data sharing that they were engaging
in. Future iterations of either type of access control should contain concrete repre-
sentations of data being requested. Omission of this improved context can cause user
decisions from incomplete information and therefore may expose users to a significant
amount of risk from unintended sharing.
Finally, the prototype in this section presented an access control dialog whenever
the application’s function needed a permission not previously granted. As a result,
participants encountered what they frequently called popups as they interacted with
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the application. The repetitive nature of these popups came up throughout the
study and manifested itself as an annoyance to the participants. This problem should
be addressed in order for runtime contextual access control to be acceptable as a
deployed technique. In the next section, Section 5.2, I attempt to address reducing
this annoyance by changing the way dialogs are initiated within the application.
5.1.6 Acknowledgements
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5.2 Social Network Contextual Configuration
In Section 5.1, I explored contextual configuration on mobile devices with the
Android operating system. In this section, I consider contextual configuration on a
social network site, Facebook. Configuration of permissions on Facebook is slightly
different than the configuration of permissions on mobile devices. On social network
sites configuring a permission almost always results in data being shared with an
actual third party. This is unlike mobile devices where execution of consumed data
can take place directly on the device.
In the previous section, participants were aware of the nature of the study since they
were comparing both methods of configuration. In this section, I study just runtime
contextual access control on its own. Studying runtime contextual access control
alone allowed me to examine decision making and the effects of its implementation.
I also studied access control more subtly in this section by designing applications to
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facilitate user interaction. Participants in this study were unaware that the access
control was being studied.
5.2.1 Prototype Scrapbooking Apps
Originally, I developed an interactive game on Facebook that used contextual ac-
cess control. Much like the mobile application Divide and Conquer discussed in
Section 5.1, the icons were bound to features like high score profiles. In pilot testing,
I determined that the game felt too much like creating a profile, similar to Audience-
View [37]. For this reason I decided to create three scrapbooking applications that
would consume user data and produce digital visualizations of their photos. Creating
a scrapbook requires multiple steps such as looking through albums, selecting pho-
tographs, looking at friends albums, annotating images, and so on. It is therefore
more interactive and less like unlocking elements of a single page. Each application
had a different look and feel and requested its own set of permissions from the per-
mission manager, later described. Permissions in these prototypes were still bound
to the part of the interface most relevant to their context of use. Participants using
the prototypes were led to believe these permission requests were from Facebook. All
three applications are shown in Figure 9.
The first application AWScrapbook requested a total three permissions : Albums,
Basic Info, and Photographs. The next, Photofire, requested four: Albums, Basic
Info, Friends, and Photographs. Finally, Tiler, requested six: Albums, Basic Info,
Contact Info, Hometown, Location, and Photographs. AWScrapbook was meant to
be minimalistic in nature. The visualization it generated was a simple smattering of
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the chosen pictures on an HTML5 canvas with the images slightly rotated randomly.
All the permissions it asked for were meant to seem reasonable within the context
of creating a photo scrapbook. Photofire was much more polished and included an
advanced visualization that looked like a Polaroid photograph. The photographs in
this visualization could also be annotated with custom text. Again, the permissions
it asked for were meant to seem reasonable related to the scrapbook context. Tiler
was the least polished using a carousel style selection. It offered little in the way of
visual feedback and requested the most permissions from participants. While each of
the applications differed in terms of functionality, visual aesthetics, and permissions
requested, they all used the same interface for configuring permissions.
5.2.2 Configuration Interface
While interacting with the scrapbooking applications, participants granted per-
missions in order to utilize functionality of the application. These permissions were
bound to the area of the interface most relevant to their context of use. There-
fore, placement of permissions was considered in the design of applications. For the
scrapbooking applications I noted that web applications rely heavily on div tags to
encapsulate elements in containers, see Figure 10.
I exploited this use of div tags to provide binding locations for the configuration
icons used in this study. For example, when displaying a list of participant albums
there would be a div for the set of all albums. Inside that div would be another
representing just a single row of albums. Similarly, inside that would be another for
an individual album. If this section of the interface used the permissions Albums
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Figure 10: Nested divs and a binding location for permissions
and Basic Info then a natural binding location is the topmost div shown in bold in
Figure 10. I used this div and absolutely right aligned a security icon like the one
depicted Figure 11. Other domains not involving web applications may have different
semantics for element placement. The most appropriate placement of configuration
icons in this and other domains could be further investigated with additional research
beyond the scope of this thesis.
As the participant interacted with the application, they begin to utilize functional-
ity. If a participant tried to use functionality requiring a permission that had not yet
been granted, two things would happen—both are depicted in Figure 11. First, the
icon for the bound div will begin shaking from side to side for three seconds. Second,
a growl sound is generated letting the user know which permissions are required to
move on.
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Figure 11: Growl like notification and configuration icon. The configuration icon
shown is in motion.
In contrast to the Android implementation in Section 5.1, I do not automatically
display a modal configuration dialog. During pilot testing, I determined this to feel
less intrusive and hoped to reduce the frustration that accompanies modal popups.
If the user hovers over the icon a short animation shows the user the portion of the
interface that is bound to the configuration icon. If the user clicks on the icon, the
configuration dialog is displayed by the permission manager. An example dialog is
shown in Figure 12.
The dialog was designed to be simple to use and easy to understand. Each per-
mission is displayed in its own container. That container contains several items of
interest. First is an icon representing the permission that is being requested by the
application. Icons lend themselves to being easily scannable. Next, a text description
of the permission accompanies the icon, for example Photographs. Finally, a repre-
sentation using the users actual user data is provided. The color of text emphasizes
actual user data. In the case of the Photographs permission, a random photo is chosen
and the string “, etc.” is appended to it indicating that there is more in the set.
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Figure 12: Runtime contextual configuration dialog with the Basic Info permission
being dragged to allowing container.
By default, no permissions are granted and are located in the You are not allowing:
container shown in Figure 12. As a user hovers over each permission, the background
color changes to a slightly darker blue which is demonstrated in Figure 12 with the
Basic Info permission. Additionally, the cursor changes from a pointer to a hand
indicating that the permission can be clicked and dragged. Once the user starts
dragging the permission, the target container background changes color to a slightly
darker gray as shown in the You are allowing: container. This signals the user about
which container the permission will be located if they stop dragging and release
the permission. The notion of dragging from one container to another is meant to
emphasize that the user is sharing their data to the application.
Once the permission is released, it is inserted into the target container as the last
permission in that container. All the permissions that were below it in the source
container move up to fill the space that was previously occupied by the permission.
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Once the user is satisfied with the configured policy, they simply click “Okay” and the
choices they made will be sent to the permission manager. The permission manager
then calls a callback function and provides updates to the interface as necessary. This
interaction is further explained in the next section.
5.2.3 Prototype Permission Manager
To facilitate the testing of runtime contextual access control and the configuration
interface, I developed a reusable prototype permission manager. I used this permission
manager in all three of the prototype scrapbooking applications previously described.
Normally, permissions are managed and handled directly by the Facebook API. Since
the applications I developed should not allow users to interact with Facebook’s per-
mission system, I created a permission manager that sits on top of Facebook’s as
shown in Figure 13. The permission manager requests the entire set of permissions
P where P ⊇ {PApp1 , PApp2 , PApp3 , ...}. When each application Appj needs a single
permission p it now interacts with the permission manager. Since the application will
not interact with Facebook’s permission system, I can create arbitrary p that does
not exist in Facebook’s API. I later use this to create finer grained permissions for
my prototypes to use. However, since the permission manager is limited by the set of
attributes S exposed by the social network (Section 4.1.1), the permission manager
can offer no more functionality than the social network API itself provides.
The permission manager provides both client and server side functions for an ap-
plication to check if p is granted. In both cases, the permission manager will respond
indicating whether or not p ∈ AAppj,i where AAppj,i is the same application policy as
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Figure 13: Example of permission manager that was placed on top of Facebooks.
described in Section 4.1.2.1 for a user i. The client or server can then make a decision
about how best to proceed with application execution. Additionally, the permission
manager also provides helper functions for the client side implementations to handle
interface binding and visualizations depending on whether a given p is granted or not.
As the application loads on the client side, helper functions check to see if the
user has granted the permissions the application is requesting for that section of the
interface. For example:
var permRequest = new Permiss ions ( ) ;
permRequest . albums = true ;
permRequest . albumsRequired = true ;
permRequest . b a s i c i n f o = true ;
$ . fn . checkPerms ( permRequest , f unc t i on ( r e s u l t ){
//Get and d i s p l a y albums or d e f a u l t content
}
In the above example, I require Albums because I want to display them, but I op-
tionally request Basic Info so that I can provide a header with the user’s name. The
function checkPerms takes the requested permissions and checks them. It then calls
back the anonymous inner function letting the application know the result. Develop-
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ers do not need to concern themselves with alerting the user to missing permissions
since the permission manager will do this for them, as described in Section 5.2.2. The
only concern should be with the content for the bound div.
Finally, the permission manager and all three of the scrapbooking applications were
instrumented to log all the actions taken by the participant. Each time they added
or removed a photo, navigated to a page, granted or revoked permissions, that action
was logged. Actual photographs were not logged, just the action of adding one. Logs
were stored in a password protected MySQL database.
5.2.4 Study Methodology
In the Spring of 2013, I recruited 18 participants from Charlotte, NC and from the
University of North Carolina at Charlotte (UNC Charotte) using flyers, tables, and
active solicitation to participate in an hour long study. In exchange for participa-
tion, participants received a $15 Amazon Gift Card. Inclusion criteria for the study
included the participant being 18 years of age or older, having an active Facebook
account, and having photographs on Facebook. Participants scheduled an appoint-
ment to come to the Usability Lab at UNC Charlotte. Participants were not informed
ahead of time about the security, privacy, or access control aspects of the study. I
indicated to participants that they would be taking part in a student project to write
a report on how to build better scrapbooking software. However, they were actually
taking part in a deception based study on the runtime contextual access control.
Once participants arrived at the Usability Lab, I reintroduced myself to them and
explained the scope of the study. Participants were told that there would be audio
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and video recording and that the session would last about an hour. I then gave
the participants an informed consent document and asked them to review it and
provide me with any questions they might have. After the participants signed the
informed consent, I gave them a brief explanation on how to use the study computer.
The computer consisted of two screens, a primary screen where participants would
perform the tasks assigned and a secondary screen off to the right containing the
survey. I instructed the participants that after finishing each set of tasks, they would
be asked to fill out a small survey on the secondary computer screen.
After participants indicated that they understood how to move between the two
screens, I instructed them to fill out a brief demographic survey. The survey asked
standard demographic questions and included no privacy or security related questions.
Once this survey was completed, I handed participants a task sheet and asked them
to read it over while I started the recording software and backup audio recorders. I
started the recording but I also secretly installed the study software to the partici-
pant’s Facebook account. This deception was necessary to avoid participants inter-
acting with the Facebook API that uses an install time access control system. By
installing the software without their knowledge, they would be interacting completely
with the prototype runtime permission manager I developed. Again, the permission
manager was meant to look as if it was from Facebook and not part of the disguised
study.
The task sheet that participants read first informed them that I in no way en-
dorsed or reviewed the three applications that they were about to interact with. It
explained that the three applications were three random scrapbooking applications I
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selected from Facebook. It then provided instructions for them to carry out normal
scrapbooking tasks for each application. They were asked to add at least 5 photos for
each application to the scrapbook, view the visualization, and add custom content to
some of the photographs.
Once the participants finished reviewing the task sheet I let them know which
application to begin with. Since there were three applications, each differing in func-
tionality and permissions, the order participants used the applications was counter-
balanced. I reminded them that after completing the tasks for that application they
should fill out the survey on the right.
Once participants started using the applications they would encounter runtime
contextual access control for the first time. If confused participants requested help
from me I initially avoided helping them. I would simply ask them to show me what
they had done. By having them show me what they did, participants would get a
second chance of noticing the permission icons animation. If the participant remained
confused and still required help, I would mention there is a lock present on the screen.
Participants were left to use the application themselves while I sat at a neighbouring
desk working on a non study related task. If participants asked if they should allow
a permission I would respond by saying I was sorry but did not know anything about
the applications.
The survey that accompanied each application was designed to measure several
general usability issues: how hard or easy to use the application was, how frustrating
or pleasing it was, how much effort it required, if there was a reason they would not
want to use it, or if there was anything about it they would change. These questions
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were all directed towards the scrapbooking application not the access control. I
later separately ask about some of these items in a post interview. Finally, I asked
participants to describe any problems they encountered completing the tasks. Each
question included a small box asking participants to explain why they felt that way.
I specifically instructed participants to be brief in their answer on the survey because
I would be fully interviewing them after they completed all the tasks.
Once participants completed using all three applications I read a prepared deception
debriefing statement. Participants were informed that the study had actually been
about the decisions they had made and that I actually was studying the access control.
Participants were then offered the chance to completely withdraw from the study, have
all their data deleted, and also keep the $15 Amazon Gift Card for their participation.
They were asked if they were willing to stay in the study and answer additional
questions about the prompts they received.
Once the participants, confirmed they would remain in the study and answer ad-
ditional questions, I gave them a short semi-structured interview. In the interview, I
asked about the participant’s understanding of the access control prompts, problems
they encountered, and who they thought they were sharing data with. I also exam-
ined their overall experience using the access control and additionally assessed several
qualities including: how hard or easy using it was, how complicated it was, how much
control they had over their data, any distraction caused by the access control, and
desire to have more applications use it. During the interview, the video recording was
also played back for them and paused to observe as many configuration prompts as
possible given the time remaining for the session. Each time the video was paused,
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I asked them to discuss the reasoning for the access control decision they made at
that moment. After the interview, I asked participants to complete the Westin pri-
vacy segmentation index [34] questions. I used their answers to identify participants
as privacy fundamentalists, pragmatists, or privacy unconcerned. Finally, I thanked
participants and provided them with the study inducement.
The audio files were transcribed for analysis and log files collected. The transcribed
interviews from the recorded sessions were coded using Atlas.ti. Two researchers
performed open coding on the transcribed data. We developed concepts based on
the agreed coding to examine common responses and better understand behavior
and then resolved any coding differences, resulting in inter-coder reliability of 84%
agreement between two independent coders.
5.2.5 Results
A total of 18 participants participated in the study. One participant withdrew
from the study collecting their gift card after the deception debriefing. I also encoun-
tered multiple problems with another participant during the study. That participant
answered her phone and communicated via text messages during the interview pro-
cess and did not focus on the interview questions. I asked the questions multiple
times in order to solicit a response because the participant was distracted. I therefore
discarded this participant from my analysis.
I analyzed the results for the remaining (n = 16) participants. Participants re-
ported ages ranging from 18-43 with (x̄ = 27.44, s = 9.19) and (M = 24). Partici-
pants were divided fairly evenly between male (n = 7) and female (n = 9). Partici-
124
pants reported having a wide variety of ethnicities including Asian (n = 4), African
American (n = 5), Hispanic (n = 3) and Caucasian (n = 4). Participants educational
backgrounds varied with (n = 7) indicating they had at least some college, (n = 7)
indicating they had a master’s degree and (n = 1) indicating they obtained a Ph.D.
Despite all having advanced education, very few (n = 2) strongly agreed that others
would come to them for computer help, most (n = 9) were either neutral or did not
agree others would come to them for help. Using Westin Privacy Segmentation Index,
participants were mostly pragmatists (n = 8), followed by fundamentalists (n = 7),
and then 1 unconcerned. The sample including so many university students is a
limitation of this study and future studies may wish to examine a different sample.
Most participants (n = 15) reported having only one Facebook account, a single
participant reported having two. All (n = 16) reported having been a member of
Facebook for over 2 years, many (n = 12) over 4 years, and some (n = 4) over 6.
In cases where participants were unsure we checked using their timeline for when
they joined the site. Most participants (n = 13) used Facebook several times a day,
although some (n = 3) used it once a day. So the sample was made up of fairly active
Facebook users who were familiar with the site. Nearly all participants (n = 13)
reported being deceived. Some participants (n = 2) said they suspected that the
study was not just about scrapbooks and one participant (n = 1) said they knew
that something else was being tested.
Participants added 339 photos to scrapbooks across all three applications. A break-
down per application is shown in Table 7. I used a Friedman test to determine if there
were differences between the number of photos added per application and performed
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Table 7: Photos added and dialogues requested per application.
AWScrapbook Photofire Tiler
Photos Added 112 147 80
Dialogs Requested 56 57 76
pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment (p < .0166) because of multiple
comparisons. The number of photographs added per application was statistically
significant with χ2(2) = 23.143, p < .001. Specifically, participants added more pho-
tos to Photofire (M = 8) than AWscrapbook (M = 5), Z = −2.947, p = .003.
Additionally, participants added more photos to Photofire than to Tiler (M = 5),
Z = −3.494, p < .001. This result is not at all unexpected since the Photofire applica-
tion included the ability to add photos from your friends albums which AWScrapbook
and Tiler did not provide.
Participants in total were shown 189 dialogs, see Table 7, and requested (M = 12)
dialogs each. The minimum number of dialogs required to complete the tasks for
all applications was 7—this assumes participants added all required permissions the
first time the dialog was initiated. Despite the appearance that participants initiated
more dialogs for the Tiler application, I found no statistically significant difference
χ2(2) = 5.193, p = .075 between the applications using a Friedman test. Although this
was not statistically significant, it is approaching significance. Additionally, the effect
size of the differences between Tiler/AWScrapbook (r = .32) and Tiler/Photofire
(r = .48) was moderate. Given a larger sample it is very likely this difference would
be significantly different and is therefore worth examining why Tiler had so many
more dialogs.
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Table 8: Final policies configured per application
AWScrapbook Photofire Tiler
Albums 16 16 16
Photographs 16 15 15
Basic Info 6 6 4
Friends 13
Contact Info 14
Hometown 3
Location 4
The Tiler application was designed to look crude and unrefined as well as request
the most permission from the participants. In order to view photographs in an album,
participants would have to grant the Contact Info permission. Many participants
(n = 13) tried not to grant Contact Info to Tiler. Most (n = 8) only tried once to not
allow their contact information to be shared with the application. In other words,
they made a decision not to share it and then after seeing it was required went back
and allowed it. Some (n = 3) tried a second time not to allow it, and one participant
(n = 1) tried 6 separate times not to allow the permission before giving up and
granting it. Finally, a participant (n = 1) tried once not to grant this permission and
when the application did not respond by showing their photographs, they initiated
the dialog twice in rapid succession and closed the dialog before it loaded. This
triggered a bug in the application that allowed the photographs to be seen without
the Contact Info permission, however, this participant had already granted access to
Photographs.
Users configured a variety of policies during the course of the study session. Table 8
shows the final state of the policies participants had configured. The first thing to
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note when looking at the table is that there are high rates of sharing for the Albums
and Photographs permission. Given the nature of the applications participants are
using this is expected. However, note the permission Photographs was not granted
by every participant in the study. The reason for this is one participant revoked
that permission for the Photofire application. When asked about it the participant
explained that they were experimenting with the access control after completing the
task to see what effect revoking it would have.
The permission Contact Info was also granted by nearly all (n = 14) participants.
As previously discussed, this permission was required in order to view the photographs
in an album and most participants initially attempted not to allow it, however, a cou-
ple of the participants (n = 2) did not allow permission. As a result, one participant
(n = 1) failed to complete the task. After granting Albums she quit attempting to use
the app and filled out the corresponding survey without asking me for help. Because
study design required minimal interaction from the investigator, I was not aware of
this until after the participant had been debriefed. The other participant (n = 1)
I previously noted discovered a bug allowing her to see the photographs without
actually granting Contact Info. Her initial decision was not to grant permission.
5.2.5.1 Decision Making With Contextual Access Control
Overall, participants granted permissions 148 times and revoked them 8 times.
Participants did not always grant or revoke permissions for a single reason, therefore,
it was possible that a participant had several reasons why they would grant or revoke
a permission. Additionally, because of time limitations it was not possible to discuss
128
each and every decision. As a result there may be reasons participants granted or
revoked permissions that went under-reported or even unreported. However, the
majority of decisions were discussed with participants in the post interview.
When asking for permissions with contextual access control, I bound the permission
requests closest to the context of use. Consequently, most participants (n = 14)
cited granting a permission because it was necessary to unlock the features they
needed/wanted to use. Most times the functionality they envisioned was real but
other times it was imagined. For example, granting a hometown so that photos taken
in the participants hometown would be easier to find. One participant explained why
they granted Basic Info when picking out photographs:
P10:“[I allowed it] so that when it could publish the photographs, it would
publish with my name.”
Similarly, most participants (n = 11) reported denying a permission because they
felt it was unneeded for the current task. Most participants (n = 11) also reported
denying permission because they were confused or unsure why it was needed for the
functionality they were attempting to use for the task. Another participant discussed
the same permission:
P16:“I really couldn’t see why I would need to do that if I’m just making
a picture scrapbook.”
Most participants (n = 9) reported granting a permission because they felt forced to
allow it in order to continue the task. In fact, many participants (n = 6) even said
they would grant almost anything in order to get the application to work.
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Some participants (n = 5) engaged—at least partially—in managing privacy at
the disclosure boundary. In other words, they manage what they share with social
network by self censoring in order to ease the burden of making a privacy/security
decision later. For example:
P14:“Sure, because the contact info I have posted on Facebook... I’m very
careful with what info goes onto Facebook, so even if an advertiser or a
identify thief got a hold of it, it wouldn’t be enough for them to be able to
ruin my life with. Anything on Facebook, I’m okay with sharing because
I’m not putting anything on there that is going to be able to hurt me.”
As I note later, this participant became quickly desensitized to the dialog and granted
every permission requested for every application.
Some participants (n = 4) explained that they were willing to grant the permission
because it was the only permission being asked for in the dialog. Many participants
(n = 7) also reported basing their decision on whatever they believed to be the mini-
mal set of permissions to accomplish the task. This is different from being necessary
to complete the task because in these situations participants were actively considering
all the choices to chose the minimum possible policy to accomplish their goal. A few
participants (n = 3) mentioned granting a permission just because they wanted to
see what would happen if they added it.
P10:“I wanted to see, was it getting access to the next level by sharing
only my location and not giving access to the photos? I wanted to see the
response [from] the applications still.”
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In essence they were testing to see how the permission they granted was affecting the
application.
Other miscellaneous reasons participants reported granting permissions include:
the application did not respond fast enough, having the ability to later revoke the
permission, not disagreeing with request, the permission could possibly be useful in
the future, not considering the data as personal to them, and the permission requested
was safer than alternatives. Other miscellaneous reasons for denying a permission
included: simply not wanting to share, friends already knew the requested data, the
requested permission was unsafe to grant, and the permission being requested was
unexpected.
Finally, participants revoked permissions 8 times. For some participants (n = 2),
this was recorded as part of the decision making process. For example, the partici-
pant granted access to Basic Info and before clicking “Okay” dragged it back. One
participant (n = 1) had decided to experiment with the access control as previously
mentioned. After he finished the task, he went back and started revoking permissions
to see what effect it would have on the application. Finally, a participant (n = 1) un-
intentionally granted a permission and when he discovered what happened, revoked
it. This is a serious interface problem that I discuss later in Section 5.2.5.3.
5.2.5.2 Attitudes Towards Contextual Access Control
During the semi-structured interview participants discussed their feelings towards
contextual access control. I discussed with participants various dimensions of those
feelings including if they thought the access control was complicated and if they
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reported being annoyed or distracted by the dialogs. In this section, I discuss how
participants felt towards contextual access control and why they described feeling
that way.
Many participants (n = 7) said their overall experience was positive although a
few (n = 4) said it was negative. When asked about their overall experience, many
participants’ (n = 6) feelings were related to the applications and not necessarily
the access control. Even after the deception was exposed, participants actually com-
mented about the interactions with the prototype applications instead of the contex-
tual access control. For example, one participant that said their overall experience
was negative commented:
P12:“I think the only reason why I would say somewhat negative [is] be-
cause of the fact that it exposed my location and hometown which I found
it kind of shocking.”
Similarly, half of the participants (n = 8) filling out the survey for the tasks performed
after each application referred to the access control in determining their experience
with that application. These surveys were taken before they had been debriefed.
None of the questions in these surveys mentioned or asked about access control.
During other questions unrelated to the applications, many participants (n = 9) had
trouble separating their thoughts about the access control from thoughts about the
applications. This may indicate there is an interdependent relationship between the
access control and the application.
Many participants (n = 8) reported being disturbed by the applications requesting
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permissions before being asked about their sharing decisions. For example, when
I asked a participant if they knew the study was not about the scrapbooks, they
responded:
P6:“No, [...] but I did notice that one of the things required me to add my
contact information, that didn’t bother me either because I only have an
email address up there that I no longer use and then I noticed that it had
my location up there but I didn’t allow that.”
This indicates an increased awareness of sharing and concern of it when using runtime
contextual access control.
Nearly half of the participants (n = 7) said they thought the access control was
annoying. Of the participants who found it annoying, nearly all (n = 6) mentioned
the repetitive nature of granting permissions as the reason for feeling that way. In-
terestingly, some of these participants (n = 3) also mentioned the permission being
asked for as the reason they were annoyed with the access control:
P9:“... and then the fact that it was asking for what it was asking was
annoying me. [...] One of the ones asked for access to my email stuff,
like my main account information, and then it asked for my location. I
didn’t see the need for it to know where I was. [...] and then the last one I
didn’t like was the friend access scrapbook part of it. I didn’t particularly
care for that, because I don’t know how the other person feels; their stuff
is being added to something they didn’t know.”
This provides further evidence that runtime contextual access control and the appli-
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cations themselves have an interdependent relationship.
The remaining participants (n = 8) did not find the access control annoying. Par-
ticipants cited various reasons they did not find it annoying including: it was easy
to understand (n = 1), it offered more security (n = 1), it was part of a process to
use the application (n = 1), and that they wanted contextual runtime access control
(n = 1). A couple of the participants (n = 2) did not find the access control dialogs
annoying but did mention the interactions seemed repetitive.
When asked about how complicated the access control was, most participants (n =
12) felt it was not complicated, although some (n = 2) found it complicated to use.
A few participants (n = 3) discussed how their feelings were at least partially tied to
the applications, again possibly pointing to an interdependent relationship between
access control interaction and general interaction with the application. Some of the
participants (n = 4) who did not find it complicated discussed some initial confusion
they had with how to use the access control. All participants (n = 16) said it was
easy to understand what information the applications requested with the runtime
contextual access control dialogs.
Overall, participants did not find the access control to be distracting (n = 11).
Participants who did not find it distracting explained: they considered it to be part
of the process (n = 4), they like the ability to have control (n = 2), found the
information given informative (n = 1), and gave them a secure feeling (n = 1).
The remaining participants (n = 5) found it distracting. Most of those participants
(n = 3) cited the repetitive nature of the permissions:
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P9:“[...] and every time I would try to complete a task, I had to go to
another permission, it would ask me for another permission.”
Some participants (n = 2) also said it was distracting because they were trying to
understand why they were being asked for certain permissions. Additionally, a few
participants (n = 2) suggested that some justification should be provided along with
the request for permission.
Most participants (n = 10) reported feeling like they had more control over their
data and two participants (n = 2) felt neutral about it. All participants who said they
felt like they were in more control (n = 10) cited the ability to chose exactly what
to share. Two participants (n = 2) also mentioned increased control because they
had the ability to better understand the sharing that occurred. Surprisingly, some
participants (n = 4) felt like they were in less control of their data. Participants
(n = 4) cited feeling like they were in less control because they were unsure of what
was done with their data after sharing. Another participant expressed an insecurity
by describing the sharing as a possible hacking risk (n = 2):
P9:“[...] I think one of them asked about contact, it listed my email and
something else behind it. I don’t know what it’s doing with that data itself.
I was concerned that, ‘Okay, is this going to hack into my page later on,’
type of thing.”
When asked about what would happen if their account was hacked because of the
sharing, they indicated that their friends would potentially be spammed from their ac-
count. They explained that their friends had experienced similar unpleasant hacking
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events.
Most participants (n = 10) wanted to see access control like this associated with
more future applications. Two participants (n = 2) did not care either way and four
participants (n = 4) would not like it used with other applications. Participants who
did not want to see it cited the time to configure policies (n = 2) and that it was
annoying (n = 2). Interestingly, one of the participants who found it annoying also
did not want it because of the information the applications had requested. They
considered the decisions like granting photographs to a scrapbooking application to
trivial to even be asked. Participants who wanted it used for future applications
primarily liked the ability to choose what they were sharing (n = 9). Some also
found it easy it to use (n = 2), thought it was intuitive (n = 1), and said it left them
feeling secure (n = 1).
5.2.5.3 Problems With Contextual Access Control
The most common problem participants (n = 11) encountered was being initially
confused about what was going on and how to initiate interaction with the prototype
applications. Sometimes participants (n = 4) blamed themselves for the application
not working. However, most participants (n = 9) were able to overcome this quickly
and use the applications to complete the tasks. The remaining participants (n = 7)
asked me for help when they encountered their first application that required them
to interact with the contextual access control dialog. When participants asked for
help I tried to provide little or no assistance as previously described. Most of the
participants (n = 4) who required initial help simply needed to be shown the lock
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icon. However, a few of them (n = 3) figured it out with me just looking over their
shoulder and offering no assistance. After this initial help, participants completed
tasks with the remaining applications without any assistance. A few participants
(n = 3) suggested having additional instructions might avoid some of their initial
confusion. As part of this study, no interstitial explaining the access control change
was given to participants.
During the semi-structured interview, I asked participants who they thought they
were sharing data with as they interacted with the contextual access control dialogs.
While it can be harder to identify participants that fully understand the scope of
sharing, it is easy to see when a participant does not understand it at all. A few
participants (n = 3) indicated they did not understand the sharing scope. One
participant (n = 1) indicated they thought they were sharing with their friends
and several different locations. They said because they were asked to drag Albums,
Location, and Hometown that they were sharing their albums with their location and
hometown. This was an understandable, but incorrect notion of data sharing. This
misconception of data sharing led to this participant considering only their friends as
an audience when making decisions. Another participant (n = 1) thought they were
sharing with themselves and their friends. Finally, one participant (n = 1) thought
they were sharing only with Facebook, the company. They rationalized that because
Facebook offered the application, Facebook was asking to share with themselves.
One interface issue led a participant (n = 1) to unintentionally grant a permission.
When a permission is dragged and dropped, it becomes the last item in the box it
was released to. All the other items that were below it move up to occupy the pre-
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vious space. This participant in manipulating the Photographs permission had that
permission moved to the last place in the box and Basic Info moved up to occupy
its space. When the participant finally decided to grant Photographs, she accidently
granted Basic Info instead of Photographs because the permissions had changed po-
sitions. When the application did not respond like she expected, she realized what
she had done and then revoked access to Basic Info and granted Photographs.
A few participants (n = 3) became desensitized to the prompt and referenced that
as a reason for their granting a permission.
P14:“Yes, I was like, okay, another one. Dink! [...] I was just on autopilot
at this point, dragging.”
This participant received a total of 12 dialogs and used the scrapbooking applications
for approximately 16 minutes. The second desensitized participant received 10 dialogs
and used the applications for 27 minutes. The third user encountered 8 dialogs and
used the applications for 15 minutes. Despite there being three participants who
mentioned being desensitized, only one (n = 1) actually granted every permission
they encountered. This was also the only participant in the study that granted
every permission requested. Others mentioned that despite being in a desensitized
“autopilot” state they still noticed things they were not comfortable sharing.
P13:“Other than the one that said hometown. I don’t know why that caught
my eye, but I didn’t drag it over. [...] It didn’t just say IOS photos or
albums. It asked hometown. I thought, hmm, why did they want to know
that? Then I didn’t use that, I mean, drag it over there.”
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Finally, some participants (n = 3) said the lock icon for the prompt was too small
and needed to be made bigger and a few others (n = 2) suggested moving it because
they did not notice it. These minor issues were not directly studied, so it is not
possible to know how often they surfaced. Future studies might help to determine
optimal placement of privacy control icons.
5.2.6 Discussion
In this study, I offered participants the ability to configure a smaller set of permis-
sions that are contextually bound to areas of the interface where they will be used. As
a result, most participants thought about the functionality that they used and deter-
mined what to grant based on that functionality. I observed an increased awareness
of data sharing, increased decision making, and a general positive attitude towards
contextual access control. However, I also observed several paradoxical results like
engaging in decision making while desensitized, inability to distinguish between ap-
plication and access control experience, and a feeling of less control that seemed to be
the result of more awareness. This may be similar to other research which indicates
that being more informed of data flows may lead to cognitive overload [54].
5.2.6.1 Desensitization
When all a user has to do is click “Okay” or “I Agree” to move on they frequently
become accustomed to the prompt over time and stop carefully reviewing them. Ear-
lier in Section 4.1.4, I examined offering fine grained access control at install time.
The default policy in that case was to allow all requested permissions so that unmo-
tivated users were not inconvenienced. In that study, nearly half of the participants
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did not take the time to review policies and accepted the default policy. Since the
default policy was to allow all requested permissions, I expected users would quickly
become desensitized.
In this study however, the default policy was to allow nothing. In fact, participants
needed to initiate an access control dialog to begin using the applications. They then
would have to drag data they wanted to share from one section of the interface to
another. Obviously, by using so many dialogs, I expected desensitization over time.
However, I observed three participants who seemed desensitized almost immediately.
The rapid desensitization and the additional effort introduced to manage permissions
may reduce the efficacy of using runtime contextual access control. This may indicate
that desensitization could also be a larger issue beyond these three participants.
Interestingly, two of the participants who reported being desensitized mentioned
noticing a particular permission while using contextual access control during runtime.
It may be possible that the small amount of time it takes to drag the permission com-
bined with the enhanced context of actual user data helps them to more carefully con-
sider the sharing decision. As previously mentioned, these desensitized participants
changed the default and did not grant the application permission. If the sharing de-
cisions for desensitized users are somewhat subconscious, using rich contextual cues
such as real user data may make sharing more salient even with desensitization. This
phenomenon warrants future research on possibly improving subconscious decision
making with contextual access control. There would be some positive research im-
plications if it is possible for desensitized users to bring sharing decisions closer to
consciousness in moments where it subjectively matters to them.
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5.2.6.2 Distinguishing Applications From Access Control
The dialog emphasized sharing with an application and forced participants to give
their information to the application by dragging it. Participants were told they were
testing random applications found on Facebook. Despite this emphasis on sharing
with an application, some participants still did not understand who they were sharing
with. Participants answers’ appeared to be directly influenced by the contextual
access control interface. Although this may be considered a problem, it may also be a
positive result. By focusing on the parties involved in sharing, this problem could be
lessened or eliminated. Of the three participants who did not understand with whom
they were sharing, each of them had different answers.
One participant believed that because he was dragging location and hometown,
he shared the scrapbook with those locations. The actual caption for the box used
for granting permissions was labeled: “You are allowing:”. It seems reasonable to
consider an appropriate interpretation of that label is “You are allowing photographs
with Charlotte, NC.” presuming that Charlotte NC. was where his friends were lo-
cated. The second participant thought he shared with himself. Similarly, the third
participant thought he shared with Facebook, the company. While a first impres-
sion might seem that these are odd participant responses, it makes sense with the
design of contextual access control and how applications are displayed on Facebook.
Facebook applications enjoy a special privilege of appearing in the Facebook site it-
self, see Figure 9 and Figure 11. Immediately above the application, you can see
the Facebook header which shows the users name and provides them quick access to
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privacy settings, additional help, the logout feature and more. These features are all
provided by Facebook and interact directly with Facebook. Thus, there is no visual
separation between the application and the social network site itself and likely will
lead to others being confused with sharing audience when granting permissions to
Facebook applications.
When we add contextual access control, we further exacerbated confusion with the
intended sharing recipient because the prompts, icons, and notifications all appear
to be from Facebook. It becomes even harder to distinguish Facebook from a third
party application. This is particularly true of well polished applications like Photofire.
When a user encounters applications like scrapbooking applications, it may appear
as though it is a new way to manage Facebook photos not yet activated. Once
the user grants a permission like Albums, the user interface changes and updates
displaying a list of their albums. It now seems entirely plausible to the user that he
was activating a Facebook feature by moving their albums to this new visualization or
even sharing with himself so he could see his own albums. Unfortunately, this could
have negative and unintended consequences if more sensitive items are requested since
both audiences may be trusted by the user. The user obviously trusts himself with
his data and since he has already given it to Facebook he plausibly entrusts data to
them as well. It is possible that as users use more applications with contextual access
control, they would become accustomed to the correct sharing recipient of their data.
However, this does not mitigate the damage that may already occur as a result of an
incorrect mental model.
Other participants expressed attitudes that led me to believe they understood the
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audience. However, they were no less susceptible to the blurred line between appli-
cations and the access control. As I stated previously, when discussing aspects of
the access control many participants would comment about the applications. Their
experience with those applications led them to feel a certain way towards the access
control. Similarly, when discussing their experience with applications, they would
also discuss the access control. This intermixing of concepts underscores the sym-
biotic nature of the applications and the access control. A poorly designed runtime
contextual access control interface can reflect poorly on the user experience of well
designed applications. Likewise, a poorly designed application can and seemed to
affect the user experience of the access control interface. In this study, participants
reported not liking the access control because of the data being requested by appli-
cations. This may extend even further into cross application problems. For example,
the Tiler application affecting the experience of the Photofire application because of
a common access control interface.
Since the line between applications and access control becomes more blurred and
affects the user experience when adding context during runtime, it may be beneficial
to consider preventing the system from encroaching on the applications and vice
versa. One example is establishing a trusted path for the access control. Normally
trusted paths are used to prevent users from being tricked by fake warning dialogs
and engaging in risky behavior like installing an application on their computer. In
this case, they can serve a similar purpose and also help to better highlight the real
separation between the application and the access control for the platform. The
increased separation may help to mitigate the damage to user experience that poorly
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designed applications would have on the access control mechanism.
5.2.6.3 More Awareness and Less Control
This study provides evidence suggesting that participants were more aware of the
sharing that was taking place with runtime contextual access control. On one hand,
this is a success—encountering the runtime contextual access control interface raised
awareness. Yet, that awareness produced some unexpected negative side effects.
Many of the participants expressed concern about the sharing that took place be-
fore being asked about it. Many of those participants thought the access control
was annoying because applications were asking for permissions they did not want to
grant. Additionally, I observed that participants’ increased awareness may have led
to a feeling of less control.
In the previous study in Section 5.1.3, only one participant reported feeling like
they were in less control. That participant reported feeling rushed and therefore
could not make informed decisions resulting in less control. In this study 25% of the
participants reported feeling like they were in less control, albeit for different reasons.
The access control dialog in this study by default shared nothing and each permission
had to be granted by the participant. Participants had full control over their sharing
and nothing was shared without their explicit consent.
It could have been participants’ increased awareness of their sharing that lead them
to feel like they had less control. All the participants who felt this way did so because
they felt unsure about what was being done with the data they gave the application.
Additionally, two of them were worried that their sharing might lead to hacking or
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inappropriate use. Their feelings are unfortunate because instead of feeling more
empowered by the knowledge of what they were sharing, they instead feared it.
While it is possible that as participants increase interaction with access control,
they may feel more empowered and less fearful of data sharing, their short-term be-
havior in this study suggests the opposite. Many of the participants felt obligated
to share data out of context to get the application to work. Specifically, many par-
ticipants did not want to grant access to Contact Info for a photo scrapbooking
application. Nearly all participants tried at least once to not grant permission. One
participant even tried six times before giving up on the task. Several of the par-
ticipants reported only sharing because they were in the study and felt that I had
probably reviewed the applications despite my contrary instructions. However, I have
previously observed participants willing to trade data in order to access functionality.
In Section 3.1.3.1, I found one of the reasons users added applications was because
they were curious about bumper stickers that had been sent to them. Thus, partici-
pants may have ignored their better sensibilities because of the study, but in real life,
it would likely be the interaction with others that they would trade for the same. As
further evidence that this is a major problem, quite a few participants indicated that
they would share almost anything in order to get the application to work.
One positive aspect to this problem may exist in that participants were far more
aware that sharing data occurred. Sharing out of context became much more salient.
While it is not ideal that they are engaging in unwanted sharing, they are aware of the
decision to trade their data for functionality. Since uncomfortable sharing affected
user experience, we may see developers in the future attempt to minimize out-of-
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context sharing specifically to improve the user experience. Users tend to gravitate
towards the best user experience over time and it may ironically be the developers
who help protect user data.
5.2.6.4 Repetition and Contextual Access Control
An unfortunate but obvious side effect of having runtime contextual access control
is that there is more interaction required between the access control system and the
user. As the number of features of an application increases, so generally will the
number of prompts that a user will encounter. As the number of prompts increase,
so does the frustration of the user experience. In this short study, I observed many
participants who said they liked the additional choice they were given and the majority
of participants wanted to see more access control like this on their applications in the
future. However, many of them do not like the repetitive nature of the configuration.
This becomes an increasing problem because despite wanting and liking the control
they are annoyed that they are forced to repeatedly interact with the system to
accomplish a secondary task such as access control.
5.2.7 Conclusion
The goal of contextual access control is to present users with permissions when and
where they are most relevant so that they can make more informed decisions. In this
section, I evaluated a runtime contextual access control dialog on a social network
site. I explored several aspects of the runtime contextual access control including
decision making. I found that many participants would grant a permission if they
thought it would unlock functionality that they desired to use. In cases where they
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were confused or uncertain of the functionality, they would not initially grant the
requested permission. Many participants eventually engaged in sharing they did not
initially want to because the permission was required. While several participants
attribute this to being in a study, several said they would grant most anything to get
the application to work.
In this study, I found that participants were very aware of the sharing taking
place. However, some also felt as though they were in less control as a result of
the awareness. While it may not be desirable for participants to grant everything
to unlock functionality, in this study, it represented a cognizant decision to trade
private information for functionality. It does not seem that the problem with more
awareness leading to a feeling of less control is isolated to runtime or install time
access control. Instead, it would apply to any configuration interface that creates
increased awareness of information sharing. Since this problem extends beyond a
single interface and method of configuration, it could be a topic for further study.
I found three participants quickly became desensitized to the runtime contextual
configuration prompts. One of those participants granted each and every permission
asked of them. Granting everything required extra effort on the part of the participant
since the default policy was not to grant any access to an application. As such, de-
sensitization may be a problem for other runtime contextual access control interfaces.
However, there is an interesting finding to the desensitization: two of the participants
who reported being on “autopilot” noticed sharing they were uncomfortable with
and did not grant those permissions. They also did not express unease with other
permissions they did grant. These participants could not explain why they noticed
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the items they did not want to share, only that it caught their eye. Future research
needs to explore any subconscious decision making that might be taking place and
how those results may address the desentization problem in this and other domains.
In this study, the runtime contextual access control further blurred the already
uncertain line of where the platform stops and the application begins. As a result,
some participants’ understanding of the sharing audience was negatively affected.
Additionally, many of the participants’ experience with the access control was colored
by their experience with applications and vice versa. Platforms need to be cautious
not to create a negative user experience for other developers applications. Similarly,
poorly designed applications can affect the experience of the application platforms.
One potential solution to this problem lies in creating a trusted path. Trusted paths
highlight the separation between what is part of the application and what is part of
the underlying system. Traditionally, this has been desirable because it prevents users
from being tricked by providing an understanding of that separation. In this case,
highlighting that separation may help to reduce the interdependent user experience
that could be beneficial to both the platform and applications.
Finally, it was clear from this study and also from Section 5.1 that repetition was
a problem with runtime contextual access control. I needed to find ways to reduce
the number of times users needed to interact with the access control dialogs. Alter-
natively, I found ways to reduce the perceived frequency or annoyance resulting from
repetitive interaction with them. An example of this was abandoning the automatic
dialog presented in Section 5.1 and having users initiate the dialog for themselves.
Unfortunately, it was still not clear how much interaction was too much. This is an
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issue I explore more thoroughly in Chapter 6 on notifying users.
CHAPTER 6: NOTIFYING USERS
Runtime contextual access control requires notifying users of permission requests.
These notifications can help increase the awareness of data sharing in application
platforms for users. In Chapter 5, I tested runtime contextual access control in two
different domains. In Section 5.1, I examined runtime access control on the Android
platform and in Section 5.2, I examined it for social network application platforms.
In both cases, users had problems with the repetition of the access control indicating
that the problem extends across both domains. In this chapter, I present a study that
helps better understand the problems surrounding notifications and the acceptable
usage limits.
The goal of the study in this chapter was to investigate the point at which partic-
ipants would no longer be willing to be notified about data accessed on their phone
during a two week long study. Ultimately, I was not able to use the drop off day as
a metric as most participants stayed in the study the full two weeks. I did however
learn some valuable lessons as well as observe some interesting qualitative cases which
I describe in this chapter.
6.1 Notifying Users
It stands to reason that since there are a variety of ways to try and display in-
formation, some will by nature be better than others. For example, a popup box
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Figure 14: Android notification and ticker example
notifying the user of each and every data access would be quite annoying and have
a low level of tolerance with users. In contrast, a ticker provides users with notices
at the top of the screen. Users might accept this solution more frequently than the
popup box and have a higher level of tolerance for it. The goal of this chapter is
to design more informative notifications that are less frustrating by understanding
which notification styles have higher levels of tolerance and usefulness. Additionally,
we can better understand the repetition problem that recurs in Chapter 5. In this
section, I test four notification styles on the Android platform: status bar notifica-
tions, icons, tickers, and toasts. I compare these methods to each other in terms of
tolerance, usefulness, and understanding. In order to do that, I designed a mixed
methods, between subjects deception study I describe in the next section. The main
goal was to increase the notifications everyday and look for a drop off day.
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Figure 15: Android icon example
The first type of notification I tested is the status bar notification. This notification
has a title and a message text inserted into the user’s status bar. The application
logo is shown in the status bar and is used to indicate that the application has a
notification waiting for review. When the user dragged the status bar down, the
notification’s title, application logo, and message text together were displayed as seen
in Figure 14.
The next type of notification, the icon was inserted into the top status bar rep-
resenting the type of access that was just utilized. An example of this is shown in
Figure 15. If the user dragged the status bar down, they saw the description of the
icon as well as the application that generated the notification.
Next, the ticker style notification, was a spin off of the status bar notification. An-
droid does not include a built-in ticker feature, however, it provides ticker-like func-
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Figure 16: Android toast notification example
tionality. When displaying a new notification with ticker, the notifications message
were shown line by line in the top status bar. Once the visualization was completed,
the icon was added as previously described. In order to use only the ticker part of
this functionality, the application I created issued a status bar notification, waited
for it to provide the ticker visualization, then immediately removed the notification.
Thus, the messages were ticked, but dragging down the bar showed no notifications.
Finally, the toast notification as seen in Figure 16, displayed a short message in the
lower portion of the screen. The message was center-aligned and appeared for a few
short moments before disappearing.
6.1.1 Study Methodology
This study is designed to compare and contrast different notification styles on a
mobile phone. To effectively test each notification style, participants were assigned to
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one of four different groups. Each installed an application on their phone that would
facilitate the generation of notifications, administration of surveys, and sending of
log files to our lab server. Participants were recruited into this study by posting
craigslist ads in major cities in North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee,
and Virginia.
Participants were informed they were participating in a study that examines noti-
fying them about what information applications on their phones were able to access.
Participants were informed the study would last up to two weeks, depending on how
long they chose to stay in the study. Participants were told they could earn $1 for
every day they stayed in the study and an additional $6 for not missing any daily
surveys. They would also earn an additional $10 for a post study phone interview
discussing the previous 14 days. Inducement was provided in the form of an electronic
gift card for Amazon. Participants were informed that they needed to complete the
final phone interview to receive the study inducement.
Participants first filled out a screener that asked if they had an Android phone,
were willing to fill out daily surveys for up to 2 weeks, if they were above the age
of 18, and the frequency they use applications other than the phone application and
GPS. Participants who were under the age of 18, did not have an Android phone,
were not willing to fill out surveys, or used phone apps less than once a day were not
eligible to participate. Participants who did not frequently use their phone were not
eligible because the data collected from them would not be meaningful.
Participants who met the criteria were formally invited into the study through
an email further explaining the expectations of the study, a bulleted summary of
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the informed consent as well as the entire informed consent text. Participants were
asked to indicate if they still wished to participate in the study. Participants who
affirmatively responded were assigned to one of four groups. Each group differed
by the notification style they would be receiving in the study. Participants then
received an email asking them to install software from the Google Play Store. The
application is later described in Section 6.1.1.1. In order to utilize the software,
they first had to accept the informed consent a second time, this time by clicking “I
Accept.” Participants then had to enter a code which would assign them to their
respective group. Participants obtained the code by filling out a survey unique to
their group. The link to their survey was sent in the same email along with the
instructions to install the software.
The survey to receive the code asked participants for their age, gender, ethnicity,
occupation, education, and a question used to indicate their level of comfort with
technology. The survey also asked for identifiable information used to correlate the
logs to participants so we could provide them with inducements, ensure the software
was working as expected, and listen to audio comments before the phone interview
upon exiting the study. These identifiers were deleted from the dataset after the
conclusion of the study and inducement.
For the two weeks following the participants’ installing and activating the software,
they received notifications about data access by applications installed on their phone.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to actually inform users of real data being accessed
on the phone since that required modifying the phone’s operating system. Projects
like TaintDroid [20] could provide actual data for notifications, however, they would
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require modifying the phone’s existing operating system. In addition to voiding the
participants’ phone warranties, this would also have been logistically difficult. There
would also be no guarantee of data collected that represented notification frequencies
measured in the study design.
For these reasons, the notifications about application access to the phone was
fabricated. However, the notices were actually based on plausible data access. For
example, applications that requested permission to access the contacts would generate
notifications regarding access to those contacts. If the application did not request the
permission that allows access to contacts, I never generated a notification indicating
such an event occurred. Thus, I only provided fake notifications to participants that
were entirely plausible, but did not actually occur at the time of the notification.
Each day participants would receive a survey on their phone that allowed them to
indicate usefulness, frustration, strange application usage, and general comments. To
reduce the burden on participants, the survey could record audio comments instead
of using text boxes. After they completed the daily survey, they would continue to
receive notifications at the same frequency until the following day. The next day
notifications would become more frequent than the day before. Again, at the end of
the day, participants completed another daily survey. As they submitted the survey,
they indicated whether or not they wished to remain in the study. All survey and
usage data was stored on the phone and my application was designed to transmit all
logs and audio files to the usability lab server at UNC Charlotte when the phone was
connected to a WiFi network.
After the participant disabled my client software, I ensured that all the logs had
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been transmitted successfully and scheduled a phone interview that required 24 hours
notice. During that 24 hours, I listened to the audio comments and made notes about
anything interesting that was useful to ask participants during the final interview. If
the logs were not on the server, I asked participants to uninstall the study application
and install a secondary application that transmitted the logs files in a different way.
During the phone interview, participants were first informed of the deception and
asked if they had any questions about it. Participants were initially informed of the
deception to ensure this understanding in the event they wanted to discontinue the
interview. Participants were next asked if they were comfortable removing the study
software themselves or if they wanted assistance to help remove it. After participants
indicated they were comfortable with the removal of the study application, I began the
final interview. Participants were asked to talk about the notifications they received
and why they decided to withdraw from the study or continue for the full 14 days.
While it might seem obvious that the reason was excessive notifications, it was also
possible they withdrew due to concerns about what was happening on their phone or
other reasons. I asked them to talk about their reactions to general application usage
and how they reacted to the notifications generated by the study application. I asked
about what concerns, if any, they had with notifications and if they considered them
accurate. I then asked them if they wished they had more information about any
notifications they received. Finally, I asked them any specific questions I generated
from listening to their individual survey responses from both text responses and/or
audio recordings.
Several tools were developed in order to facilitate, run, and analyze data from
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the study. First, an application for the phone was developed and made available on
the Google Play Store. Second, an alternative uploader application was developed
to mitigate situations where log and audio files were not transmitted to the server.
Next, a server application was developed that would accept, parse, and store log files
in a database. The server would notify the client software of successful commits to
the database so the client could appropriately mark the study file as transmitted.
Finally, an analysis application was designed to pull data from the database, analyze
it, and output it in a form useful for my analyses. In the next sections, I describe
each of these tools in more detail.
6.1.1.1 Android Client Application
Participants installed an application on their Android phones which collected data
for the study and provided notifications about application access to their personal
device. This application could be found on the Google Play Store to make it easier for
the participant to install the software. Once the participant installed the application,
it would do nothing until the participant opened it and accepted the informed consent
agreement. Once they accepted the informed consent, the application then prompted
them for a code. The code was obtained by filling out the online demographic survey
to begin the participation in the study. The codes’ purpose was to assign users to
one of four groups: toast, notification, ticker, and icon. The codes were simple words
like water or pear and had no indication to the participant of anything related to the
notification study.
Initially I planned on having the study server assign the group for the participants,
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Table 9: Notification frequencies
Day Frequency
1 1 every 10 mins
2 7.5 mins
3 5 mins
4 2.5 mins
5 1 min
6 50 sec
7 40 sec
8 30 sec
9 20 sec
10 10 sec
11 5 sec
12 2.5 sec
13 1 sec
14 .5 sec
but ultimately decided against this. I wanted to make every effort to ensure that
participants did not incur any additional data charges as a result of participation
in the study. For this reason the software was designed to communicate with the
server only when the participant was on WiFi. Thus, by providing a code no wireless
communication using their data plan would be necessary and they could start as soon
as they entered the code.
After the participant entered the code into the application, it waited until the
following day to start the participant on day one of the study. This delay was to
ensure each day’s treatment was consistent for each participant. The notification
frequency was determined by the day of the study. Table 9 shows the frequencies the
application provided notifications.
There were some exceptions to these frequencies. When the participant was on a
phone call, notifications were not generated. Also when using maps or navigation,
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notifications were not generated for safety reasons. To reduce battery usage and
prevent notifications while the participant was not using the phone, the application
only displayed notifications while the phone was being used. Additionally, the device
settings was honored, so if the vibrator was set to silent it was not used.
To determine what notification was provided to the user, the client application
queried the Android Package Manager for the current foreground application and
retrieved a list of access permissions granted to that application. A permission was
chosen at random and used to match with a pre approved permission list. The
permission list contained acceptable permissions that were subjectively accessible
to participants. For example, permissions involving mounting or unmounting file
systems were not included in this list. If the randomly selected permission was in
the list of acceptable permissions, the application generated a notification type based
on the participant’s study group. If the permission did not match the permission
list, the application made several more attempts to randomly select a permission.
If after several random tries no permission was suitable, the list of permissions was
then iterated over to find a match. If no match was still possible, the application
generated a notification that stated an unknown item was accessed by the foreground
application. After a full day of treatment, a daily usage survey was generated at 6:00
PM and was available until 11:00 PM. An example of the survey is shown in Figure 17.
The survey option was displayed by the study application when the participant used
their phone during these hours. If the survey was not completed within that time, it
was marked as missed. The survey asked a few questions about their experience with
the notifications and allowed audio recordings for each question. The audio files and
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Figure 17: Android notification study survey
responses were logged on the phone. The participant had two options after filling out
the survey: they could chose to stay in the study or they could chose to drop the
study. If they chose to drop the study, a confirmation screen was shown to confirm
their intent to quit participating. If the participant chose to continue in the study,
the application would continue to work and stop providing notifications at 11:00 PM
until 7:00 AM the next morning. When the participant dropped from the study the
application stopped providing notices and the participant was informed that they
would still earn credit for all 14 days. Since the goal of the study was to observe
drop-off rates, this was considered the best possible and most fair practice. They
were also informed to contact me after they quit the study to arrange an interview.
A web link let them do this directly from their phone.
The application also logged all of the phone activity that occurred. In particular
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we recorded:
• When the phone was started up or shut down
• When the phone screen was turned on or off
• The current running application and notification generated
• When the participant was alerted to a new survey
• Responses to the survey or an indication that it was missed
• If the participant dropped from the study through the survey or directly through
the application
All events were notated with the study data and the exact date and time of the event.
Periodically, the phone would check to see if it was connected to WiFi and attempt to
upload the audio files and log files associated with the study participation. Based on
the response from the server, the application marked the files as successfully uploaded
or marked them for future upload attempts.
6.1.1.2 Server Application
On the server, a password protected mysql database was used to store the log
entries of all participants. All communication from client to server was protected by
Secured Socket Layer (SSL) communication to ensure participant confidentiality. The
server software accepted the audio and log files and handled them appropriately. In
the case of audio files, the files were moved to a non-web accessible location on the
server for participant confidentiality. An indication of success was then returned to
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the client so that the audio files could be appropriately marked on the participants’
phone. The server software parsed uploaded log files to ensure they matched the
required format for insertion into the database. It then started a SQL transaction
to insert each of the log entries into the database. If for any reason any of the log
entries were not inserted into the database, the whole upload batch was rolled back
and a failure notice sent to the client. This ensured that only a complete set of logs
was inserted into the log database.
6.1.1.3 Alternative Uploader
In some cases, participants did not have access to WiFi or their log files became
corrupted and could not be successfully inserted into the study database. In these
cases participants were asked to uninstall the study software and install an alternative
uploader that was also available from the Google Play Store. The uploader would
take each of the audio and textual log files and upload them to a different location
on the target server. Instead of attempting to insert these files into the database, the
files were sent to the non public file system directly. Again, success was indicated
so that files were appropriately marked on the client side. I could then later look at
the files and any exception traces to determine if there was a problem with the file
or if there were any fixes that needed to be rolled out for the rest of the participants.
These files were then inserted into the database with the rest of the log files.
6.1.1.4 Analysis Application
The amount of data collected was extensive. There were millions of log entries
that were inserted into the study database. The data, while complete, does not lend
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itself to simple SQL queries to extract content of interest. One example is when
calculating the phone screen on/off data per day, there are anomalies that prevent
simple analysis. The screen may be turned on and a participant may play a game
so long that the battery is exhausted and the phone is shut off without the study
application being able to log the event. This does not mean that the next phone
off event, which could occur the next day, implied that the participant used their
phone for 12+ hours. To accommodate intelligent mining of the data, I designed an
application that parses the logs and compiles both per day and aggregate values for
participant data. Since it is an application, it more easily tracked the state of the
phone and made sure erroneous calculations were not included.
The analysis application calculates the average number of notifications per day,
a list of applications notifications that were generated, statistics about the types of
notifications provided to the participant, length of time a participant used the phone
and so on. This data served as the basis for the quantitative analysis. With this data,
I examined questions such as, did phone usage decrease as notifications increased?
This was a self reported observation by some participants during the phone interview.
Finally, the application generated output to an SPSS friendly format for statistical
analysis of the observed data.
6.1.2 Results
A total of 160 people responded to the Craigslist ad indicating that they were
interested in participating in the study, 111 were invited to participate in the study.
Of those, 50 actually accepted and were assigned to one of the treatment groups in the
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study. Of the 50, 43 actually filled out the survey associated with their group which
gave them a code to activate the software. A few participants (n = 4) voluntarily
withdrew from the study. One participant’s phone broke at the beginning of the study.
The cause was unrelated to the study. Another participant returned their phone and
decided to buy an iPhone. One participant only had an iPhone, their Android phone
was broken and thought they could complete the study on the iPhone. Finally, one
participant contacted me to explain they were too busy and had to withdraw from the
study. Of the 39 participants remaining only 22 actually finished the study. Those
participants were assigned to each the four groups: notification (n = 6), toast (n = 6),
ticker (n = 4), and icon (n = 6).
The 22 participants’ ages ranged from 21-66 with (M = 26.5). Participants were
primarily female (n = 15) and Caucasian (n = 12). Other reported ethnicities in-
cluded African American (n = 5) and Hispanic (n = 4). Most participants reported
having some college education but no degree (n = 9), (n = 7) indicated they had
a bachelors degree, (n = 2) indicated they had an associates degree, (n = 1) had a
masters degree, (n = 1) had a professional doctorate, and (n = 1) had less than a
high school education. A few participants, (n = 2) indicated their occupation was
in a technical related field and (n = 5) indicated they strongly agreed that others
would ask them for computer help. Most participants (n = 12) were located in North
Carolina. Other locations included: Georgia (n = 3), Florida (n = 1), South Carolina
(n = 3), and Texas (n = 2). One participant chose not to disclose their ethnicity,
education, state, and self reported computer help. One participant disabled the abil-
ity of the application to generate notifications on day 6 and continued to stay in the
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study answering surveys everyday. For this reason, I did not include their data in the
following analysis.
6.1.2.1 General Phone Use
During the study, participants used their phones (turned the screen on, then off) a
total of 30,490 times and spent a combined 157.87 hours on their phones. On average
participants spent 35.88 minutes on their phone per day. Each time participants used
their phone they only used it for an average of 18.83 seconds. On average, 6 of the 21
participants shut their phone down at least once during the study period. I based this
average on the phone shutdown event since participants in the interview reported that
the notification application would at times crash their phones or that their phones ran
out of battery. This event could only be triggered by a user shutdown, therefore it is
a more accurate reflection for user-initiated shutdown than the phone startup event.
In total, participants phones were shutdown 147 times or 7 times per participant.
Obviously, the most frequent time to turn the phone off is between the hours of 8PM
and Midnight. Given the crashing and battery problem with the study application,
I did not determine the frequency of times participants powered on their phones.
A comparison of the phone startup and shutdown events indicated that there were
about 4 crashes per day across all participants making this a minor but important
problem.
Participants’ phone activity per hour is shown in Figure 18. The activity is reported
in terms of the participants time zones. Therefore 11PM EST and 11PM CDT is
reported simply as 11PM. Participants were least active between the hours of midnight
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Figure 18: Phone activity per hour
and 9AM. Participants were moderately active between the hours of 9AM-11AM and
most active between 11AM and midnight. There is a notable spike in activity at
lunch time and again between 2-4PM.
6.1.2.2 Notifications
A total of 615,051 notifications were generated during the study. Notifications were
generated for 338 different applications. On average each of those applications was
installed by only 2 users highlighting the diversity of Android applications. There were
several notable applications that were installed by at least half of the participants:
Google Calendar, YouTube, MMS text messaging, Facebook, Google Maps, Browser,
and Google Contacts. The top 10 notifications that were randomly generated and
displayed to participants were: accessing the Internet, accessing the network state,
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Table 10: Average notifications per day across all groups
Day Average Notifications Shown
1 10
2 11
3 30
4 58
5 177
6 200
7 300
8 568
9 728
10 1285
11 2853
12 5178
13 11715
14 18652
accessing vibrator, accessing WiFi state, writing to the SD card, preventing the phone
from sleeping, reading the phone identity, changing a phone setting, reading the phone
contacts, and making a phone call—in that order.
As described in Section 6.1.1.1, the notifications were meant to become more fre-
quent over time and cause participants to drop from the study. The frequency schedule
is shown in Table 9 of Section 6.1.1.1. The average number of notifications per day
resulting from that schedule is shown in Table 10. The number of notifications were
modeled with the equation 5.33e.58x. The residuals R2 = 0.99 indicate that this was
a very good fit. If this sampled phone use was indicative of the population parameter
this equation can be used to determine the average number of notifications users will
encounter when given the frequencies in Table 9 as an input for x.
The purpose of making the notifications grow more frequent was to examine the
drop off rate for each of the different notification types. By observing the drop
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off rate I hoped to determine what frequencies of privacy related notification were
acceptable for each notification type. I tied a $1 incentive to staying in the study
each day. I thought that as the notifications grew more frequent, notifications would
have become less useful, more frustrating, and participants would discontinue the
study. Additionally, I planned to give the majority of the financial incentive at the
initial point of agreement to participate. Unfortunately, I underestimated the power
of a dollar. Nearly all the participants (n = 14) stayed in the study the full 14 days.
This confounded my attempt to examine an actual drop-off day with the small sample
size in this study. However, there were other metrics I looked at to examine cross and
within notification differences.
One such measurement was the total time that participants used their devices.
Daily measurements of participants’ phone usage were calculated based on moment-
to-moment recorded usage data. These daily measurements were combined into quar-
terly measurements (3 days) to observe changes over time that occurred as a result
of the treatment conditions. Figure 19 shows the phone use in seconds per day for
each quarter and for each treatment condition. One thing to notice is that the toast
groups phone usage time is cut nearly in half from 2,939 seconds in first quarter to
1,550 seconds in the last. This is a decrease in phone use of slightly more than 23
minutes per day per user as a result of having the toast notifications. However, none
of the differences shown, including the toast group, was significantly different from
any other group or quarter. Such a large reduction in phone usage with a lack of
statistical difference could likely be the result of a small sample size (n = 5) for this
group.
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Figure 19: Phone use per group over time
Another measure that I examined was the sentiment scores generated by partici-
pants daily on dimensions of annoyance and usefulness. Each study day, participants
were asked to adjust a sliding scale with values from 0 to 100 indicating whether the
notifications were useful or not useful, and satisfying or annoying. This data only
includes (n = 18) participants because I completely discarded two of the participants
survey data. Both these participants marked the notifications very high in terms
of satisfaction and usefulness while simultaneously also indicating they had seen no
notifications that day for all study days. This seemed to indicate a clear pattern
of not reading the survey. I still include these participants in the former analysis
because they did received the treatment like others, they just failed to participate in
the daily survey in a meaningful fashion. Additionally, their post-study interviews
indicated they did receive and act on notifications, which contradicted their reported
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daily survey results.
The two sentiment scores for satisfaction and usefulness sum to 200. In the case of
a participant believing the notifications were extremely useful and very satisfying, the
score would be 200. In cases where they thought the notifications were entirely useless
and annoying, the score would be 0. Again, the values were averaged over a quarter
(3 days) to examine difference over time and between groups. The results, shown
in Figure 20, indicate a clear downward trend towards a more negative sentiment as
notification frequency increases. The change in sentiment appeared nearly identical in
every case except for ticker. Because of the outliers mentioned earlier, the ticker group
only had (n = 3) data points. Again, none of the differences here are statistically
significant despite a 20 point or more drop in sentiment. It is interesting to note
that the only treatment condition that ever had any positive sentiment was the toast
group. Also, this is the same group that caused participants to use their phones on
average 23 minutes less per day over the study period.
6.1.2.3 Interview Results
I conducted a short interview after participants had either completed their 14 days
or dropped out of the study. Interviews lasted between 10-15 minutes and were
conducted after participants were debriefed and helped with uninstalling the study
application. In this section, I examine some of the interesting participant cases that
occurred during the study.
171
1 2 3 4
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Neutral
Positive
Negative
Quarter (3 days)
C
om
b
in
ed
S
co
re
Notification
Toast
Ticker
Icon
Figure 20: Combined scores of usefulness and annoyance
6.1.2.3.1 Cases 1 and 2
Perhaps two of the most interesting cases involved the participants’ extremely
strong desire to keep applications on their phones they liked despite the study no-
tifications informing them of inappropriate and unwanted sharing. In both cases,
participants had been informed of the same event. In both cases, they reacted to
the notifications, but ultimately decided to keep applications installed on the phone
despite being informed of the access event.
The first case, C1, involved several different applications. She noticed that Face-
book and CNN had taken her photograph. After noticing this, she inspected and
deleted many of her applications. The very next day she went and added them all
back:
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C1:“At first it freaked me out and I went and checked them out. Then I
deleted them all... Like Facebook, I took it off, and I took CNN off, and
I took a lot of the stuff off but then the next day I put a lot of that stuff
back on because I need that stuff... you know?”
Instead of preventing the applications from taking her picture entirely she modified
her behaviour with the applications to prevent the unwanted exposure.
C1:“And then what I would do is I would just put my thumb over the
camera so they wouldn’t get my photo, they would just get my thumbprint
you know.”
This participant said she trusted that the notifications were real. She explained that
there was never a point where she doubted they were fabricated.
Similarly, in a second case, another participant had noticed when we informed her
Facebook had taken her picture.
C2:“Facebook said it took a picture... and to be completely honest with
you, I’m laying in my bed naked and Facebook takes a picture... and I’m
like oh no, so where is this picture going?”
Again the participant modified her behaviour with the application:
C2:“I put a piece of electrical tape across the front camera of my phone.”
When asked why she did not just uninstall the application she explained:
C2:“I like facebook... I don’t use it that often but when I do I enjoy having
it. I was also waiting to talk to you.”
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Ultimately, she later said she probably would get rid of her phone, yet she used
it for nearly two weeks with a piece of electrical tape over it. Even this participant
“absolutely” trusted the notifications until the last few days. Then she thought they
were being duplicated or they were not as frequent as they should have been at
the beginning. Thus, she still believed the notifications were accurate. Even when
participants were aware and believed an unwanted event was regularly taking place,
the desire to use an application outweighed the inconvenience of simply modifying
their behavior.
6.1.2.3.2 Case 3
For case 3, a coincidence increased her belief that the study notifications were real.
This participant mentioned that she noticed a notification that an application had
called someone but could not find out who. The next day a friend called saying he
had missed a call from the participant. As a result, the notifications increased the
awareness that applications could access her phone.
C3:“My one app kept saying... I got a whole bunch of notifications about
that one... about messaging and everything else. When I had downloaded
it, the list of permissions was pretty lengthy and I hadn’t looked through
it. When I got like 20 notifications about it including my contacts, it’s
messaging, and making a phone call I decided it wasn’t the safest app for
me because it wasn’t really doing anything anyway... so I didn’t need, so
I deleted that one.”
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In this case, the desire to use the application was low so she uninstalled it permanently.
She was also informed of access permissions she did not previously consider. She later
explained she liked her increased awareness from the notifications:
C3:“They were great, especially when you don’t understand a certain ap-
plication or all the permissions they ask you for. It would be nice if there
really were notifications like that because sometimes your phone really is
doing something on your behalf and you don’t know about it... ”
This case provided further evidence that the willingness to tolerate unwanted sharing
seems to be balanced with the desire to use the application. This case, like the next,
also shows how notifications provided an increased awareness.
6.1.2.3.3 Case 4
Case 4’s awareness was also increased, but unlike the other cases, this participant
felt powerless to do anything about it.
C4:“I was like wow, I didn’t know my stuff had so much access to every-
thing. Its like certain applications won’t let your phone sleep, and I was
like oh wow, everything has access to everything. [..] It kind of gets on
my nerves because I wish certain apps can have access to certain things.
Like, I don’t think a game should have access to your contacts, now email
I could understand that, but I just kind of wish every application doesn’t
have all that access.”
This participant had come to terms with application permissions and many have
access to a large amount of her data and phone functionality. When asked if she took
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any actions as a result of this she explained:
C4:“It was kind of hard to take action because everything had access to
everything, and I use all my apps, so I couldn’t change anything, or at
least I don’t think so.”
6.1.2.3.4 Case 5
This final case, although not unique, helps to explain some of the negligible changes
in the toast group. Like the other cases, this participant believed the notifications
they were receiving were accurate and useful.
C5:“At first it was relatively informative, like I said, I didn’t know they
were mock notifications but it was ok because I saw what was sending off
or like you said, could possibly send off to other people that I didn’t even
know it was doing.”
However, as time went on the toast group experienced problems other groups did not
as a result of that notification style.
C5:“Toward the end it became so frequent that the little space where the
notifications come up was never free. There was a button behind that, I
couldn’t press it, I had to time it just right between notifications, that split
second. If I was reading something online, I’d have to adjust my phone 3
or 4 ways to see what that was behind it.”
This helps to explain why participants in this group reduced their phone usage by
nearly half at the end of the study period. It was difficult for them to make use of
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features like the keyboard or read information on the screen because of the occlusion
created by the notification style.
6.1.3 Study Lessons Learned
Findings in this chapter are limited by the small sample, unexpected user behavior,
and lack of statistical significance. Additionally, these findings may not be relevant
for other notification styles or types. For example, notifications containing ads for
products are likely to be perceived differently than a notifications about data access.
The design and purpose of the study was to investigate when notifications became
unacceptable for a set of different notification styles. A better understanding of this
could help address the repetition problem noted in several of the sections in this
dissertation. However, several circumstances led to this not being possible for this
particular analysis. First, a very high attrition rate resulted in a smaller sample
size. Additionally, participants’ behavior regarding the anticipated withdrawal from
the study, reduced the ability to analyze notification overload. Most participants
only stayed in the study to earn a few extra dollars despite that the majority of
the inducement was provided at the beginning of the study. Although these results
lack quantitative significant differences, additional participants may provide stronger
evidence supporting some interesting patterns that emerged from the data.
Studies in the future need to look at alternative ways of finding the drop off day.
There are a few other ways that I might have been able to go about finding the drop
off day for notifications. First, instead of increasing the notifications daily I could
make the frequency the between subjects independent variable. This would limit the
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ability to test more than one notification style, but would allow for participants to
more directly experience the large number of notifications instead of becoming slowly
accustomed to them. Another option would be to remove the option to withdraw from
the study and instead provide participants with a way to disable just the notifications
aspect of the software. I would likely develop some other functionality that could be
studied at the same time since the expectation would be that participants would
continue in the study for several more days.
Studies in the future also need to plan for the extremely high attrition rates. In
this study, I was able to understand that rate more directly by tracking a participants
progress through the various stages. Others should seek to do the same. Since I was
able to understand the rates of attrition, I could more easily over recruit into the
study. Additionally, I set deadlines on the invitations since the funding was limited.
This again allowed me to move on and invite others without receiving an explicit
indication from a participant that they were no longer interested.
It still may be worthwhile to examine alternative ways of measuring drop off as a
result of too many notifications. This might involve reducing the incentive per day,
however, this may also reduce incentive to complete any portion of the study. In some
ways, this highlights an interesting problem with studies using daily surveys and pro-
viding daily incentive to continue participation. For this reason, I would recommend
designing a more elaborate study that allowed for the disabling of notifications but
not withdrawal from the study.
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6.1.4 Discussion and Conclusion
The toast group participants’ total time using their phone decreased over time to
nearly half as much at the end of the study period. Reports from these participants
suggested this was a result of an occlusion that occurs on the interface. When the toast
message frequency is low, the occlusion is only a minor problem because the toast is
short-lived and does not significantly interrupt the interaction with other sections of
the user interface. However, as frequency increases, that portion of the user interface
never becomes completely visible and results in impeding phone interface usage.
Another interesting pattern was that the rate of sentiment change appears nearly
equal across all groups except the ticker group. Because the ticker group only con-
tained a (n = 3) after removing outliers, it is unclear if these participants might have
exhibited same pattern. In any case, the expected result from the study was that
some of the notification types would be more annoying than others. For example, I
expected that toasts would cause a negative sentiment faster than an icon because
of how prominent the message is on the user interface. However, I only observed a
small change in phone usage and the change in user sentiment was largely unclear. A
larger sample size might confirm this trend and would be quite interesting.
In the qualitative portion of this study, I noted several interesting cases. Cases 1
and 2 really challenge the notion that increased awareness of application permissions
would effect a change of behavior. In these cases, the participants reported being
disturbed by the application permission, yet continued to use the application, in
once case actually reinstalling it. In some sense, the awareness did change behavior.
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These participants covered their phones with tape and fingers to prevent the unwanted
sharing with applications they desired to use. Despite any change in behavior, it still
illustrates that the user’s desire to use applications and be social leads to unwanted
granting of permissions. This increases motivation for using runtime contextual access
control. With runtime contextual access control, these participants would have been
able to continue to use the Facebook phone application, however, they would lack the
functionality to take pictures for Facebook until the application requested permission
at a contextually appropriate moment.
In Case 3, I saw a similar circumstance to that of Cases 1 and 2. However, in Case
3, I observed that the desire to use the application was low and therefore resulted in its
removal. Additionally, I observed evidence that the awareness created by notifications
helped to address the desensitization issues of the install time access control. In Case
4 there is further evidence of this awareness, but with a different result. In this case,
the participant felt as if there was nothing she could do to take action and so did
nothing. Finally, Case 5 provided some explanation of the observed differences in the
toast group.
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I sought to empower users to create more desirable policies. I
presented several studies contributing towards that goal. First, I presented a study
examining how users find, install and understand applications on social platforms
like Facebook’s application platform. I then added more concrete sharing context
with community recommendations at install time to help users configure a desirable
access control policy. From this study, I found that users had trouble making sharing
decisions before they used the application, so I conducted two studies examining
the effects of pushing sharing decisions into runtime. Each time I observed positive
changes, but also causes for concern. Finally, I conducted a study examining the
repetition problem observed in several of the studies conducted. In this chapter, I
review the studies to bind the work together, discuss implications for system designs,
and discuss directions for future research.
In the time the work for this dissertation was conducted, the Facebook application
platform changed in size from 24,000 applications to over 9 million applications and
websites. Additionally, Facebook grew to over one billion active users. With growth
comes the necessity for change, therefore Facebook modified their access control to
meet the demand of the increased usage while at the same time trying to provide
users with more fine grained privacy choices. Access control permissions moved be-
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yond simply controlling consumption of data; they now also extend to managing the
creation and modification of user data. As a result, social network sites are creating
new access control models that increase emphasis on when users are sharing their own
data with applications in addition to sharing a friend’s data. Thus, I now discuss the
updates to the model previously presented in Section 4.1.1.
7.1 Updated Model
From a technical perspective, Facebook’s access control still consists of users i who
each maintain a user profile Profilei. These profiles still contain user information
such as interests and photos. Each user still maintains a default policy Di that limits
which attributes s ∈ S are available to their friends who have installed applications.
Recall that S is the set of attributes for consumption, not creation, which have been
exposed by the social network site. Since Facebook now also allows modifying a
Profilei, we are not just concerned with RAppj ,v,t which is the profile attributes for
target user t accessible to application Appj through a viewer user v. We are now
also concerned with WAppj ,t which represents the ability of an Appj to write to target
Profilet. Just as R is upper bounded by S, W is bounded by X, the set of attributes
exposed as modifiable by the social network site.
Facebook’s introduction of fine grained access control permissions necessitates the
creation of a user-to-application policy AAppj ,i . Note that user-to-application policy
presented here differs from those created in previous sections of this dissertation. In
this case, AAppj ,i contains attributes from both sets S and X. However, when dealing
with S, the access control makes a distinction for whether a single s has been granted
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for a user himself or for a user’s friends. In other words, it is now possible to allow
your friends’ birthdays to be consumed by an application while not allowing your
own. Thus the user-to-application policy can now be defined as:
AAppj ,i = UAppj ,i ∪ FAppj ,i ∪ YAppj ,i
Where:
• UAppj ,i contains the s that i has granted Appj to consume for i himself
• FAppj ,i contains the s that i has granted Appj to consume for i’s friends
• YAppj ,i contains the x that i has granted Appj to modify of Profilei
Thus, the set of information consumable by an application for a target t by a viewer
v is defined by:
RAppj ,v,t =

Pt,v ∩ UAppj ,v ∩ S : t = v
Pt,v ∩ FAppj ,v ∩Dt ∩ S : t 6= v
and the set of information modifiable by an application for a target is defined by:
WAppj ,v,t =

Pt,v ∩ YAppj ,t ∩X : t = v
∅ : t 6= v
Note that in cases where t = v the term Pt,v = S∪X. It thus has no real effect in those
cases but has been included in the above formalization for clarity. This formalization
also does not pertain to notifications/wall posts since both are managed differently.
Facebook’s current platform is a quasi-fine grained contextual access control system
that permits users to have fine grained choice but only if developers allow. Facebook
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Figure 21: Facebook runtime dialog
also still supports the original style of install time configuration. However, it is now
limited to only those permissions requested by the application. Optionally developers
can chose to ask for those permissions at runtime. The dialogs used by Facebook at
runtime have similarities to those in Section 5.1. In particular, Facebooks dialogs are
presented to users when they encounter functionality that requires permissions not
yet granted. In addition, the goal of the dialogs is to present just the permissions
relevant to the functionality attempting to be used.
Unlike the dialog in Section 5.1, Facebook does not provide any on-screen icon for
the user to activate the dialog and grant/revoke permissions. The dialog generated
shown in Figure 21, only allows an all-or-nothing decision for the requested attributes,
albeit at runtime. It provides very little context about the scope of the sharing, leaving
users with only a sentence to reason about what is shared as a result of granting the
requested permissions.
Facebook’s access control interfaces are designed to facilitate an ever increasing
amount of sharing. There is no way to revoke granted permissions at runtime and
not all permissions are revocable once granted. To revoke a permission a user must
visit the application privacy settings page shown in Figure 22. Even then only a subset
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Figure 22: Facebook permission revocation
of the permissions are revocable. This is unfortunate since developers cannot specify
a non-revocable permission as not required for interaction. Thus, if the user wishes
to revoke any of the non-revocable permissions, they must remove the application
entirely. So while the newer access control system is technically fine grained, the
interface limits the user’s choices.
The contextual access control I have presented supports users’ need for increased
context in making decisions. Since decisions can change over time, the interfaces de-
signed supported the ability to easily review, and modify an access control policy is
important. Facebook’s platform could provide this functionality with small changes
to their access control system which would better represent the desires of users to
have control of their data. However, many of the runtime studies indicated an an-
noyance with repetition. Therefore, it may be desireable to provide this functionality
seperately like in Figure 22 until these issues can be resolved through additional
research.
7.2 Discussion
Users use mental models to help interpret and navigate the systems they use. In
Chapter 3 the users’ interaction with the site and social interaction with friends
created false understandings of data sharing with the Facebook application platform.
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In Chapter 4, a newer install time interface helped to address some of these problems.
That interface helped to refocus users to the application and data they shared and
accentuated actual data sharing practices. Using that interface, I observed that users
attempted to configure appropriate privacy policies given the name of the application
and perceived uses of it. However, even then social interaction was considered in the
decision to allow an application or not. For example, I observed users who did not add
applications because of the additional space it would take up on their profiles. Thus,
the profile’s outward appearance was more important than accessing the application.
In Section 5.2, I provided a runtime interface that allowed participants to con-
figure policies as they interacted with applications and used functions that required
permissions to access data. In that study a few participants’ conceptions of sharing
were incorrect as a result of the mental model they created when using the interface.
For instance, one participant thought by putting the permissions photographs and
location in the “You are allowing” box that the interface was implying “You are al-
lowing your photographs to be shared with Charlotte NC.” This misconception can
be partially attributed to the interface, but also partially to their knowledge about
the social interaction.
Thus, users’ decisions about applications are influenced by the access control in-
terface as well as perceptions of the social interaction created by the applications and
the desire to engage in that type of social interaction. This is problematic when a
user wants to use an application but is worried about the appropriateness of it for
people within their social spheres. Facebook’s newer interface now addresses this as-
pect of social application privacy. Users can now select to which audience they wish
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to expose the details of an application’s usage. Unfortunately, because of the problem
described in Section 4.1.1, applications have the ability to gather more information
about users.
While fine grained controls as well as strong default policies will help mitigate this
property, it still very much exists. Even with the most careful use of applications,
it can be hard to control the spread of activity generated within an application to a
user’s friends. For example, a user that uses an application but sets the applications’
visibility to “Only me” still can have their activity in that application viewable by
friends who use the application. Going beyond fine grained access control by pro-
viding generalization of personal attributes may be one solution to this problem. By
perturbing the user identifier, the application will have a harder time accidently (or
purposely) exposing user activity within the application.
An encouraging observation of participants in both the install and runtime interface
studies was that their mental models were developed quickly in order to accommodate
the change in the systems behavior. This means that any permanent understanding
of the platform has not yet become deep-seated in users. It is therefore worthwhile to
continue to investigate ways of providing awareness of the data sharing—not just for
research—but also for actual adoption in production environments. Users simply do
not wish to share everything and we should continue to try and provide them tools to
make that possible. I presented evidence in this dissertation that increased context
is one way to increase awareness of data sharing.
When users lacked context as studied in Chapter 3, they were largely unaware of
data sharing with third parties. Participant responses to the surveys also indicated
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they preferred to not share some requested information with the applications. When
provided with an install time interface emphasizing the context of the application
and data sharing, many tried to share appropriately. By providing additional context
of the functionality during runtime time, many participants tried to make decisions
based on the actual or imagined application functionality. Additionally, participants’
understanding of audience was more accurate. This highlights that adding sharing
context to runtime access control increased user awareness of data sharing to appli-
cations. Awareness is a distinguishing feature of a successful mechanism and I have
shown how increasing context also increases awareness.
I observed quantitatively some increased awareness in Section 5.1.3 by demonstrat-
ing increased memorability of the permissions requested by platform applications.
Increased awareness helps users to more fully consent to decisions to allow or deny
sharing data with applications. However, increased awareness can be a double-edged
sword. I observed that as users became more aware of sharing, they were also more
aware of their discomfort by that same increase in awareness. In fact, 25% of the
participants in Section 5.2, reported feeling in less control of their data. By design,
they have more control of their data and the awareness of sharing led them to feel
like they had less control. While some participants in that study attributed this to
actually being in the study, I found in earlier studies that decisions are influenced
by the social interaction of the site. Users have, and probably will continue to make
decisions on that basis resulting in an uncomfortable awareness of sharing.
188
7.3 Optimizing User Experience
One of the ways I increased the sharing context for users was by providing concrete
representations of requested user data. When not given concrete representations,
Section 5.1, many participants reported being able to understand what was asked
of them. When permissions are terms accessible to most people like: contacts, pho-
tographs, and so on, it is easy for users to think they understand the scope of sharing
that is occurring. However, two participants introspection of their own understand-
ing indicates that understanding is not as straightforward as it might seem. This
is precisely why concrete representations of sharing are necessary. While the repre-
sentations I provided users with were rudimentary, they were useful. It would be
interesting to see if more user friendly representations of user data have an improved
effect on decision making or memorability.
One of the design differences between the install time and runtime contextual inter-
faces for social network sites was including permission justifications. For the install
time interface, I included the ability to read a justification about the requested per-
mission. In that study, participants relied on the name of the application as context
for sharing decisions and the justification feature was largely unnoticed by partici-
pants. Since participants did not benefit from the justification feature, I removed it
when I designed the prototype runtime interfaces. However, when participants inter-
acted with the runtime interfaces, they seemed to more carefully consider whether
a permission was needed for the application to function. In cases where they did
not understand why a permission was needed for functionality, they did not initially
189
grant the permission. Because of this uncertainty, two participants from the runtime
configuration studies wanted the justification feature to be included. It is possible
that the inclusion of the justification feature may help users trust applications, and
therefore they would not use the feature. It is also possible that at runtime the in-
creased decision making resulted in a desire to better understand the request. In
either case, it is a feature that should be included in other access control interfaces
and can improve the user experience.
The two contextual runtime configuration interfaces also differed in design. One of
the differences was the choice in how to prompt the user. In the Android prototype,
Section 5.1, when encountering functionality that required a permission a prompt was
simply generated and shown to the user. As a result, some participants referred to it
as a popup and found it distracting. In the Facebook prototype used in Section 5.2,
participants still found it distracting, but for different reasons. In the Facebook
prototypes, participants found it distracting because of the repetitive nature and
that they took time to try and understand why the application needed permission for
a particular functionality.
Many of the participants in the Facebook study using runtime contextual access
control did not find it distracting and referred to the prompts as “part of the process”
of using applications. The most likely reason for the difference between the two
was that the Facebook prototypes did not automatically prompt the user with a
popup, even though a popup was used. Instead of automatically prompting, the
system responded by using visual indicators that additional permissions were needed
to continue using the application. For both runtime systems, the permission was
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necessary to continue with the task, however, with the runtime Facebook study, the
user initiated the configuration dialog. While the difference is subtle, it appears to
impact how users view configuration dialogs and the readiness to accept this type of
interaction.
7.4 Limitations And Future Work
From a methodological point of view, most of the studies presented in this disser-
tation are limited by the sample I was able to obtain. While a goal is always to use
participants from outside the university population, performing lab based usability
studies requires participants to travel to the university. For this reason the partici-
pants from the surrounding community are rarely willing to participate. Other studies
should be conducted to compare these results with more diverse or different sample
populations. Additionally, small sample sizes limits the utility of the statistical and
quantitative findings. Although, larger sample sizes would be ideal, the large effect
sizes I reported would support significance with larger samples.
Beyond methodology, contextual access control has limitations worth discussing.
One limitation of both install and runtime is with having empty context data for
permissions. Providing users with more context of data being shared requires creat-
ing visualizations using that data. It is not clear how to create visualizations based
on data that does not exist. For example, how would you meaningfully visualize a
user’s contacts when they have none? Even if they are able to rationalize a decision
based on a visualization of empty data, they may make a preferred decision because
they are not able to see the sharing impact. At a later time, the user may begin
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to create contacts and engage in sharing based on the decision made with an empty
contact list. As a result, privacy violations may occur. Future research should in-
vestigate alternative solutions such as preventing the authorization of empty data
items or treating such authorizations as only symbolic in nature to see how well they
are received. Another problem that affects runtime contextual access control is the
limitations on the permission binding locations. Not all permissions are used in the
foreground or visual parts of the interface. Thus, additional research is needed to
understand where and how the user can initiate requests for such permissions.
There is also a real problem with increasing annoyance and repetitive interaction.
This problem is not unique to install or contextual runtime configuration interfaces.
It is however, exacerbated by the runtime contextual access control dialogs. Future
research should examine ways to reduce annoyance and repetition of access control
dialogs. The study I presented in Chapter 6 becomes a first step to understanding
tolerances of access control messages and when the user experience is disrupted by
different type notifications. Similarly, we must seek ways to mitigate the desensiti-
zation that occurred because of the repetitiveness. Desensitization was an issue in
each of the studies testing access control. Even at runtime where the amount of
effort to not think about dialogs and allow everything was large, participants still
quickly became desensitized. While it is positive that two of the three desensitized
users subconsciously noticed undesirable sharing, future research is needed to better
understand and address this problem. Future research may even find that these two
participants experiences are just anomalies.
Finally, in examining the repetition problem, user behavior and high attrition rates
192
of participants led to inconclusive findings regarding the acceptability of notifications.
It does appear that there are changes in the time participants will use their phone
for the toast method of notification, although this was not found to be significant.
Rather unexpectedly it also appears that the rate at which sentiment changes is
constant across the groups as frequency increases. Unfortunately, without additional
participants it is not possible to say whether these changes are significant or confirm
the pattern holds for the ticker group. Given the unexpected desire of participants
to complete all 14 days the study design likely needs to be modified in order to
accommodate better understanding the point in time that notifications are no longer
useful.
7.5 Conclusion
In this dissertation, I argued for the need to increase context in access control
decisions. I found that users did not understand the sharing that occurred with third
party applications and that participants voiced social concerns about disclosure. In
order to improve focus on the applications, I increased visibility of the sharing context
at install time and runtime to help the user make better access control decisions. By
providing context of data sharing through concrete representations of user data, I
made decisions more clear and understandable. I also presented quantitative and
qualitative evidence that runtime contextual access control increased memorability
of requested permissions, illustrating a greater level of awareness over install time
configuration methods. As a result, I found that users created more appropriate
policies primarily determined by application functionality.
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Despite the success of contextual access control, I found several concerns that
should be addressed by future research. First, runtime contextual access control
suffers from being repetitive in nature and thus can result in a negative or annoying
impact on user experience. Additionally, contextual runtime access control may be
subject to greater desensitization issues than those encountered on other platforms
and interface types. In the case of runtime contextual access control the unexpected
speed at which I observed users become desensitized is troubling and may hint at
a larger problem with widespread adoption. While subconscious decision making
seemed to take place in two of three desensitized users, it is impossible to say whether
this would happen in other users and that question remains unanswered. It is a large
problem that requires further research.
In each study, I increased the context given to users while making access control
decisions. I argue that the policies configured by users at runtime when given the most
context were the more appropriate because they better matched the user preference.
This was a result of increased awareness provided by context combined with a more
restrictive default policy. However, the increase in awareness came at a cost and some
users felt like they were in less control over their data. This problem may be mitigated
as users begin to feel more empowered with their data and increased control. However,
I also presented evidence that the use of these applications is social in nature and so
users may also continue to engage in sharing when they are uncomfortable because
they desire interaction with both applications and others. In either case, runtime
contextual access control can still be considered an improvement since users make
more informed choices to exchange their data for functionality.
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The scope of the problem I investigated is large and the evidence I presented in
this dissertation deals with just two of the vast number of possible domains. While
increasing context results in better decision making in these domains, it is not certain
what effect, if any, it would have on others. Additionally, the permissions required
for configuration in these studies were quite accessible to users. My dissertation
only addresses a smaller scope of runtime contextual access control in two application
platforms and shows a measure of improvement in sharing awareness with applications
and others through application usage. Although future research may address further
domains and scope, it is my hope that by providing more context to users to gain
greater understanding about sharing decisions, they can begin to better control their
digital lives.
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APPENDIX A: SCRAPBOOKING STUDY TASK SHEET
General Information
You are going to use 3 applications obtained from the facebook app store. I do not
endorse these apps in anyway they are just three that I chose. You will use the photos
in your facebook albums to create a scrapbook in each of the applications. After you
use each application you will answer a few questions about it. Try to remember
features of each application that you liked and disliked. I will use that information
to create a better scrapbooking application for facebook.
AWScrapbook
• Use the application to add 5 or more photos from your albums to the scrapbook.
• View the scrapbook.
• Fill out the associated survey.
Photofire
• Use the application to add 5 or more photos from your albums to the scrapbook.
• Use the application to add at least 2 photos from your friends albums to the
scrapbook.
• Use the application to add at least 1 photo you’re tagged in to the scrapbook.
• Add a caption to one of the images.
• View the scrapbook.
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• Fill out the associated survey.
Tiler
• Use the application to add 5 or more photos from your albums to the scrapbook.
• View the scrapbook.
• Fill out the associated survey.
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APPENDIX B: SCRAPBOOKING STUDY SURVEY
1. Participant ID:
2. Which app are you starting with?
• AWScrapbook
• Photofire
• Tiler
3. What is your age?
4. What is your gender?
• Female
• Male
• Prefer not to say
5. What is your ethnicity? (Please choose the best one that applies)
• American Indian or Alaska Native
• Asian
• Black or African American
• Hispanic
• Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
• White
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• Other: Please Specify:
6. What is your occupation?
7. What is your highest level of education?
• I have not graduated high school
• GED
• High school diploma
• Some college
• Associate Degree
• Bachelor Degree
• Masters Degree
• Doctorate Degree
• Other:
8. Are you a student at UNC Charlotte?
• Yes
• No
9. On a scale from 1-5, how would you rate the following statement: Others look
to me for help when they have computer problems.
• Strongly Disagree
• Somewhat Disagree
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• Neutral
• Somewhat Agree
• Strongly Agree
10. How many Facebook accounts do you have?
• 1
• 2
• 3
• If more than 3, please specify:
11. How long have you been a member of Facebook?
• I do not have a Facebook account
• Less than 6 months
• More than 6 months but less than one year
• Over one year but less than 2 years
• Over 2 years but less than 4 years
• Over 4 years but less than 6 years
• Over 6 years
12. How often do you use Facebook?
• Several times a day
• Once a day
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• Once every few days
• Once a week
• Once a month
• Less than once a month
13. Application 1
• Which of the following best describes your use of the application?
– 1 - Very Hard To Use
– 2
– 3
– 4 - Neutral
– 5
– 6
– 7 - Very Easy To Use
• Which of the following best describes your use of the application?
– 1 - Very Frustrating To Use
– 2
– 3
– 4 - Neutral
– 5
– 6
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– 7 - Very Pleasing To Use
• Which of the following best describes your use of the application?
– 1 - Required To Much Effort
– 2
– 3
– 4 - Neutral
– 5
– 6
– 7 - Required Very Little Effort
• Any reason(s) you wouldn’t want to use this application?
• Would you change anything about this application?
• If you had any difficulty or problems completing this task describe them
here.
14. Application 2
• Which of the following best describes your use of the application?
– 1 - Very Hard To Use
– 2
– 3
– 4 - Neutral
– 5
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– 6
– 7 - Very Easy To Use
• Which of the following best describes your use of the application?
– 1 - Very Frustrating To Use
– 2
– 3
– 4 - Neutral
– 5
– 6
– 7 - Very Pleasing To Use
• Which of the following best describes your use of the application?
– 1 - Required To Much Effort
– 2
– 3
– 4 - Neutral
– 5
– 6
– 7 - Required Very Little Effort
• Any reason(s) you wouldn’t want to use this application?
• Would you change anything about this application?
208
• If you had any difficulty or problems completing this task describe them
here.
15. Application 3
• Which of the following best describes your use of the application?
– 1 - Very Hard To Use
– 2
– 3
– 4 - Neutral
– 5
– 6
– 7 - Very Easy To Use
• Which of the following best describes your use of the application?
– 1 - Very Frustrating To Use
– 2
– 3
– 4 - Neutral
– 5
– 6
– 7 - Very Pleasing To Use
• Which of the following best describes your use of the application?
209
– 1 - Required To Much Effort
– 2
– 3
– 4 - Neutral
– 5
– 6
– 7 - Required Very Little Effort
• Any reason(s) you wouldn’t want to use this application?
• Would you change anything about this application?
• If you had any difficulty or problems completing this task describe them
here.
16. Consumers have lost all control over how personal information is collected and
used by companies.
• Strongly Disagree
• Somewhat Disagree
• Somewhat Agree
• Strongly Agree
17. Most businesses handle the personal information they collect about consumers
in a proper and confidential way.
• Strongly Disagree
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• Somewhat Disagree
• Somewhat Agree
• Strongly Agree
18. Existing laws and organizational practices provide a reasonable level of protec-
tion for consumer privacy today.
• Strongly Disagree
• Somewhat Disagree
• Somewhat Agree
• Strongly Agree
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APPENDIX C: NOTIFICATION STUDY SURVEY FOR CODE
1. What is your email address?
2. What is the phone number of the Android phone you will use for this study?
3. What is your age?
4. What state do you live in?
5. What is your gender?
• Female
• Male
6. What is your ethnicity? (Please choose the best one that applies)
• American Indian or Alaska Native
• Asian
• Black or African American
• Hispanic
• Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
• White
• Other: Please Specify:
7. What is your occupation? i.e. Student, Sales Rep, Nurse, etc...
8. What is your highest level of education?
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• I have not graduated high school
• GED
• High school diploma
• Some college
• Associate Degree
• Bachelor Degree
• Masters Degree
• Doctorate Degree
• Other:
9. How would you rate the following statement: Others look to me for help when
they have computer problems.
• Strongly Disagree
• Somewhat Disagree
• Neutral
• Somewhat Agree
• Strongly Agree
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APPENDIX D: NOTIFICATION STUDY DAILY SURVEY
1. The notifications today were: Not Useful → Very Useful (Slider)
2. The notifications today were: Very Frustrating → Very Satisfying (Slider)
3. Did you notice any strange app usage today?
• No
• Yes
4. Do you have any general thoughts you would like to share?
• No
• Yes
5. Did you notice any notifications at all today?
• No
• Yes
Note: Audio recording buttons were placed with each question.
